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Abstract 
 
The United States (US) has always used its aid program as a strategic lever in foreign 
policy.  In the early days of aid, it was used to prosecute the Cold War.  Now aid 
supports the United States in its effort to win the war on terror.  Aid is used both to 
pursue short-term or “realist” objectives (e.g., to win support for US foreign policy 
goals) and long-term or “nation-building” ones (e.g. to strengthen governance).  The 
trade-offs and tensions between these goals have been examined for the Cold War 
period (e.g., Seitz 2012), but not the post 9/11 one. 
 
This research takes a case-study approach and examines US aid to Pakistan.  It is 
based primarily on interviews with the Pakistani and American elite collected in 
Pakistan between October 2011 and October 2013 and the United States in March 
2012.  
 
The period of research (2011-2013) is one in which the Obama Administration tried 
to pivot its relationship with Pakistan away from a focus on realist objectives 
(principally, the war in Afghanistan) towards nation-building ends, for example, 
through a much larger civilian aid program to improve Pakistan’s governance and the 
economy.  This thesis examines the success of that pivot, and argues it was limited, on 
three main grounds   
 
First, both groups of elite view Pakistan’s challenges are mostly nation-building in 
nature, and particularly related to its economy (and, in the case of the Pakistani elite, 
internal security needs).  But both groups nevertheless perceive that the US still 
primarily wants cooperation on countering terrorism and in Afghanistan.  Second, the 
leverage and goodwill that US aid provides is seen to be undermined by the pursuit of 
its realist objectives.  Third, US aid is seen by many in the elite as targeted at the elite 
not the masses.  
 
Some interesting differences in views between the two groups of elite are observed.  
In general, more importance was attached to nation-building objectives by US 
respondents than by Pakistani respondents.  For example, US respondents were more 
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likely to think that the US was concerned with trying to improve Pakistani governance 
and was trying to influence public opinion in Pakistan, whereas Pakistani respondents 
viewed US aid as much less concerned with governance and more directed to the 
Pakistani elite. 
 
Despite these differences, which are suggestive of at least a genuine US intent to 
engage in nation-building, the findings of the thesis point to a failure by the Obama 
Administration to follow through on its nation-building objectives in Pakistan.  
Nation-building floundered, it is argued, because of ongoing disputes in relation to 
realist goals, especially in relation to the war on Afghanistan.  
 
Several published studies of US-Pakistan relations argue for a further nation-building 
push.  In my interviews, I find considerable support for such a position in the US elite.  
However, I also find little sympathy for it on the Pakistani side.  The Pakistani elite is 
concerned rather to regain equality in their relationship with the US.  They see the 
need to put their own house in order, but have little appetite for US assistance.  This 
calls into question the likely success of any further nation-building push on the part of 
the US in Pakistan. 
 
The academic contribution of this thesis is to establish the relevance of Cold War aid 
analysis for the post-9/11 era.  The findings are consistent with much of the Cold War 
literature, though some nuances are provided to earlier conclusions.  The policy 
contribution is to suggest that in cases such as Pakistan where short-term foreign 
policy goals are of great importance the US should put nation-building on the back-
burner.  
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Chapter One: Introduction and context 
 
 
 
 
“How do you try to help Pakistan keep from becoming a failed state? How do you 
help them maintain internal stability? How do you get them to not support the Taliban 
and other terrorist groups? How do you get them not to proliferate nuclear 
weapons?” 
 
Professor Robert Lieber, Georgetown University. (Interview: 14 March 2012).  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
The multi-volume, 2013 edited collection The Geopolitics of Foreign Aid reminds us 
with its opening words “Foreign aid is an essential element of foreign policy for many 
countries.” (Milner and Tingley 2013c). Certainly the United States (US) has always 
used its aid program as a strategic lever in foreign policy, alongside diplomacy and 
defence.  The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that aid is to be used to promote 
“the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States” (Burnett 1992, 
p. 27).  Little has changed since.  The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) website states that “We partner to end extreme poverty and 
promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.” 
(USAIDa 2015).   
 
In the early days of aid, it was used to prosecute the Cold War.  More recently, aid has 
been a weapon in the war on terror.  Aid has been used to win recipient support for 
foreign policy goals (such as opposition to communism or support for the war on 
terror).  It has also been used to try to buy popularity for the US, to bolster 
development and, more ambitiously, “nation-building” in what are today called 
fragile states.  But what are the trade-offs between all of the different objectives of 
aid?  
 
There is no more interesting or important country to attempt to answer this question 
than Pakistan.  The United States and Pakistan have had a long relationship, within 
which aid has played a crucial role.  Since 9/11, the US has used aid, with varying 
degrees of success, to win Pakistan’s support for the war on terror, to promote 
development and nation-building in Pakistan, and to win “hearts and minds”.   
 
Despite this, there has been little research on US aid to Pakistan, and, in particular, 
little research that has sought to understand both US and Pakistani perspectives on 
aid.  In recent years, the country has been all but shut off to long-stay foreign 
researchers on security grounds.  In this thesis, I used the unique opportunity 
I received to spend more than three years in Pakistan (as a diplomatic spouse) 
between July 2010 and October 2013 to engage intensively with the issue of aid to 
that country.  The years I had in the country were fascinating and turbulent ones; they 
12 
 
included game-changing events like the May 2011 US operation that killed Osama 
bin Laden, and the historic May 2013 national elections.  The insights I was able to 
obtain will, I hope, provide a useful contribution to analysis of aid’s conflicting 
objectives. 
 
Beyond an interest in the objectives of aid, and a fascination with understanding a 
country that is now off-limits to most, two additional motivations guided my work.  
 
First, as already noted, there is little reference in the post-9/11 period to the pre-9/11 
era and in particular to aid during the Cold War.  The Cold War period is a useful 
point of comparison when examining the United States’ foreign aid policy, given that 
during both periods aid was given in return for a promise: whether it was to sway 
countries away from communist ideals and aligning with the Soviet Union; or to help 
the United States win the war on terror.  Yet, also, in both periods aid was given for 
development and/or nation-building reasons.  Seitz (2012) explores these tensions in 
the context of Cold War aid giving, but they have not yet been examined in the 
literature in the context of the war on terror. 
 
Secondly, most of the literature on foreign aid, no matter the topic, is based on donor 
perceptions.  This research seeks to address this gap, highlighted by Riddell (2014), 
through the comprehensive examination of the perspectives of both aid donor and aid 
recipient.   
 
The primary research tool used in this thesis is elite interviews.  While hearing is not 
believing, I am particularly interested in comparisons and contrasts between the views 
of the donor and those of the recipient, and argue that both sets of views illuminate 
the story of aid to Pakistan. 
  
This context-setting chapter begins with some definitions, and a brief overview of the 
history of nation-building within the US aid effort (Section 1.2).  It then provides a 
brief history of Pakistan, of US-Pakistan relations, and of US aid to Pakistan (Sections 
1.3 to 1.5), before concluding (Section 1.6).  The next chapter will examine the 
relevant literature and provide the questions and methods underlying this research.   
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1.2 The United States and nation-building: not just a post 9/11 
phenomenon 
 
1.2.1 Nation-building and realist aid objectives 
 
Since nation-building is a critical concept for this thesis, it is important to define it at 
the outset.  Francis Fukuyama defines it as “constructing political institutions, or else 
promoting economic development” (2006, p.3).  Thomas Seitz has a slightly more 
narrow definition, in terms of “programs designed to strengthen a recipient state’s 
control over its territory, enhance its popular legitimacy and generally improve its 
stability and viability” (2012, p. 1).  Fukuyama points out that Americans are 
criticised for using the terms nation-building and state-building interchangeably, i.e., 
what the Americans refer to as nation-building, Europeans would call this state-
building coupled with economic development.  This thesis follows the American 
conceptualisation of nation-building, that is, as activities encompassing both 
reconstruction and development (2006, p.3). 
 
There is a tendency to define nation-building objectives only in relation to military 
interventions; see for example, Pei, Amin and Garz (in Fukuyama 2006).  It is true 
that many nation-building exercises are preceded if not accompanied by military 
engagements; think of the Balkans, Iraq or Afghanistan.  But an element of military 
intervention should not be regarded as essential to making an aid effort one of nation-
building.  We can think of nation-building exercises after the Second World War 
(Germany and Japan, for example); or in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, not 
only in Vietnam (which was at war) but in, say, Indonesia, which was not.  
 
Fukuyama is clear in his definition that nation-building goes beyond military 
intervention, for example, by talking about Pakistan in the Cold War era as a “prime 
example” of the failure of state building (2006, p.5).  Clearly, he puts America’s 
efforts there under the state or nation-building heading even though there has never 
been a US military intervention in Pakistan.  
 
Rashid also defines nation-building in a broad way, without a necessary link to a 
military intervention. He defines it as “aid and support to civil society to rebuild the 
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shattered economy, provide livelihoods, create social and political structures, and 
introduce democracy” (2008, p. LIII).   
 
Aid can have realist as well as nation-building objectives.  Following Sietz (2012, 
p.141), the realist objective of aid is “its promotion of direct interest, the quid pro quo 
approach that used aid as payment for services rendered, as in maintaining basing or 
transit rights.”  From this perspective, aid is viewed as a way to bind countries to align 
with the US, and to increase the likelihood that they will make foreign policy and 
security decisions consistent with US preferences.  Such objectives for aid were 
initially emphasised by realist scholars such as Morganthau (1963).  However, there is 
no attempt made in this thesis and there is no need to link the realist objectives of aid 
to realism as a school in international relations (on which, see, for example, 
Mearsheimer 2002, and Viotti and Kauppi 2012).  
 
Indeed, different terminology could be used in place of the dichotomy between the 
nation-building and realist objectives of aid, which I choose following Seitz’s work 
on the role of nation-building in US foreign policy.  Banfield (1963) talks of an 
indirect vs. direct dichotomy in relation to aid, and, as can be seen from the paragraph 
above, Sietz draws on this in his definition of the realist objectives of aid. Banfield 
writes that the direct objective of aid is to “directly influence the recipient 
governments and people to act as the interests of the United States requires or, more 
often, to refrain from acting in ways injurious to the United States” (p.24).  Banfield 
says that the indirect objective of aid is to “bring about fundamental changes in the 
outlook and institutions of the recipient society” (p. 4), which is essentially my 
definition of the nation-building objective.  
 
Burnett (1992) uses different terminology again.  He contrasts the “short-term” and 
“long-term” goals of aid.  His short-term (“Cold War” or the containment of the direct 
communist threat) goals are our realist and Banfield’s direct goals.  His long-term 
goals (“economic self-sufficiency, democracy, social reform”) are our nation-building 
and Banfield’s indirect goals.  
 
While all three pairs of terms can be found in the literature, talking about “nation-
building” and “realist” objectives seems more evocative and informative than talking 
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about “indirect” and “direct” or “long-term” and “short-term” objectives.  Another 
possibility would be to talk of “strategic” instead of “realist” objectives.  However, 
since nation-building objectives can also be pursued for strategic reasons I avoid this. 
 
There is an ongoing debate about the relative merit of these various objectives for aid. 
Those opposed to nation-building view it as misguided social engineering that 
“diverts attention and money to small and remote countries of marginal relevance to 
vital American interests” (Menkhaus 2003, p.8).  While those who describe 
themselves as realists are often opposed to nation-building (Walt, 2012), a realist case 
for nation-building can also be made (Miller 2010).  
 
The interest in this thesis is not which objective makes more sense in general, but 
what weight they are given and what the trade-offs are between the two are when they 
are both pursued.  Though there is clearly a tension between them, it has been little 
explored in the literature in the post-Cold War era.  Chapter 2 returns to these issues 
with a literature survey.  
 
1.2.2 The rise and fall and rise of nation-building in US foreign policy 
 
US realist aid objectives are obviously long standing, stretching back through the 
Cold War.  But it is important to recognise that nation-building is also not a new 
objective for the United States’ aid program.  (See Essex 2013 for a recent history of 
USAID.)  An examination of the United States’ nation-building interventions 
demonstrates that the United States’ nation-building efforts span multiple decades and 
countries (Dobbins et al. 2003).  Indeed, the United States is perhaps the world’s 
largest unilateral nation builder.  Of the more than 200 cases of the use of force by the 
United States since 1900, Pei, Amin and Garz (in Fukuyama 2006) find that 17 cases 
(including the occupation of Iraq) may be considered attempts at nation-building.  
They comprise interventions in a diverse group of countries, including Afghanistan, 
Haiti, Japan and Cuba (p. 65).   
 
Why does the United States persist with its policy of nation-building, an approach it 
has taken for more than one hundred years?  Some suggest that it stems from the 
American character: 
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Americans have engaged in nation-building throughout their history, but their 
impulse to do so springs naturally and inevitably from their character and 
experience as a people (Kagan 2011). 
 
But the US also undertakes nation-building for strategic reasons: to contain 
communism and, more recently, to win the war on terror.  As Sietz writes:  
Nation-building was a fundamental, if understated, element of containment 
from the earliest years of the Cold War and indeed, throughout most of the 
twentieth century (2012, p.4).  
 
To prove his point, Seitz provides a comprehensive evaluation of US nation-building 
policy during the first two decades of the Cold War during the Eisenhower, Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations.  He shows that initially the United States addressed the 
threat of communism through security assistance programs in developing countries.  
Over time, however, Eisenhower became convinced that the Soviet threat would come 
economically, as Moscow opened trade and aid relationships with the developing 
world, in a marked departure from the policies of the Stalin era.  Eisenhower adjusted 
US policy accordingly to focus more on development:  
Washington’s perceptions of and response to these Soviet economic initiatives 
are highly significant because they focused US attention on economic 
development assistance as a security measure; such aid gained salience as a 
Cold War weapon.  In response to these Soviet initiatives, the Eisenhower 
Administration launched the first significant program of public-sector 
economic aid to the developing countries… The aid war also triggered a 
sweeping reassessment of the appropriate balance between military and non-
military aid instruments in Washington’s security assistance policy, and it 
redirected the course of US aid policy for the next decade (p. 6). 
  
Kennedy further intensified the United States’ emphasis on nation-building, with a 
greater emphasis on rural development.  Indeed, Seitz sees the Kennedy 
Administration as the high point of interest in nation-building during the Cold War.  
Kennedy was concerned with the threats to Indochina, Indonesia and elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia and centred his approach on overcoming counterinsurgency in these 
areas through developing policies to win the “hearts and minds” of the people.  The 
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Johnson Administration also implemented Kennedy’s initiatives, but increasingly 
resorted to military measures in security assistance, at the expense of economic 
development measures in response to perceived threats (ibid, p.19). 
  
The Nixon Administration marked a shift back to realist objectives.  Seitz (2012) 
writes that, under Nixon:  
Washington’s use of aid in developing countries was to be targeted less 
toward promoting internal stability through development and more towards 
quid pro quo, conditionality and bribes …there was no longer a broader, 
regional effort towards internal defence through political development efforts. 
The USA was stepping back from its broad nation-building project in the 
developing world (p. 139-40). 
 
The focus instead shifted to protecting regimes from being overthrown.  This was 
reflected in Nixon’s Guam Declaration, which stated that the US would: “provide 
recipients with military aid and honour security pacts, but would expect those 
recipients to look after their own internal security” (ibid, p.139).  The Nixon Doctrine, 
as it came to be known, reflected an approach that involved “transferring the 
responsibility and necessary hardware for maintaining security to the local regime,” 
which signaled Nixon’s view “that the USA’s role in shaping recipients’ domestic 
politics should be limited” (ibid, p. 142). 
 
The United States’ interest in unilateral nation-building receded further when the 
threat of communism was removed following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
However, while the US did not engage in nation-building on its own, it did begin to 
display greater willingness to work multilaterally to intervene in humanitarian 
disasters and to rebuild failed states, for example, in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans.  
 
Nation-building got a new lease on life following the terrorist attacks in the 
United States on September 11, 2001.  Pre-9/11, George W. Bush’s Administration 
was anti-nation-building.  Bush ran for President on a platform that specifically 
disavowed nation-building.  Yet, the policy became central to the Bush 
Administration’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Mockaitis (2003) commented 
soon after 9/11: “A president who campaigned on a promise not to engage in nation-
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building finds himself stuck with a belly full of it and faces more in the future” (p. 
33). 
 
Kuperman (in Greenblat 2011) reinforces this point: “If you’d have asked 
Dick Cheney on September 10, 2001, if he supported nation-building, he would have 
said are you on crack? But all of a sudden, he became a big nation-builder”.  This 
change of heart is reflected in President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Security 
Statement, which declared that the US would not only defeat global terrorism, but 
ignite a new era of economic growth and expand development by opening societies 
and building democracy: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than 
we are by failing ones.”   
 
In dealing with the Bush Administration’s unpopular operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Dodge 2006; Brownlee 2007), the Obama Administration was careful 
not to engage in nation-building rhetoric publicly.   And indeed, it is difficult to find 
any explicit references at all to nation-building by President Obama.  Yet this change 
was one of packaging, rather than policy.  As Tellis (2009, p.1) writes “The Obama 
Administration, while implicitly acknowledging the need for nation-building, has 
avoided making this a publicly announced policy.”  As we will see later in this 
Chapter (Section 1.5), under President Obama US policy in Pakistan in fact became 
more concerned with nation-building not less. 
 
It is clear that in the post-World War II era official interest in nation-building has 
waxed and waned.  US nation-building efforts and associated rhetoric reached a peak 
under Kennedy, and fell away with Nixon with the end of the Cold War and the 
reprioritisation of foreign policy goals towards realist ends.  However, with US 
engagement in the Balkans and in Africa in the 1990s, the US interest in nation-
building never fully went away.  Interest rose again in the 2000s, in response to the 
scourge of terrorism.   
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1.3 Pakistan’s history and development: an overview  
 
Pakistan has battled instability throughout its history.  Successive bouts of 
authoritarian rule, regional and ethnic divisions, economic volatility and chronic 
insecurity have created an unsteady melting pot of social, economic and political 
challenges.   
 
Almost from the outset, Pakistan failed as a democratic state.  The country became 
independent in 1947, but was unable to ratify a constitution until 1956.  The army 
seized control of the government in a 1958 coup, and since then Pakistan has swung 
between periods of dictatorship and democracy.  Three military coups have taken 
place in all, in 1958, 1977 and 1999.  All have led to lengthy periods of authoritarian 
rule.  Since independence, Pakistan has been ruled by the military for almost half of 
its history.  Pakistan returned to civilian rule most recently in 2008, three years prior 
to the commencement of my fieldwork research in Pakistan.  In 2013, it had the first 
peaceful transition via federal elections from one civilian government to another.  
While at the time of writing Pakistan remains a democracy, the army is very 
powerful, particularly in the areas of defence and foreign policy, and it would be 
foolish to underestimate the possibility of another coup.  Illustrative of the military’s 
enduring strength in Pakistan, during a state visit to Washington DC in October 2015, 
Presidents Sharif and Obama continued to differ on all areas that divide them: 
Afghanistan, India and nuclear security in South Asia.  However, many commentators 
noted: “since all these issues concern security, the Americans will, hopefully, have 
more substantive talks when Army chief Raheel Sharif visits next month…The 
general perception in Washington is that Pakistan’s civilian government does not have 
much say in security matters” (Iqbal 2015). 
 
Pakistan’s founders had to govern not only a new state, but a state that combined two 
masses of territory 1,000 kilometres apart and separated by India.  In his analysis of 
the modern state of Pakistan, Owen Bennett-Jones (2009) highlights the key 
challenges the government faced in uniting Pakistan during its formative years.  East 
Pakistan was more populous (42 million, according to a 1951 census, compared to 
34 million in the west) and more homogenous than West Pakistan. “[B]oth Hindus 
and Muslims spoke Bangla, and only 1 per cent spoke Urdu [in East Pakistan].  West 
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Pakistan by contrast, was an ethnic cocktail and brought together Punjabis, Sindhis, 
Pukhtoons and the Baloch, as well as the newly arrived Urdu speakers” (p. 145).   
 
The perception in Dhaka of West Pakistan’s dominance in political, social and 
economic life resulted in numerous violent protests.  In the 1970 election, the 
East Pakistani Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan, thereby 
winning a majority of seats in the central government’s 313-seat parliament, and the 
right to form government.  However, the leader of the biggest political party in 
West Pakistan, the Pakistan Peoples Party, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused 
to yield his leadership of the parliament to the Awami League, even though it had 
more seats.  President Yahya Khan called in the military, dominated by West 
Pakistanis, to suppress the uprising in East Pakistan.  In 1971, India intervened after 
deciding that an independent Bangladesh would be in its interests.  The liberation of 
Bangladesh occurred on 16 December 1971.  
 
Pakistan’s perception of India influences most aspects of national life.  Enmity with 
India shapes the national narrative of politics, the economy and the military.  At the 
heart of the enduring tension between India and Pakistan lies the struggle for 
Kashmir.  Three wars have been fought in and over Kashmir (1948, 1965 and 1999) 
and ongoing skirmishes between the two militaries have the potential of escalating.   
 
Pakistan’s ongoing tensions with India are seared into the national consciousness and 
are used to justify defence budgets (which are large relative to Pakistan’s GDP) and 
foreign policy decisions.  Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously said in 1965: 
“If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves; even go hungry, but we will get 
one of our own” (Khan 2013, p.7).  In the years following independence, Pakistan 
sought to build up its armed forces in order to defend the nation against India.  
According to Talbot (2009), between 1947 and 1950, up to 70 per cent of the national 
budget was allocated for defence.  This could only be done through: “diverting 
resources from ‘nation-building’ activities and expanding the state’s administrative 
machinery to ensure the centre’s control over the provinces’ finances.  The long-term 
repercussions were a strengthening of the unelected institutions of the state – the 
bureaucracy and the Army – at the expense of political accountability” (Talbot 2009, 
p. 119).  In part because of their rivalry, both India and Pakistan have developed 
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nuclear capability, something they both demonstrated in the late 1990s and which 
only temporarily made both countries international pariahs, but which has certainly 
increased tensions between the two.  India was always too big to fail.  Pakistan, by 
virtue of its nuclear capability, has perhaps also joined that club.  
 
In the decades immediately following independence, Pakistan grew faster than India, 
but growth slowed over time.  Average annual real per capita GDP growth rates in 
Pakistan were 4.5 per cent in the 1960s, 1.6 per cent in the 1970s, 2.9 per cent in the 
1980s, 1.3 per cent in the 1990s, and 2.3 per cent from 2001 to 2014 (World Bank 
2015).  In the 1960s, Pakistan was seen as a model of economic development around 
the world, and as a country that was set for “take-off” (Looney 2004, p.774).  
Comparisons were made between “free-market” Pakistan and “socialist” India, in the 
former’s favour.  Yet, over time, growth accelerated in India, but slowed in Pakistan, 
due to political instability and economic mismanagement in the latter among other 
reasons.  
 
Pakistan’s social development has also fared poorly.  India has caught up to Pakistan 
in terms of life expectancy, which is now about 66 years in both countries, though in 
the mid-1970s, it was 56 in Pakistan and 52 in India (World Bank 2015).  Infant 
mortality was higher in Bangladesh at the time of independence (145 per 1,000 versus 
130 in 1975) but infant mortality is now half the level in Bangladesh that it is in 
Pakistan (33 versus 69) (World Bank 2015).  This may be explained by the greater 
prevalence of feudalism in Pakistan, and thus the greater concentration of wealth and 
power in the hands of a few, and also the country’s large military budget.  Both 
factors have deprived the social sectors of funding and attention.  
 
Undeniably, one of the greatest changes in Pakistan since independence has been the 
influence of Islam.  A battle for power between the military and civilians played out 
in the decades following Pakistan’s independence, with both groups working to 
establish themselves as legitimate rulers.  While it is often thought that General 
Zia ul Haq Islamised Pakistan, it was in fact Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who began the 
process.  He saw an opportunity to embrace Islamic socialism off the back of two 
failed secular military leadership periods and introduced several policies to appeal to 
Islamic conservatives, like banning alcohol, declaring Friday a non-work day and 
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Islamising the military.  General Zia’s rule built on Bhutto’s Islamisation, making 
Islamic ideology a pillar of state and saw the military as “indispensible for the 
maintenance of Pakistan as an ideological state” (Talbot 2009, p. 255).  This created 
the environment for radical Islamists to prosper, and even gain legitimacy, as 
Islamists were used to pursue foreign policy objectives, particularly in relation to 
Kashmir and Afghanistan.  
 
Afghanistan has always been viewed as critical by the Pakistani elite, in particular to 
bolster its position vis-à-vis India.  Afghanistan is often referred to as Pakistan’s 
“strategic depth”.  Gall (2014) explains: 
Pakistan had fostered Afghan protégés in order to have a friendly ally in 
power in Kabul that would protect its western flank.  Pakistan was a young 
nation and paranoically insecure about defending its territory… Rulers in 
Islamabad were constantly concerned that regional rivals, whether India, Iran 
or Russia, would use Afghanistan as a springboard to attack Pakistan.  
Pakistan’s generals wanted Afghanistan firmly in their own camp to provide 
“strategic depth”.  Some even advocated annexing Afghanistan as Pakistan’s 
fifth province… The [Pakistani] Taliban, a primarily Pashtun band of radical 
mullahs, fitted the bill and by 1995, became Pakistan’s new instrument of 
policy in Afghanistan (p.46-47). 
 
It was not until the decade after 9/11 that Pakistan became a victim as well as a 
promoter and exporter of extremist ideology.  According to the South Asia Terrorism 
Portal, in 2000 there were six major incidences of terrorist violence in Pakistan.  In 
2011, there were 28 major incidences of terrorist violence in October alone (SATP 
2014) (see also Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3).  The marked increase in terrorist violence 
can be attributed in part to the war in Afghanistan.  The porous border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan facilitated the two-way flow of militants: those seeking safe 
haven in Pakistan and those joining jihad against the American- led forces in 
Afghanistan.  The tribal areas of Pakistan became a heartland for the Pakistani 
Taliban, who allegedly received support from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in 
order to carry out attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.  
Blowback on Pakistan started occurring as the Pakistani military, under pressure from 
the US, began cracking down on safe havens.  American drone strikes became a 
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terrorist recruitment tool, with extremists using civilian casualties as a call to jihad 
against the Pakistani government and the West.  Many terrorist attacks, particularly in 
the latter half of the 2000s, have been against the Pakistani military and intelligence 
services, including a large-scale attack against a naval base in Karachi in 2011.  A 
number of attacks have also targeted Western interests, like the 2008 Marriott hotel 
bombing in Islamabad.  It took some time for Pakistan to respond to the growing 
threat of domestic terrorism, but it started to in July 2009 with the military moving 
against the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan in Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to 
Salvation). 
 
1.4 US-Pakistan relations 
 
The United States and Pakistan have had an unsteady and, more often than not, 
difficult relationship.  Kux (2001) writes that since Pakistan gained independence in 
1947 its relationship with the United States has “careened between intimate 
partnership and enormous friction – reflecting the ups and downs of global and 
regional geopolitics and disparate national interest” (p. xi). 
 
The rollercoaster relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been 
strongly influenced by the geopolitical environment (Wright 2011).  The two became 
allies in 1954.  After India chose a neutralist path, Pakistan became an attractive 
partner to the United States in its quest to contain Soviet expansionism in the 
Middle East.  In May 1954, Pakistan and the United States signed a mutual defence 
assistance treaty, the first bilateral security pact between the two countries.  In the 
mid-1950s, Pakistan leaned on the United States for greater assistance given their 
close relationship.  Although US economic and military assistance was slow to arrive, 
by 1957 Pakistan was receiving significant amounts of military equipment and 
training and substantial economic aid (Kux 2001, p. 84).  The Eisenhower 
Administration succeeded in achieving closer ties with Pakistan, in part due to this 
provision of substantial aid.  However, this unraveled in the years to follow.  
 
Relations between the two countries first fractured during the Kennedy and Johnson 
presidencies.  The US sided (diplomatically) with India during the Sino-Indian border 
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war of 1962, and Pakistan, an enemy of India and a friend of China, was sidelined.  
Pakistan was deeply against the US provision of military aid to India.  In a letter to 
President Johnson, Pakistan’s military president, General Ayub Khan, argued: “Aid 
[to India] imperils the security of Pakistan, your ally…  [T]his is no way of 
preventing the inroads of communism into the subcontinent – if this is the United 
States’ objective.  On the contrary, it would facilitate them” (Haqqani 2013, p. 108).  
In 1965, the Indo-Pakistan war broke out and Johnson largely “gave up on Pakistan”.  
The United States’ inability to pressure Pakistan and India not to go to war (in 
Kashmir in 1965) coincided with the peak of the Vietnam War.  Its preoccupation in 
Vietnam saw the US lose interest in the subcontinent.  Kux argues that by the time 
Johnson left office, the alliance was over in all but name.  Washington continued to 
provide substantial economic assistance, but because of its diminished interest in the 
subcontinent, it severely curtailed military aid (2001, p. 176).  
 
The United States’ rapprochement with China opened the door for a closer 
relationship with Pakistan, but had little real impact.  Nixon’s remarks to military 
President, General Yahya Khan, in October 1970 highlight the improvement in the 
rhetoric around the relationship between the two countries: “Nobody has occupied the 
White House who is friendlier to Pakistan than me” (p. 214).  Nonetheless, Nixon 
continued the previous Administration’s policy on foreign assistance: the 
United States remained Pakistan’s largest source of economic aid, but provided no 
security assistance.  During this period, the United States’ key focus in Asia was 
“disentangling itself from Vietnam without appearing to lose the war” (ibid, p. 214). 
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a turning point in the US-
Pakistan relationship.  Suddenly, the US needed Pakistan.  In a January 1980 speech 
on Afghanistan, President Carter said, “We will provide military equipment, food and 
other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against 
the seriously increased threat from the north” (in Kux 2001 p. 247).  Pakistan’s 
President, General Zia ul Haq, who took power in a 1977 military coup, rejected the 
United States’ initial assistance offer of US$400 million in aid as “peanuts”, and said 
“Pakistan will not buy its security for $400 million… [T]his will buy greater 
animosity from the Soviet Union which is now more influential in this region than the 
United States” (Borders 1980).  Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, upped the aid 
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package to around US$3 billion “to give Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its 
security and provide us reciprocal benefits in terms of our regional interests” 
(Haqqani 2010, p.188).  Kux (2001) describes this as “Washington trading military 
and economic aid for Pakistan’s cooperation in opposing the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan” and notes that negotiations were protracted and difficult, but landed on a 
US$3.2 billion multi-year commitment equally divided between economic and 
military assistance (p.257-58).  Separately, the Reagan Administration also provided 
US$3 billion dollars to Afghan jihadis.  Wright (2011) points out: “These funds [to 
the Afghan jihadis] went through the sticky hands of the Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) directorate, the spy branch of the Pakistani Army… the ISI became so glutted 
with power and money that it formed a ‘state within a state’”. 
 
In February 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, and by November 1989 
the Berlin Wall had fallen.  Meanwhile, there was growing concern about Pakistan’s 
development of a nuclear weapon.  The Pressler Amendment, passed in 1985, banned 
US economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the US President certified on 
an annual basis that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device.  In 1990, once Pakistan 
was no longer needed in relation to Afghanistan, the Bush Administration cut off 
military aid on the grounds that Pakistan had begun to pursue a nuclear weapons 
program.  US$563 million in economic and military assistance allocated for 1991 was 
frozen (Kux 2001, p. 308).  Aid fell further in 1998 following Pakistan’s testing of a 
nuclear weapon.  Pakistan was judged to have become not only a nuclear power but 
also a source of regional instability.  Under the Clinton Administration, relations 
remained cool given Pakistan’s refusal to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.  
Though President Clinton visited Pakistan during his presidency, his visit was short – 
only five hours.  Many Pakistanis were bitter that Clinton spent five days in India 
during this visit to South Asia.  Even today, this is a sore point – with some of the 
Pakistani elite raising Clinton’s short visit to Pakistan and long visit to India in 
interviews for this research.   
 
9/11 was even more of a game-changer for US-Pakistan relations than the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan had been.  Pakistan-US relations transformed, almost 
overnight.  President Pervez Musharraf recounts, in his 2008 memoir In the Line of 
Fire, his engagement with the United States in the aftermath of 9/11.  In his “candid” 
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phone call with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Musharraf was told: “You are either 
with us or against us”.  Musharraf also relates a discussion with his ISI Director 
General, who was in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks:  
He told me over the phone about his meeting with the US Deputy Secretary of 
State, Richard Armitage.  In what has to be the most undiplomatic statement 
ever made, Armitage added to what Colin Powell had said to me and told the 
Director General not only that we had to decide whether we were with 
America or with the terrorists, that if we chose the terrorists, then we should 
be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.  This was a shockingly 
barefaced threat, but it was obvious that the United States had decided to hit 
back, and hit back hard (p. 201). 
 
In what was a difficult strategic decision, Pakistan chose to side with the 
United States.  Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani, 
(2013) provides an overview of the considerable debate within the Pakistani military 
about the extent to which Pakistan should support the US.  Haqqani outlines 
Musharraf’s key reasons for working with the Americans: “He alluded to the US 
threat and suggested that India would benefit if Pakistan did not cooperate with the 
Americans and also implied that he would make a sacrifice on the Afghan front to 
ensure the Kashmir front could remain alive” (p. 311).   
 
However, while Pakistan moved to side with the United States, it was a decision 
made, and implemented, reluctantly.  Haqqani (2013) recounts that the Inter-Services 
Intelligence agency was not willing to give up on its “decades-long investment in 
Afghanistan” whatever Musharraf had agreed to.  Moreover, while the US wanted to 
move against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and had sided with the Taliban’s opponents, 
the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, Pakistan believed that America’s strategic 
objectives would “best be accomplished by coercing the Taliban to do it [go after al 
Qaeda] themselves.  If the Taliban are eliminated [Pakistan believed], Afghanistan 
will revert to warlordism” (Haqqani 2013, p. 312).  Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, Pakistan was not prepared to abandon the Taliban, its traditional ally, in 
Afghanistan.  Pakistan worried that without the Taliban, Afghanistan would fall under 
Indian influence.  Accordingly, Pakistan continued to pursue its policy of “strategic 
depth” in Afghanistan.  Thus Pakistan began a game of mixed support for US 
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objectives in Afghanistan, something the US came to find very frustrating.  For 
example, Haqqani (2013) explains that not long after 9/11: “Musharraf replaced 
Lieutenant General Mamud Ahmed [ISI chief at the time of the 9/11 attacks] with 
Lieutenant General Ehsan-ul-Haq so as to convince Americans that the ISI would not 
impede their operations in Afghanistan.” (p. 312).  Yet, Haqqani continues, “As the 
United States commenced bombing Afghanistan, hundreds of Pakistani military 
advisers and ISI operatives assisting the Taliban were evacuated.” (ibid). 
 
While Bush increasingly embraced nation-building in relation to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Rashid (2008) argues that this change of heart never really applied to the 
United States’ engagement with Pakistan, despite the significant uptick in foreign aid.  
 
As noted earlier, when he came to power President Obama was reluctant to use 
nation-building rhetoric.  This was for political reasons, particularly given waning 
public support for the war in Afghanistan and the mounting cost of US aid being 
provided to rebuild it.  However, it would be a mistake to read into this deliberate 
choice of language a lack of enthusiasm for nation-building as an activity.  
 
To the contrary, Obama sought to rebalance the relationship with Pakistan away from 
one focussed on security to one that included a greater focus on the economy, trade 
and enhancing people-to-people links.  In 2009, Obama started increasing economic 
aid and also appointed a Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke1, a strong supporter of nation-building (Nasr 2013, 
p.79) to broker smoother trilateral relations.  Holbrooke’s appointment kicked off a 
raft of other countries following suit in appointing a Special Representative, including 
the European Union, Japan and Australia.  Like Obama, Holbrooke also saw the 
benefit in normalising relations with Pakistan through greater economic engagement.   
 
Obama also made several statements that make clear his commitment to nation-
building even without using the term.  In his 2009 speech on Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Obama stated that: 
                                                 
1 Holbrooke was Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan up until his sudden death in 
December 2010. 
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To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship 
with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and 
the Pakistani people.  And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a 
commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity.  A 
campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. 
Al Qaeda offers the people of Pakistan nothing but destruction. We stand for 
something different. So today, I am calling upon Congress to pass a bipartisan 
bill co-sponsored by John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorises $1.5 billion 
in direct support to the Pakistani people every year over the next five years - 
resources that will build schools and roads and hospitals, and strengthen 
Pakistan’s democracy. 
 
President Obama was also cognisant of the risk of Afghanistan or Pakistan becoming 
a failed state.  In the same speech quoted above, Obama talked about the importance 
of capacity building and bolstering Pakistan’s democracy – key tenets of any nation-
building policy:  
We are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation 
of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen 
Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries ... [and 
provide] substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and 
development.  We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis 
displaced by the fighting ... [T]he Pakistani people must know America will 
remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the 
guns have fallen silent. 
 
At the same time, there were still clear realist objectives. This is from Obama’s same 
speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan: 
The American people must understand that this is a down payment on our own 
future - because the security of America and Pakistan is shared.  Pakistan's 
government must be a stronger partner in destroying these safe havens, and we 
must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people.  And these steps in Pakistan 
are also indispensable to our efforts in Afghanistan, which will see no end to 
violence if insurgents move freely back and forth across the border” (Obama 
2009).  
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Other senior officials have also articulated the mix of objectives the US had in 
relation to Pakistan.  In her memoir covering her time as Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton expresses clearly the mix of nation-building and realist objectives the 
US pursued in Pakistan over this period, as well as the difficulties faced: 
As their country’s problems worsened, many Pakistanis directed their anger at 
the United States, fueled by a rambunctious media that trafficked in wild 
conspiracy theories.  They blamed us for stirring up trouble with the Taliban, 
exploiting Pakistan for our own strategic ends, and showing favoritism toward 
their traditional rival, India.   And those were the most rational claims.  In 
some polls, approval of America fell below 10 per cent, despite the billions of 
dollars in aid that we had contributed over the years.  In fact, a massive new 
assistance package passed by Congress [the KLB aid package, discussed in the 
next section] became a lightning rod for criticism in Pakistan because it was 
seen as having too many strings attached.  It was maddening.  All the public 
anger made it harder for the Pakistani government to cooperate with us in 
counter-terrorism operations and easier for the extremists to find shelter and 
recruits.  I saw my job as pushing Pakistan to be more committed and 
cooperative in the fight against terrorists and helping its government to 
strengthen democracy and deliver economic and social reforms that offered 
citizens a viable alternative to radicalism.  I had to pressure and criticise 
without losing Pakistan’s help in the struggle that was critical to both of our 
futures (2014, p. 186-187). 
 
Overall, it is clear that the United States, especially under the Obama Administration - 
that is, during the period of research - both wanted Pakistani cooperation in relation to 
Afghanistan and to countering global terrorism (realist objectives) and wanted to 
strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy (nation-building objectives).  How the 
US government in practice balanced these two goals is a key focus of this research.  
 
In the decade post-9/11, the US-Pakistan relationship had its tensions and ups and 
downs, but remained relatively stable.  However, in 2011, a large increase in aid in 
preceding years notwithstanding (see the next sub-section for details), relations 
ruptured between the two sides as a result of a number of events, including the US 
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raid that killed Osama bin Laden and the NATO airstrike that accidently killed 24 
Pakistani soldiers.  In retaliation for the latter, Pakistan closed NATO supply routes 
for months.  In response, the US withheld aid until the supply lines were eventually 
reopened.  Parallel Gallup polls in the United States and Pakistan following the 
operation that killed bin Laden demonstrated a wide gap in public opinion between 
the US and Pakistan on the operation.  Two-thirds of Pakistanis condemned the 
United States’ military action, while in the United States there was near universal 
approval (Ray and Srinivasan 2011).   
 
More broadly, public attitudes towards the United States in Pakistan are very 
negative.  In 2012, around three-in-four Pakistanis (74 per cent) considered the US an 
enemy, up from 69 per cent in 2011 and 64 per cent in 2009.  President Obama is also 
held in low regard by the Pakistani public.  Among the 15 nations surveyed in both 
2008 and 2012 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pakistan is the only country 
where ratings for Obama are no better than the ratings President George W. Bush 
received during his final year in office (Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2012). 
 
In 2014, as the US commenced its military drawdown in Afghanistan, US-Pakistan 
relations improved slightly.  Washington ratcheted down the public aspects of its 
engagement with Pakistan, like high-level visits, as other issues in the Middle East 
drew political attention away from Pakistan.  
 
It is difficult to predict if the rollercoaster of US-Pakistan relations will continue, but 
history suggests that it will. 
 
1.5 United States aid to Pakistan 
 
Pakistan has been one of the United States’ largest recipients of US military and 
civilian aid since 1947, receiving over US$71 billion (in constant 2009 US dollars) in 
total economic aid, total military aid and coalition support funds over this period, 
peaking at US$5.61 billion in 2010.2  As the previous section made clear, the US-
Pakistan aid relationship has always been strongly influenced by the state of the 
                                                 
2 Computed using Centre for Global Development Data, 2011. 
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overall bilateral relationship.  Figure 1.1 illustrates the fluctuating nature of US aid to 
Pakistan between 1951 and 2011. 
 
Figure 1.1: History of US aid to Pakistan, millions US$ (in constant 2011 
dollars) 
 
Sources: Centre for Global Development (2012) for data up to 2010.  Security Assistance Monitor for 
data post 2010.  Data pre and post 2010 is broadly rather than exactly comparable. CPI data from 
World Bank (2015) is used to deflate the post-2010 data. (The CGD data is deflated.) 
  
This graph shows three large spikes in aid.  In the first, Pakistan became America’s 
Cold War ally, and was rewarded accordingly.  The US was keen to show that 
capitalism can work in Asia, and was attracted to Pakistan especially given India’s 
neutrality and its heavy emphasis on socialism.  This period came to an end following 
the Indo-Pakistani War in 1965.  The United States began to lose interest in the 
subcontinent as pressure to exit Vietnam mounted.   
 
The second spike shows the US response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with 
aid petering out when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.  
 
The third and largest spike of all shows the US response to 9/11, when Pakistan sided 
with the United States in the war on terror.  Post 9/11, economic aid increased almost 
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immediately.  Schaffer and Schaffer (2011) report economic aid rose overnight as the 
United States provided US$500 million from a 9/11 supplemental appropriation to the 
Pakistan Treasury for balance of payments support (p. 140).  Total aid (economic and 
military) to Pakistan from the US increased almost tenfold from US$228 million in 
2001 to US$2,677 million in 2002 (Figure 1.1; measured in 2009 prices). 
 
Initially, as Figure 1.1 shows, the emphasis was mainly on military aid.  Under Bush, 
between 2002 and 2008, the US gave Pakistan US$13.7 billion in total aid (in 2009 
prices).  70 per cent of this was military aid.  Over the next five years, under Obama, 
the US gave Pakistan US$14.2 billion, but the proportion of military aid fell to 
57 per cent.  Military aid in fact fell slightly over the two periods from US$9.5 billion 
to US$8.2 billion, but civilian aid increased by 50 per cent from US$4.2 billion to 
US$6.1 billion. 
 
Of the military aid about 40 per cent in the post 9/11 period was provided as Coalition 
Support Funds (CSF), a type of budgetary support.  The CSF was a Bush 
Administration initiative intended as reimbursement for costs incurred in the war on 
terror (Figure 1.2).  Epstein and Kronstadt (2013) report that according to the US 
Department of Defence the CSF reimbursements have been used by the Pakistan 
military to support Pakistani military operations, including keeping more than 
100,000 Pakistani troops in northwest Pakistan, by paying for their food, ammunition, 
clothing and housing.  About US$11.8 billion has been provided to Pakistan as CSF 
since 2002 and another US$16.1 billion as other military assistance (including 
training and hardware).  Putting these figures into perspective, this security assistance 
equates to between one-fifth and one-quarter of Pakistan’s total military expenditure 
during this period (p.17).   
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Figure 1.2 Total US military aid to Pakistan (1999-2010) – constant USD 
millions (2009 prices) 
 
Sources: Centre for Global Development (2012) for data up to 2010.  Security Assistance Monitor for 
data post 2010.  Data pre and post 2010 is broadly rather than exactly comparable. CPI data from 
World Bank (2015) is used to deflate the post-2010 data. (The CGD data is deflated.) 
 
In addition to military aid, the United States also provides other security-related 
programs aimed at improving Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts.  For example, the 
United States has built roads in the terrorism-affected regions of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  Training 
programs have focused on counterterrorism and enhancing the professionalism of 
Pakistan’s military.  Between 2001 and 2013 over 2000 Pakistani military officers 
undertook US-funded training (ibid, p. 22). 
 
Economic aid increased after the US Congress passed and the President signed the 
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act in 2009.  The Act was sponsored by Senators 
John Kerry (Democrat) and Richard Lugar (Republican) and Congressman 
Howard Berman (Democrat) (hence the reference to it as the Kerry Lugar Berman 
(KLB) Bill) and was passed with strong bipartisan support.  It provided for 
US$1.5 billion annually for five years from 2010 to 2015 for civilian aid, with 
provision for a second five year funding period.  Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, 
described the KLB aid package as a demonstration of American “goodwill towards 
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the people of Pakistan” (Clinton, in Landler, 2009).  Two of the authors of the bill 
speak clearly about its nation-building intent, with their aim being to establish a 
“foundation for strengthened partnership between the United States and Pakistan, 
based on a shared commitment to improving the living standards of the people of 
Pakistan through strengthening democracy and the rule of law, sustainable economic 
development, and combating terrorism and extremism” (Kerry and Lugar in Markey 
2015, p. 222).  These assessments are borne out by the five objectives for assistance 
given in the Act: “(1) to support the consolidation of democratic institutions, (2) to 
support the expansion of the rule of law… (3) to promote economic freedoms and 
sustainable economic development, (4) to support investment in people…, and (5) to 
strengthen public diplomacy” (see Section 101 (a) of the Enhanced Partnership with 
Pakistan Act). 
 
While the civilian aid might have been intended to improve goodwill, the Act also lay 
down a number of conditions for non-civilian assistance.  This rankled Pakistan and 
left many in Pakistan against the aid package before even one dollar had been 
delivered (The Nation 2009).  Moreover, even though KLB did not place conditions 
in annual appropriation bills, getting the bills through Congress often saw conditions 
tacked on (Bennett-Jones 2011).  In 2012, for example, economic assistance and most 
forms of military assistance to Pakistan required certification from the Obama 
Administration that Pakistan was cooperating on: 
Nuclear non-proliferation; investigations into Osama bin Laden’s presence in 
Pakistan; efforts to counter the proliferation of improvised explosive devices; 
the provision of visas for US visitors ‘engaged in counterterrorism efforts and 
training’; and in operations against al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani 
network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, among other groups (Cookman and French 
2011, p. 8-9). 
  
Moreover, even with strong authorising language, it was up to the administration to 
request the funds and up to the Congressional appropriations committees to approve 
those requests.  According to Epstein and Kronstadt (2013), in only one of the first 
four years of KLB’s five-year authorisation period (2009 to 2013) did the final 
appropriation for US economic-related aid to Pakistan meet or exceed the average 
envisaged annual authorisation of $1.5 billion.  Overall, civilian aid did significantly 
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increase following KLB, reaching almost US$2 billion in 2010.  However, this was 
not sustained, and civilian aid had been reduced to under $US1 billion by 2013 
(Figure 1.1).  Getting money out the door was partly a US systems problem, but also 
partly due to the capacity of the Pakistani Government to absorb the large amounts of 
aid coming from both bilateral and multilateral donors.  
 
The United States is by far the largest bilateral donor to Pakistan.  Figure 1.3 below 
shows the breakdown of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Pakistan, in 
2010.  In 2010, the United States provided over half of all bilateral aid to Pakistan 
(56.3 per cent).  The other major bilateral donors to Pakistan in 2010 were Japan (11.7 
per cent), Germany (5.5 per cent), United Kingdom (4.5 per cent), Australia (3.1 per 
cent) and the United Arab Emirates (1.7 per cent). 
 
Figure 1.3: Official Development Assistance to Pakistan – by Donor  
2010 – current USD millions 
  
Source: Compiled using Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development data.  
 
China is also a significant aid donor to Pakistan.  It is difficult to calculate the size of 
the Chinese aid program in Pakistan given the lack of available data.  However, recent 
announcements give some insight into the size and reach of Chinese aid and 
investment.  For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad in April 
2015, he announced US$46 billion in infrastructure aid with most projects in the 
energy and transport sector.  The package will focus on the proposed China-Pakistan 
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economic corridor, which stretches 3000km from Kashgar in Western China to 
Gwadar, a Pakistani port city near its border with Iran.  
 
Epstein and Kronstadt (2013) report that of the $US5.1 billion in total economic aid 
committed to Pakistan in 2010, 24 per cent was from multilateral donors and 
76 per cent was from bilateral donors.  The International Financial Institutions have 
large programs in Pakistan.  In 2010, US$430 million was provided by the 
World Bank’s International Development Association, US$270 million from 
European Union Institutions and US$290 million from the Asian Development Fund 
(Epstein and Kronstadt 2013). 
 
Pakistan also has a long-standing relationship with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and has been party to 21 IMF agreements since 1958, with the last agreement 
in 2008 expiring in 2011 (IMF 2015).  This is a significant number of agreements 
compared to other countries in the region.  For example, since 1998 India has signed 
one facility with the IMF and Bangladesh has signed three.  Pakistan, by contrast, has 
signed 12 agreements, more than all of the countries in the region combined (Husain 
2015).  As discussed in Chapter 5, these IMF programs have had a disappointing 
record.  
 
Data on military assistance to Pakistan in the post-9/11 era from countries other than 
the US are not publically available.  In addition to the United States, China, Russia 
and Saudi Arabia also have substantial military assistance programs to Pakistan.   
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This context-setting chapter has introduced the dual nation-building and realist aid 
objectives, with special reference to US aid.  It also provided a brief history of 
Pakistan, of US-Pakistan relations and of US aid to Pakistan.  How the multiple goals 
of US aid – the many questions that Professor Robert Lieber of Georgetown 
University asks in the quote which opens this chapter and which aid is called on to 
answer – played out in the complex Pakistani environment and within the volatile US-
Pakistan relationship is the central interest of this thesis. The next chapter provides an 
overall literature review of areas relevant to this research, and highlights the gaps in 
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that literature, which this thesis aims to fill.  It also provides the research questions of 
the thesis, and its methodology.  Chapters 3 to 7 provide the key results from my 
research.  Chapter 8 concludes. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review, research 
questions and method 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
As set out in Chapter 1, the focus of this thesis is how nation-building and realist (or 
direct and indirect, or short-term and long-term) objectives have played out in US aid 
to Pakistan in the post 9/11 era.  Chapter 1 provided necessary context in the form of 
a brief history of Pakistan and American-Pakistan relations and aid, and an overview 
of the role of these two goals in American foreign and aid policy.  This chapter 
completes the introduction to the thesis by undertaking a literature review, identifying 
the gaps in the literature, formally posing the research questions, and outlining the 
methodology pursued. 
 
A number of literatures are relevant to this thesis.  Studies of Pakistan, particularly the 
literature on Pakistan-US relations, provide an important foundation, and are 
summarised in Section 2.2.  So too does the literature on the objectives of aid, which 
is reviewed in Section 2.3.  Two other literatures are also important for this thesis.  
The first is the literature on aid conditionality and leverage, since there is evidence 
that aid conditionality for nation-building purposes can be undermined by realist 
objectives (Section 2.4).  The other is the literature on winning “hearts and minds”, 
which is an endeavor that can be directed towards either nation-building or realist 
ends (Section 2.5).  In all of these cases I am particularly interested in pre-9/11 
writings, particularly with regard to the Cold War, as one of the arguments of the 
thesis is that history can illuminate how aid has played out in the post 9/11 era. 
 
After the four literature review sections, which also highlight the limitations of 
existing studies, this chapter summarises the research gaps and questions which this 
thesis will address (Section 2.6).  Section 2.7 sets out the interview-based research 
method and Section 2.8 concludes and outlines the structure of the remainder of the 
thesis. 
 
2.2 Pakistan studies 
 
In the post-9/11 period, there has been a renewed interest in Pakistan both because of 
its proximity to Afghanistan and in relation to its own internal political, economic, 
social and security problems.  Numerous books have been written in recent years on 
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Pakistan examining its challenges in both historical and contemporary contexts 
(Lieven 2011; Cohen 2006 and 2011; Talbot 2010; Nawaz 2009; Gul 2010; Lodhi 
2011).  Much of the literature focuses on individual issues, such as Pakistan’s security 
challenges (Weaver 2010; Siddiqa 2007) or contemporary economic and social 
challenges (Inskeep 2012; Hathaway and Kugelman 2010; Kugelman 2013).  There 
has also been a surge of literature on Pakistan’s terrorism and militancy challenges 
(Bennett-Jones 2003; Riedel 2008, 2012; Fair 2009b, 2010, 2011; Hussain, Z 2008, 
Hussain, T 2010) and its geopolitical role in a post-9/11 world (Burke 2011; Bergen 
2011, 2013; Rohde 2013; Nasr 2013).  
 
There has been relatively little written on US-Pakistan relations.  Pre-9/11, Kux 
(2001) provides the most comprehensive overview of Pakistan-US relations between 
1947-2000, with a detailed examination of relations under each US administration, 
from Truman to Clinton.  Goldberg and Ambinder (2011), Riedel (2012), Schaffer 
and Schaffer (2011), Samad (2011), Butt and Schofield (2012), Markey (2013), 
Haqqani (2013) and Gall (2014) describe the key themes, complexities and 
ambiguities in US-Pakistan relations in the post 9/11 period.  A number of these 
authors also present their policy recommendations for the US-Pakistan relationship. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, several argue for a greater emphasis on nation-building. 
 
The literature focusing specifically on aid in the US-Pakistan context is smaller still, 
and consists of reports by think tanks and official institutions.  Writing for the 
Congressional Research Service, Epstein and Kronstadt (2013) describe US assistance 
to Pakistan, looking at both civilian and military assistance.  This report illustrates the 
state of play of US aid to Pakistan, as well as issues that are important for the US 
Congress, including aid conditionality, security and aid delivery, and aid branding and 
public diplomacy.  The Woodrow Wilson Centre (2011) provides recommendations 
on how the US can get the most out of its aid relationship with Pakistan, including 
through establishing benchmarks and third-party evaluations.  Though it purports to 
examine aid ‘from both sides’ it is heavily US-centric in its analysis and the report 
contains only a small section on what Pakistanis (from a very small focus group 
within the elite) want from US aid (p. 32-33).  At the Centre for Global Development, 
Birdsall and Elhai (2011) focus on how to improve the delivery of the US aid program 
in Pakistan and recommends the US refocus its efforts in Pakistan on trade and 
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increased incentives for investment.  Within this small literature, there is surprisingly 
little or no analysis on the relative importance of different objectives of US aid to 
Pakistan, and possible trade-offs between these. 
 
2.3 Motivations for and objectives of aid 
 
The literature on motivations for giving and the objectives of aid is large.  The 
majority of studies use quantitative analysis, but there is also a qualitative literature.  
An overview of this literature is provided below.   
 
Maizels and Nissanke (1984), World Bank (1998), Berthelemy and Tichit (2004), and 
Fleck and Kilby (2010) all find aid to be motivated by two prime objectives: 
promoting long-term growth and poverty reduction, and promoting the political, 
strategic and commercial interests of donors.  Dollar and Pritchett (1998) argue that 
the strategic interests of donors and their total aid allocations favour former colonies 
and political allies over open economies and democracies.  This is consistent with the 
findings of other empirical studies that show that donors disburse aid based on 
strategic considerations, rather than or as well as the needs of the receiving countries 
(see McKinley and Little 1977; Alesina and Dollar 1998; Boschini and Olofsgard 
2001; Dreher and Jensen 2003; Goldstein and Moss 2003; Neumayer 2011; Fleck and 
Kilby 2006, 2010; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008). 
 
Turning specifically to US aid, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) find bilateral aid 
allocations are broadly made in support of donors’ perceived foreign, economic, 
political and security interests.  Their study singles out the United States as using 
bilateral aid more openly than others as an instrument of foreign policy.  This 
reaffirms the findings from McKinlay and Little’s (1977) analysis of the United 
States’ bilateral aid program which finds that aid is allocated to reward states for 
pursuing polices favourable to the donor and denied to states pursuing policies 
detrimental to the donor.  Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) argue that US aid 
during the Cold War was targeted towards capitalist regimes willing to support 
Washington’s containment policy. 
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The relationship between security interests and aid is also examined by Boschini and 
Olofsgard (2007), who analyse the decline of aid during the 1990s.  They focus on the 
impact of the end of the Cold War on aid disbursements and find that the end of the 
Cold War led to Western donor’s cutting aid budgets because the most important 
motivation for aid disbursements – containing communism – disappeared.  
 
In one of a handful of studies examining the use of aid in the post 9/11 period, Fleck 
and Kilby (2010) assert that post 9/11, the strategic objectives of aid have been given 
more weight: “For the 35 years preceding the War on Terror, there was a clear 
upward trend in the weight given to need in the allocation of aid to core recipients.  In 
the years since, the weight given to need has decreased rapidly and steadily” (p.195). 
 
There are also a number of qualitative studies of aid motivation.  Van der Veen 
(2011), working on four European countries, identifies nine “frames” which can 
motivate the giving of aid and which can influence its size and nature.  These are: 
enlightened or indirect self-interest, humanitarianism, power and influence, obligation 
and duty, security, self-affirmation and prestige, and wealth and commercial interests.  
 
Lancaster (2006) also takes a case study approach and examines the donor practices 
of the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark.  She finds aid-giving 
practices are heavily influenced by domestic politics and used to achieve a mixture of 
different goals.  Her political analysis of US aid in the second half of the twentieth 
century finds “an enduring dualism in aid’s purposes” (p.107), with an on ongoing 
struggle between development and diplomatic interests over the purpose of aid.  On 
the one hand, domestic political support in the United States for foreign aid appears  
to be strengthening with the “growing engagement of the evangelical movement in 
development and related activities abroad”.  On the other hand, the war on terror has 
“elevated the prominence of diplomatic purposes in aid giving” (p.62).  Lancaster 
highlights that “tensions between these two purposes of US aid seem set to continue 
in the twenty-first century” (ibid).   
 
This tension is similar to the one this thesis is concerned with.  But note that 
Lancaster is interested only in the weight accorded to these tensions in policy 
formulation, as a result of contending domestic forces.  Her analysis does not extend 
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to how these contending forces play out on the ground.  Also, as noted earlier, a 
diplomatic motivation for aid may still extend to support for nation-building, if this is 
viewed as important for strategic reasons. 
 
Whereas the motivations of aid are the reasons donors give aid, the objectives are 
what aid is meant to achieve.  The two concepts are related but distinct.  The 
exploration of aid objectives that is closest to this thesis is Seitz (2012).  As 
summarised in Chapter 1, Seitz provides a comprehensive overview of the role of aid 
nation-building and realist objectives during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations, showing how the relative importance of these two objectives waxed 
and waned during the period under consideration.  Overall, he argues “nation-building 
was a fundamental, if understated, element of containment from the earliest years of 
the Cold War and indeed, through most of the twentieth century” (p.4).  
 
Burnett (1992) studies the role of economic and military assistance in winning the 
Cold War.  Like many authors writing immediately post-Cold War, Burnett argued 
that policymakers were unlikely to see a similar political-security-aid nexus emerge 
again: 
The political reality is that political and security purposes were often advanced 
as the reasons for economic assistance packages, especially if a credible link 
to the Cold War offered itself.  The fact that nothing as compelling as the Cold 
War is likely to replace it raises legitimate concerns about the future of 
appropriations for foreign economic assistance coming from legislatures with 
the twin dogs of constituency politics and budget deficits snarling at their 
heels (p. 4). 
 
In fact, the war on terror arguably replaced the Cold War and became the new 
“compelling” theatre in which foreign aid was used to advance political and security 
purposes. 
 
Burnett also focuses on the loss of leverage which realist objectives can give rise to.  
Several other authors also address this phenomenon, and it is discussed separately in 
the next section.  Burnett also argues that having multiple goals is itself a problem and 
that, specifically with reference to Pakistan (during the Cold War): “The tension 
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between long-term goals (economic self-sufficiency, democracy, social reform) and 
short-term Cold War goals in Pakistan became a serious drawback” (p. 9).  
 
There is a large literature on nation-building in the post 9/11 period, largely focused 
on Iraq and Afghanistan (Dempsey 2002; Ottoway 2002; Dobbins et al. 2003; 
Dobbins 2003, 2005; Feldman 2004; Cooley 2005; Fukuyama 2004, 2006; Berger 
2006; Berger and Weber 2006; Grandin 2006). Overall, this literature gives a negative 
assessment on the efficacy of recent nation-building efforts. 
 
One of the problems the literature highlights is the difficulty of promoting 
development and combatting insecurity at the same time (Fukuyama 2006, 
Introduction).  This goes back to the Cold War.  Seitz writes that programs to combat 
security threats “tend to be heavy-handed, short-term in nature and prone to create the 
types of violent upheaval that undermines economic and political development 
projects, ultimately threatening recipient stability” (2012, p. 145-6).   
 
While the above finding is relevant for this thesis, the post-9/11 nation-building 
literature does not, however, extend to a more general consideration of the relative 
importance of, or trade-offs between realist and nation-building goals.   No doubt, this 
is because the focus of the recent literature is on Afghanistan and Iraq.  In these two 
countries, after the initial military operation, the primary aim became nation-building. 
There were trade-offs in each of these countries between short-term internal security 
and long-term development goals, and this has been analysed in the literature, but the 
US did not have other foreign policy goals in relation to these two countries. Pakistan 
is quite a different case.  As noted in Chapter 1, the US has had important realist 
objectives in relation to Pakistan – primarily, to alter its behavior towards Afghanistan 
– which have been quite separate from its nation-building ones. How these have 
played out is the primary interest of the thesis. 
 
2.4 Aid conditionality and leverage 
 
Conditionality has been a central feature of aid for many years.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, conditionality became more prominent because of the shift from project to 
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program aid (Collier et al., 1997, p. 1399).  Much of the literature on conditionality is 
critical and argues that donor leverage is rarely sufficient to encourage recipient 
governments to undertake and sustain reforms that are not indigenously supported 
(see Collier et al. 1997; World Bank 1998; Morrissey 2004).  Evidence of the 
leverage provided by military aid is mixed (Bapat 2011, Sullivan, Tessman and Li 
2011). 
 
Apart from the fact that reforms are largely the outcome of domestic political 
processes over which donors have limited influence, there are two additional reasons 
why conditionality may fail.  First, with aid comes moral hazard whereby donors are 
under pressure to disburse aid, and reluctant to hold back funds (Svensson 2000). 
Second, strategic pressures mean that donors may at times have their hands tied 
(Fearon 1997). 
 
Sietz (2012) examines US aid’s loss of leverage during the Cold War (since it gave 
aid to support its allies), and argues: “As recipients of US security assistance 
recognised Washington’s objectives and the importance of these objectives, threats to 
suspend aid lost much of their credibility.  Washington lost leverage in these 
relationships even as recipients gained it” (p. 151).   
 
Burnett (1992) is probably the author who has examined this issue in the most detail.  
He takes a case study approach and examines the US aid program to several countries 
during the Cold War era, including Pakistan.  He likens the influence of aid to the 
flow of water through a spigot or tap: 
The effectiveness of US influence over recipient country action is in inverse 
proportion to the perceived importance that Washington attaches to the 
relationship.  If the receiving country believes that the spigot is frozen in the 
open position, that for reasons of strategic necessity or domestic politics it is 
not feasible for Washington to close the spigot, the influence the US derives 
from the aid sinks close to zero (p. 5). 
 
The more recent literature argues that, after the Cold War ended, aid conditionality 
may have become more credible as donors moved away from pure geopolitical 
objectives, but perhaps not for long.  Dunning (2004) finds donors’ geopolitical 
46 
 
objectives during the Cold War diminished the credibility of threats to condition aid 
on the adoption of democratic reforms in sub-Saharan Africa.  However, he finds that 
the end of the Cold War enhanced the effectiveness of Western donor conditionality. 
 
Bearce and Tirone (2010) find that because aid from Western countries was driven by 
strategic factors during the Cold War era, it is only positively associated with 
economic reform after the end of the Cold War (i.e. post-1990), when Western 
governments could more credibly threaten to curtail aid when reform was lagging.  
When examining the current set of global conditions, Bearce and Tirone argue:  
As foreign aid once again becomes more useful for military-strategic 
purposes, it becomes less effective at promoting economic growth and 
development.   Similarly, if foreign aid is to be effective at promoting growth 
and development in poorer regions of the globe, Western governments cannot 
also use it as an instrument to recruit and retain allies in the war on terror 
(p.849).   
 
My Pakistan case study provides an excellent opportunity for a test of these 
propositions. 
 
2.5 Winning hearts and minds through foreign aid 
 
Aid donors are eager to develop positive images of themselves among aid recipient 
populations because positive perceptions can be built upon to achieve a range of 
foreign policy objectives (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Nye 2005).  The literature 
on foreign aid and public opinion is small.  A few studies have been conducted into 
attitudes towards aid in recipient countries (Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Wood 2014; 
Milner 2006; Milner and Tingley 2013a; Milner and Tingley 2011; Paxton and Knack 
2012; Stern 1998; Wike 2012).  For example, Milner, Nielson and Findley (2012), 
survey public opinion in Uganda, finding recipients to be very strong supporters of 
development aid, expressing some preference for multilateral assistance to bilateral 
aid.   
 
A related literature is that on winning hearts and minds.  This literature spans many 
decades and encompasses many different actors and environments – from Malaya in 
47 
 
the late 1940s to Afghanistan today (see Galula 1996; Berman, Shapiro and Felter 
2011).  
 
The concept of winning hearts and minds in conflict zones is often attributed to the 
British administrator Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, who served during part of the 
1948-60 Malayan Emergency, and argued in 1952 that “the answer lies not in pouring 
more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people” (Fitzsimmons, 
2008).  
 
Pre 9/11, hearts and minds campaigns centred on influencing populations that the US 
saw as vulnerable to communist ideology.  Nagl (2005) argues that the US campaign 
in Vietnam did not work because the US Army adopted a strategy that was too 
militarily focused, therefore ultimately fighting the wrong (conventional) war, rather 
than trying to win over the population.  He contrasts US efforts in Vietnam 
unfavourably with UK efforts in Malaya, which he argues had a greater deal of 
success. 
 
Post 9/11, campaigns have been heavily geared towards reducing the influence of 
militancy and the reach of Islamist terrorism, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
more recently in Pakistan.  Success has been limited at best.  Kilcullen (2010) argues 
that since 9/11 the world has witnessed a “globalised insurgency”.  Such a campaign 
is, he argues, “not susceptible to traditional locally tailored hearts and minds 
activities, and the difficulty in achieving message unity undercuts such attempts” (p. 
13-14). 
 
Empirical tests of the success of hearts and minds campaigns deliver mixed results.  
Beath et al. (2014) examine the United States’ use of development aid as a 
counterinsurgency tool through surveying villagers in ten districts in Afghanistan.  
The study finds that development programs led both to a improved perceptions of 
economic well-being and better attitudes toward government, as well as improved 
perceptions of security.   
 
In contrast, the Feinstein Centre at Tufts University conducted a multi-author study of 
the effectiveness of a hearts and minds strategy across five Afghan provinces: Balkh, 
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Faryab, Helmand, Paktia and Uruzgan (Fishstein 2010, 2012; Fishstein and Wilder 
2012; Gordon 2011).  Perceptions of aid were generally negative.  For example, in a 
study of Faryab province, Gompelman (2011) finds perceptions of aid donors are 
“markedly negative”.  Perceptions of government are negative also, with legitimacy 
being influenced by the negative reputation and capacities of the top layer of 
government rather than by aid projects.   
 
There is small literature on Pakistani public perceptions of aid.  Kinder (2010) at the 
Centre for Global Development has conducted research on public opinion of US aid 
in Pakistan and argues that the more the US seeks out a public relations boost from its 
aid, the less likely it is that this will materialise.  In other words, more the US tries to 
take credit for its aid and aims to improve its image, the less genuine its motivation 
will be perceived.   
 
Focusing on the impact of humanitarian aid, Andrabi and Das (2005) and Wilder 
(2010) examine the effects of US aid upon mass Pakistani public opinion following 
the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir.  Andrabi and Das provide a compelling case that 
trust in foreigners is malleable, responds to humanitarian actions by foreigners and is 
not a deep-rooted function of local preferences.  Wilder finds that aid was used to win 
“hearts and minds”, but that this aid, while effective in achieving humanitarian 
outcomes, was ineffective in improving Pakistani perceptions of the United States in 
the long-run.   
 
All of these studies are about winning hearts and minds at the mass public level.  
They are in the nation-building tradition, where the aim is to fundamentally alter the 
outlook and attitudes of the nation.  There is a much smaller literature about hearts 
and minds at the elite level. Yet, for realist objectives, it is elite hearts and minds that 
matter.  As Banfield argues: 
The public opinion of an underdeveloped country does not include the opinion 
of the peasants, who in most places are the vast majority.  If our grain prevents 
the peasant from starving, he may be grateful, but his gratitude has no effect 
upon the policy of his country because politically he does not exist.  Those 
who do make a difference are the people of the cities, especially the primate 
cities, and, above all, the small group which rules. (1963, p. 28) 
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The implicit argument here is that, if you are using aid for a quid pro quo, you will be 
concerned not the masses, but the elite, to get what you want. This question of whose 
hearts and minds are being targeted by donors – the elite or the masses – is yet to be 
explored by the literature, but is a focus of this study.  
 
Another gap in the literature is whether Burnett’s argument, outlined in Section 2.4, 
that the influence of US aid over a recipient country diminishes the more importance 
that the US attaches to the relationship also applies to the donor country’s ability to 
win hearts and minds in an aid recipient country.  It is plausible that if aid is given to 
achieve realist objectives, then it will be seen as a price paid for those objectives 
rather than a gesture of good will.  
 
2.6 Research gaps and questions 
 
The gaps in the above literature can be simply summarised.  There is little analysis of 
American aid to Pakistan, especially in recent years, and especially drawing on 
Pakistani views.  There is little analysis of the trade-off between nation-building and 
realist goals in the post-Cold War era, including specifically of the weights given to 
these two goals, whether the pursuit of realist goals has undermined the efficacy of 
conditionality and hearts and minds campaigns and whether the goal of winning 
hearts and minds has been directed to realist or nation-building ends.   
 
To address these gaps in the literature, the research seeks to answer the following 
broad question:  
In its interactions with Pakistan post 9/11, and especially from 2010 onwards, 
what weight has the United States placed on the nation-building and realist 
objectives of its aid program, and has there been a trade-off between the 
pursuit of these two objectives? 
 
I utilise three tests to answer this question.  First, I examine the alignment between 
perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges and perceptions of what the United States wants 
most from its engagement with Pakistan.  If these are aligned that provides clear 
evidence that nation-building objectives dominate in US aid to Pakistan: that the US 
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is focusing its efforts on what Pakistan needs.  However, if there is a misalignment 
between the two, then this may be evidence that the US is giving more weight to its 
realist objectives. 
 
Second, I examine the leverage of aid.  Following the literature discussed in Section 
2.4, if realist goals dominate so that the US is principally interested in advancing its 
realist goals, then conditionality in relation to economic reforms should be 
ineffective: i.e. the “spigot is frozen” in the words of Burnett.  Either aid is unable to 
achieve any leverage, or if it is able to, it should be in relation to realist rather than 
nation-building goals.  
 
Third, I examine the United States’ pursuit of winning hearts and minds in Pakistan.  
If the United States is trying to win over the elite in Pakistan, then this is evidence 
that realist objectives dominate.  However, if the US is trying to win over the masses, 
then, following the discussion in Section 2.5, this is a sign that nation-building goals 
are more important.  I also investigate whether realist objectives undermine hearts and 
minds objectives, as it is argued they do in relation to leverage. 
 
These three tests or topics should all help us address the issue of the relative 
importance of nation-building and realist objectives in relation to US policy in 
Pakistan, or, put differently, to assess the pivot under the Obama Administration to 
give greater weight to nation-building.  I conclude the thesis with a fourth, which goes 
to the question not of what the balance between these two objectives is, but what it 
ought to be. Should the US emphasise nation-building more?   
 
These four topics provide the organising structure for my thesis: the first is examined 
over two chapters (Chapter 3 on Pakistani needs and Chapter 4 on US wants); the 
second in Chapters 5 (on leverage) and the third in Chapter 6 (on hearts and minds).  
Chapter 7 turns to the future – and assesses the support for a greater emphasis on 
nation-building.  
 
All of these results chapters explore the differences and similarities in views of an aid 
donor and aid recipient, comparative research that is lacking in the literature, as noted 
earlier in this chapter. 
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The answers to these questions are developed primarily on the basis of information 
about elite perceptions, garnered during interviews.  How I went about this, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of a perceptions-based approach are discussed in the next 
section. 
 
2.7 Methodology 
 
As noted above, the research presented in this thesis takes a case-study approach and 
is based primarily on elite perceptions, supplemented by external information  The 
literature is divided on the utility of case-study methods in social science research.  
Some social scientists consider studies of one or a few cases to be methodologically 
weak because data is not randomised and partial correlations are not feasible given the 
low number of data points (Lijphart 1973, Smelser 1973).  However, others argue 
strongly in favour of case-study research.  Van Evera (1997) argues case-study 
methods can offset these weaknesses because: “tests performed with case studies are 
often strong, because the predictions tested are quite unique (these predictions are not 
made by other known theories).  Specifically, case-studies allow the test of 
predictions about the private speech of policy actors” (p. 54).  King, Keohane and 
Verba (1994) consider case-studies to be “essential for description and therefore 
fundamental to social science” (p. 44).  Case-studies seem particularly well suited to 
the study of aid.  Riddell (2007) notes that “the influence and impact of aid is 
predominantly dependent upon, and determined by, a range of country specific 
variables” (p.225).  The diversity of the variables impacting the influence of aid, 
including political and security influences, make the application of a case-study 
approach particularly well suited to this research. 
 
Perceptions, and the assumptions underlying perceptions, are critical variables in 
evaluating our understanding of foreign policy.  Speigel (1985) argues that 
perceptions of leaders are the most important variable in foreign policy decision-
making.  Perceptions, as they relate to foreign policy, can cover a broad spectrum of 
issues, for example perceptions of one’s own policy, perceptions of bilateral and 
multilateral partners or perceptions of geopolitical issues.  
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As discussed in Section 2.5, there is a growing literature on the utility of considering 
perceptions in foreign policy analysis (see Mueller 1971; Page and Shapiro 1983, 
1987; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1986; Holsti 1992; Baum 2004; Baum and Potter 
2008; Milner and Tingley 2013b).  This research uses Herrmann’s (1986) definition 
of perceptions in relation to foreign policy as: “the construction of reality in which an 
individual makes foreign policy decisions”.  Fiske and Taylor (1984) find that: 
“People simplify reality, they do so in part by interpreting specific instances in light 
of the general case” (p. 141).  Although foreign policy analysis increasingly involves 
the examination of perceptions, the literature rarely compares perceptions of different 
foreign policy actors on the same issue.  In the case of the Pakistan-US bilateral 
relationship, an analysis of each country’s perceptions of foreign policy, in particular 
foreign aid policy, has not yet been examined. 
 
Given that perceptions involve a construction of reality, to what extent can they be 
used to get at answers to questions which go beyond perceptions, as the questions this 
thesis asks do?  There is a large literature on the utility of interviewing elite on public 
policy issues to inform debate (Bottomore 1964; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987; 
Zaller 1992; Lerner, Nagai and Rothman 1996; Richards 1996; Foyle 1997; Domhoff 
2002).  For the overall thesis question, and the three specific questions, information 
on perceptions is likely to be highly useful.  While I also consider external 
information, I argue that the perceptions of the elite shine important light on the 
questions we ask, and that, for the research questions, there is often little other 
information on which to base a judgment.  
 
That said, most of the thesis’ analysis is in fact devoted simply to understanding 
consensus positions and differences within and between the two elites. In presenting 
my conclusions, I distinguish between those which summarise the views of the two 
groups, and those that use these findings to address the research questions raised. (The 
concluding chapter in particular is structured along these lines: see Section 8.2.)  
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The following sub-sections detail the elite interviews (Section 2.7.1) I undertook with 
both Pakistani (2.7.2) and US (2.7.3) research informants.  Section 2.7.4 explains the 
approach taken to analysing the interviews. 
 
2.7.1 Elite interviews  
 
Interviews with both the Pakistani and US respondents followed an open-ended 
interview format, with a loose structure around a number of key questions.  This 
methodology has a number of advantages, such as allowing the exploration of 
complex subject matter and ensuring as much information between the Pakistani and 
US elite was collected given each was a one-off interview.  As noted by Aberbach 
and Rockman (2002), there are three major considerations in deciding on a mainly 
open-ended approach rather than close-ended questions.  First, the more that is 
known, the easier it is to define the questions and the response options, that is to use 
close-ended questions.  This study explores a set of complex, interconnected issues in 
an under-studied field, therefore is better suited to the greater flexibility that open-
ended questioning allows.  Second, open-ended questions maximise response validity, 
providing “a greater opportunity for respondents to organise their answers within their 
own frameworks.”  This increases the validity of responses and is best for the 
exploratory and in-depth nature of this research.  The third consideration is the 
“receptivity” of respondents: “Elites especially – but other highly educated people as 
well – do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions.  They 
prefer to articulate their views explaining why they think what they think” (2002, p. 
674). 
 
General questions were asked first, followed by more sensitive questions in order to 
build rapport with the interview respondent (Leech 2002, p.666).  While conducting 
research in Pakistan, the Australia-Pakistan cricket rivalry was often an ice-breaker, 
whereas in the US, respondents were interested in what it was like to live in (rather 
than simply visit) Pakistan.  The time taken for each interview ranged from 25 
minutes to 80 minutes.  Most interviews were recorded and transcribed (those where 
only hand-written notes were taken are noted in Annex 2.3).   
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A list of 12 key questions was used for Pakistani informants and 13 for US 
informants. See Annex 2.1 (Pakistan) and Annex 2.2 (US) for a list of key interview 
questions.  Note that the order in the Annexes is not necessarily the order in which the 
questions were asked.  There were about four questions on the issue of Pakistani 
challenges and American wants; three to four questions on leverage and 
conditionality; and four questions on hearts and minds.  In general, the same questions 
were asked of both set of respondents (though see the qualification below), but in a 
few cases different questions or wordings were used when it was felt more 
appropriate.  For detailed discussion of specific questions, see the relevant results 
chapters.  Not all respondents were asked all questions.  As noted by Aberbach, 
Chesney and Rockman, it is impossible for the interviewer to know in advance how 
“garrulous a respondent will be or how literally he will take the time estimates for the 
interview communicated to him” (1975, p. 9).  As a result, the rate of response to 
some questions is considerably lower than others.  In instances where not much time 
was given for the interview (in some cases, less than 30 minutes), a number of 
questions were skipped depending on the interviewees subject area expertise.  For 
instance, when interviewing US foreign policy scholars, less time was spent on 
specific aid questions and more time on US foreign policy in Pakistan. 
 
The United States fieldwork was conducted in March 2012.  38 of the US policy elite 
with expertise on Pakistan or US foreign policy were interviewed in Washington DC 
and New York.  Between October 2011 and October 2013, 40 of the Pakistani elite 
were interviewed in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi.   
 
Following interviews in the United States, I realised that it would be interesting to get 
the views of both the US and the Pakistani elite on the same set of issues.  This was 
not my original intent, and so necessitated a slight change to some of the Pakistani 
interview questions, to mirror more closely the questions asked in the United States.  
11 Pakistani interviews had already been conducted prior to the commencement of the 
US interviews. To fill the gaps, attempts were made to ask follow up questions via 
email of these first 11 interview respondents, but only two provided written responses 
to the set of follow up questions.  This change in interview questions accounts for 
slightly different sample sizes reported in the various results chapters.  This impacted 
upon five of the 12 questions, relating to: aid conditionality, winning hearts and minds 
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and ideas for policy change.  The change in questionnaire had a minimal impact on 
sample size numbers and did not contribute to any bias given there is a broad cross 
section of the sample in the first 11 Pakistani elite interviews: academia, think-tanks, 
retired military, retired bureaucrats, business and journalist. 
 
The two elite samples are discussed in detail in the next two sub-sections.  Random 
sampling was neither desirable nor possible.  Instead, I used a mix of purposive and 
snowball sampling.  In the US, where access to politicians was difficult, the sample 
can be regarded as representative of the non-political foreign policy elite with 
expertise on Pakistan.  Indeed, with the exception of a few Pakistan experts who were 
unavailable at the time, the sample used in this research comprehensively covers the 
population of Pakistan specialists in the United States.  In Pakistan, the sample can be 
regarded as more broadly representative of the foreign policy elite, including 
politicians, since my networks (and length of time spent in Pakistan) enabled me to 
include politicians in the elite sample.    
 
It should be noted that neither sample includes currently serving military personnel. 
While this would have been interesting, it proved too hard in both countries.  The 
research can thus be thought as providing civilian perspectives, though in Pakistan I 
also interviewed a number of retired military commanders. 
 
Because I was in Pakistan for a little over three years, in addition to the interviews, I 
was able to observe domestic media reporting on US-Pakistan relations in Pakistan, as 
well as attend numerous seminars in Islamabad on Pakistan’s economy, security and 
development, and on US-Pakistan relations.  The thesis also draws on both of these 
additional sources.  The seminars in particular gave a unique insight into the thoughts 
of the Pakistani elite on divisive topics like aid and Pakistan’s bilateral relationship 
with the US, and it was interesting to hear perspectives delivered for a domestic, 
Pakistani audience.  They were often more sensationalist or hardline than views 
provided in a one-on-one interview, even when it was the same speaker/interviewee. 
 
Approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the Australian 
National University for this thesis was received on 18 July 2011.  All interview 
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respondents, with the exception of one Skype interview in Pakistan and one Skype 
interview in Washington, were required to sign a consent form.  Of the 39 consent 
forms signed by Pakistani respondents, only one did not consent to audio recording 
(as noted in Annex 2.3).  All Pakistani respondents gave permission for names and 
quotations to be used as part of this research.  Of the 37 consent forms signed by the 
US respondents, four did not consent to audio recording.  Five respondents asked that 
all published (non-thesis) quotations be cleared in advance of publication.  
 
2.7.2 Elite interview participants – Pakistan 
 
Pakistani interviewees were drawn from academia, think-tanks, government 
departments, retired bureaucrats, retired military and politicians.  While academics 
and think-tank analysts were obvious choices, retired bureaucrats and retired military 
were important inclusions in the Pakistan sample since many remain influential in 
public life after retirement.  Access to politicians was easier in Pakistan than in the 
United States because of the length of time I spent in Pakistan.  I was able to develop 
networks within the elite and draw on the recommendations and the personal 
connections of my interview respondents in order to conduct interviews with currently 
serving politicians from all of Pakistan’s major political parties.   
 
The breadth of Pakistan’s elite within my sample enhances the value of the 
contribution of this research to the foreign policy literature on Pakistan.  A list of 
Pakistani interview respondents is at Annex 2.3.  Table 2.1 below provides an 
overview of the sample’s key characteristics.   
 
Table 2.1 – Overview of the Pakistani elite sample 
 Male  Female Total 
Academic 3 1 4 
Think-tank 8 3 11 
Politician 9 0 9 
Retired military 3 0 3 
Retired bureaucrat 3 0 3 
Media 3 0 3 
Business 2 1 3 
Consultant 0 2 2 
Government 2 0 2 
TOTAL 33 7 40 
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Politicians were interviewed from all major political parties, including Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP)3, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)4, Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), Muttahida Quami 
Movement (MQM) and Independents.  
 
Most interviews with major think-tanks and academic institutions were conducted 
with the head of department to ensure influential voices from these institutions were 
represented.  One group interview was conducted as part of the Pakistan sample, and 
included a group of three economists from the Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics (PIDE) at Quaid-i-Azam University.  PIDE is regarded as the premier 
development economics institution in Pakistan and the interview provided the 
opportunity to learn more about Pakistan’s development settings and priorities and 
how these have changed over time.  
 
To select my elite respondent pool, I familiarised myself with the major think-tanks 
and universities in Pakistan, particularly in Islamabad.  In order to select the retired 
bureaucrat/military elite that remained policy influential, I regularly read the English-
language opinion columns of a selection of newspapers and approached those who 
frequently wrote columns commenting on US-Pakistan relations.  I contacted a 
number of politicians from different political parties to ensure I had elite 
representation from all of Pakistan’s major political parties.  I approached the 
majority of potential elite respondents via email.  I also utilised the “snowball” 
mechanism to secure additional interviews by asking the Pakistani elite for 
suggestions of other suitable participants for this research at the conclusion of the first 
38 interviews.5 It is difficult to quantify the number of interviews secured using the 
snowball technique given the length of time spent in-country.  A number of 
interviews were secured because of personal recommendations given by some of the 
elite to their friends and colleagues to participate in my research.  I requested 90 
interviews via email in Pakistan and undertook 40.  My target was to interview equal 
numbers of Pakistan and US elite.  Given I interviewed 38 in the US; this was also my 
                                                 
3 PPP, in government 2008-13. 
4 PML-N, in government 2013-present. 
5 Interviews 39 and 40 were not asked this question because these interviews were conducted in my 
final weeks in Islamabad in 2013.  
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target in Pakistan.  In the end, I interviewed two additional Pakistani elite after these 
interviews were facilitated by existing contacts.    
 
This research’s sample is largely representative of the elite in Pakistan.  However, it 
could have included more of the business elite given the influence of large, land-
owning family businesses in Pakistan.  Landowners in Pakistan are both very wealthy 
and very influential – a direct result of the feudal system that has existed for centuries.  
Only five per cent of Pakistanis own over two-thirds of land used for agriculture in 
Pakistan (Ghosh 2013).   Most of the business elite are based outside of Islamabad, in 
Lahore or Karachi, which made securing interviews more difficult, given security 
considerations. 
 
The World Bank reports female labour participation in 2012 at 24 per cent.  Only 17.5 
per cent of this sample is female. This reflects both low labour participation in general 
and particularly low participation of females in highly skilled occupations.  
 
Given Pakistan is a conservative Islamic country, I was initially unsure about how I, 
as a Caucasian Australian woman would be received by the Pakistani male-dominated 
elite.  However, my gender, ethnicity and nationality turned out to be a strong 
advantage in securing interviews.  All interviewees were relaxed and frank with me 
(in my best estimation), and many men (and women) went out of their way to assist 
me in securing additional interviews with friends and colleagues.  In one instance, I 
was meeting a politician in his office and he had a lunch appointment with another 
political colleague.  My interview subject delayed his lunch appointment and insisted 
I interview his colleague then and there for this research – a politician from a remote 
area of Pakistan that I would not have interviewed otherwise.  
 
2.7.3 Elite interview participants – United States 
 
In the United States, I approached 68 people via email for interview, 53 in 
Washington DC and 15 in New York.  I interviewed 34 participants in Washington 
DC and 4 in New York.  Participants were drawn from academia, think tanks, 
political staffers and government departments.   
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The initial sample of respondents was chosen by reviewing a list of foreign policy 
think tanks and academic institutions with a South Asia focus in these cities.6  
Government officials at the State Department and USAID, analysts at International 
Financial Institutions and political staff members who were included in the sample 
either worked on Pakistan specifically or had served at the US Embassy or at 
Consulates in Pakistan.  Many interviews were set-up in advance via email, but the 
“snowball” mechanism was applied to scheduling additional interviews once 
fieldwork had commenced in the United States, though to a lesser extent than in 
Pakistan due to the severe time constraints.  Interview participants were asked to 
suggest other “policy elite” that would be able to make a contribution to this research.  
Five additional interviews in Washington DC, including three with political staffers, 
and three additional interviews New York were secured using this technique.    
 
Table 2.2 below shows the breakdown of respondents by category.  The former 
bureaucrat column is included to illustrate the large number of former public servants 
who move into academia or think tanks in the US.  A detailed overview of US-based 
interview participants, including short biographies, is provided in Annex 2.3.  
 
Table 2.2 – Overview of the United States elite sample 
Category Male Female Former 
Bureaucrat 
Total 
Think-tank 15 3 7 18 
Academic 7 0 4 7 
Bureaucrat 1 3 - 4 
International World Bank/IMF (IFI) 3 1 0 4 
Political staffer 2 1 0 3 
Consultant 0 1 1 1 
Journalist 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL 29 9 12 38 
 
Most of the US participants are from think-tanks and academia: 66 per cent of the 
total in the United States compared to 38 per cent for Pakistan.  The number of former 
bureaucrats who have moved to work in academia (4 participants) or think-tanks (7 
participants) who are a part of this sample is also reflective of the interaction between 
policy makers and think-tanks/academia in the United States.  
 
                                                 
6 See http://thinktanks.fpri.org for the list of think-tanks used to select interview participants.  
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Due to the short time frame in which I conducted research in the United States (two 
weeks in Washington DC and one week in New York) I did not seek interviews with 
politicians or senior military staff given it was unlikely I would secure interviews.  
I included participants from the International Financial Institutions, namely the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, because of the involvement of both 
institutions in Pakistan.  Although nominally these institutions reflect international 
rather than American views, in practice American influence within these institutions 
remains strong.  The inclusion of the IFI staff also gives greater policy depth to the 
sample as participants interviewed had extensive knowledge of Pakistan’s 
development landscape and could provide an ‘arms length’ assessment of US policy 
in Pakistan.  The IFIs form an important part of the US policy elite because they 
engage in both the think-tank communities in Washington DC and New York and also 
work with US government agencies on Pakistan.  
 
2.7.4 Interview analysis 
 
In order to build upon the qualitative data collected through interviews, I use some 
basic quantitative analysis to organise my data in the results Chapters 3-7.  Aberbach 
and Rockman note that in elite interviewing, where responses to questions are almost 
always well-formulated and respondents can “productively and effectively” answer 
questions in their own way, a researcher can “build a coding system that maintains the 
richness of individual responses but is sufficiently structured that the interviews can 
be analysed using quantitative techniques” (2002, p. 675).  Like Aberbach, Chesney 
and Rockman (1975), I argue that unless responses are coded to minimise information 
loss, “the transformation of highly verbalised information into quantitatively useable 
data will lead to a sizeable missing data problem since even with a uniform stimulus 
people often talk about different things or use different frameworks” (p. 3).  
 
After reading through transcripts of each response to individual open-ended questions, 
patterns began to emerge where responses could be clustered under certain broad 
headings.  All interview responses were recorded in a spreadsheet based on a number 
of key words or key themes from the interviews.  These key words (or “headings”) 
were then used to place responses into the categories.  Each chapter outlines these 
categories and the number of responses placed in each, and annexes to these chapters 
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shows how, based on the key words noted above, I categorise each response.  In each 
chapter I then come back to the qualitative responses and use these to demonstrate the 
broad themes, alongside the agreement and disagreements between both elite groups.  
 
As the literature warns, the risks of this approach is the introduction of possible biases 
due to coder discretion:  
Discretionary coding procedures can affect the independence of items; when 
coders are permitted latitude to examine context, i.e., more than a discrete 
response, the independence of the coding items may be compromised.  Relaxing 
coding constraints to some degree is essential to bring forth informational 
richness, but it also increases risk that coders may form a biased Gestalt about 
each respondent, which may, in turn create an assimilating effect across coding 
items (Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman 1975, p. 16). 
 
In practice, this did not seem to be a serious problem, as most of the coding was 
straightforward.  However, there are a few more complex cases which are discussed 
in the relevant chapters.  
 
2.8 Conclusion and thesis overview 
 
History has shown the United States’ nation-building objectives have risen and fallen, 
as outlined in Chapter 1.  As Chapter 2 showed, the tension between realist and 
nation-building goals during the Cold War has been examined in the literature.  
However, the literature to date does not look at this tension in a contemporary light.  
This thesis contributes to this literature by taking a case study approach to the 
examination of the United States’ post 9/11 aid program to Pakistan, and will 
highlight the relative importance and tensions between realist and nation building 
objectives.  It will do this by examining the perceptions of the Pakistani and US elite 
with respect to US foreign, particularly aid, policy in Pakistan.  This is not only an 
undertaking in an underexplored research area of intrinsic interest, but one that will 
contribute to a better understanding of the interaction between two fundamental goals 
of foreign aid.  
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This thesis includes six more chapters.  Chapters 3 to 7 answer my four research 
topics. Chapter 3 explores Pakistani and American elite perceptions of the challenges 
facing Pakistan.  Chapter 4 analyses perceptions of what the US wants from Pakistan.  
Chapter 5 scrutinises elite perceptions of the use of aid conditionality in Pakistan and 
the ability of US aid to achieve leverage over Pakistani policy.  Chapter 6 delves into 
perceptions of aid’s ability to win hearts and minds, distinguishing between the elite 
and the masses in Pakistan.  Chapter 7 highlights Pakistani and US elites perceptions 
of what policy changes are needed to improve the bilateral relationship.  Chapter 8 
provides an overall summary and conclusion.   
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Annex 2.1 – Guide to interview questions: Pakistani 
respondents 
 
1. What are the biggest challenges facing Pakistan? 
 
2. What does the US want most out of its cooperation with Pakistan, and which 
key policy points do both sides converge and diverge on? 
 
3. What is the US’ biggest strategic obstacle in engaging with Pakistan?  
 
4. What one key factor would you change in Pakistan's policy towards the United 
States? 
 
5. The Kerry Lugar Berman bill comes with economic and security related 
conditions.  Do you think US aid to Pakistan should have conditions attached? 
 
6. Can aid or loans from bilateral and multilateral donors, with conditionality 
attached can bring about economic policy reform in Pakistan? Examples of 
successes? 
 
7. Do you think the United States’ aid program can achieve any leverage over 
Pakistani policy? Is it leverage over international policy or domestic and 
domestic policy? 
 
8. Pakistani opinion of the United States is negative, despite the large US aid 
program.  Why can’t the US improve its image in Pakistan? 
 
9. Do you think giving aid to big projects like infrastructure or smaller projects 
like education and health, are more beneficial to try and improve America's 
image in Pakistan? 
 
10. It will be difficult for the US to win hearts and minds in Pakistan as long as it 
has a presence in Afghanistan.  Do you think it will be easier for the US to win 
over Pakistan once it has left Afghanistan? 
 
11. Whose hearts and minds is the US trying to win in Pakistan - the elite or the 
mass public? 
 
12. Can you suggest others I should speak to in Pakistan? 
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Annex 2.2 – Guide to interview questions: US respondents 
 
1. What are the biggest challenges facing Pakistan? 
 
2. What does the US want most out of its cooperation with Pakistan, and which 
key policy points do both sides converge and diverge on? 
 
3. What is the US’ biggest strategic obstacle in engaging with Pakistan?  
 
4. What is the one key factor you would change in the United States’ current 
policy settings towards Pakistan? 
 
5. The US employs a variety of carrots and sticks in its policy mix towards 
Pakistan.  What has proven to be the most effective and ineffective? 
 
6. The Kerry Lugar Berman bill comes with economic and security related 
conditions.  Do you think US aid to Pakistan should have conditions attached? 
 
7. Can aid or loans from bilateral and multilateral donors, with conditionality 
attached can bring about economic policy reform in Pakistan? Examples of 
successes? 
 
8. Do you think the United States’ aid program can achieve any leverage over 
Pakistani policy? 
 
9. It could be difficult for the US to win hearts and minds in Pakistan given its 
presence in Afghanistan.  Do you think the US will be able to win over 
Pakistan once it leaves Afghanistan? 
 
10. Is the US trying to win hearts and minds? Whose hearts and minds is the US 
trying to win in Pakistan - the elite or the mass public? 
 
11. How do you think relations will change between the US and Pakistan once the 
US military draws down in Afghanistan? 
 
12. Pakistani opinion of the United States is negative, despite the large US aid 
program.  Why is the US having trouble explaining its engagement with 
Pakistan? 
 
13. Can you suggest anyone else in Washington DC/New York I should meet 
with? 
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Annex 2.3 – Biographies of Pakistani and US elite interview participants 
 
US Policy Eli te Participants (in order of interview date)  
 
* denotes hand written notes taken rather than transcript from audio recording 
Name Title Organisation Date of 
Interview 
City  Biographical Details 
Ambassador 
William 
Milam 
Senior Scholar, 
Asia Program 
Woodrow 
Wilson Centre 
5 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Research and publications at the Wilson Centre have concentrated 
on South Asia.  Before joining the Wilson Centre, he was a career 
diplomat. He retired from the U.S. Foreign Service at the end of 
July 2001, but continues to take on temporary assignments for the 
State Department; the most recent was as temporary Chief of 
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya from August 2007 to 
February 2008. His last post before retirement was as Ambassador 
to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan where he served from August 
1998 to July 2001. 
Danny 
Cutherell 
Policy Analyst Centre for 
Global 
Development 
5 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Danny grew up in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and has managed a variety 
of development and local governance programs in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan since 2005.  He graduated with an MA in International 
Economics and South Asian Studies from the Johns Hopkins School 
of Advanced International Studies in 2011.  
Walter 
Andersen 
Senior Adjunct 
Professor, South 
Asia Studies 
School of 
Advanced 
International 
Studies (SAIS), 
Johns Hopkins 
University 
6 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Recently retired as chief of the U.S. State Department's South Asia 
Division in the Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia; 
held other key positions within the State Department, including 
special assistant to the ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New 
Delhi and member of the Policy Planning Staff in Washington, 
D.C.; previously taught at the University of Chicago and the 
College of Wooster. 
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Dr Andrew 
Wilder 
Vice President, 
South and 
Central Asia 
Program 
United States 
Institute of 
Peace 
6 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Prior to joining the Institute, he served as research director for 
politics and policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts 
University. Also served as founder and director of Afghanistan's 
first independent policy research institution, the Kabul-based 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). This was 
preceded by more than 10 years managing humanitarian and 
development programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including with 
Save the Children, International Rescue Committee, and Mercy 
Corps International. 
Paul 
Fishstein 
Fellow  Harvard Belfer 
Centre 
6 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Visiting Fellow at the Harvard Belfer Centre, visiting fellow at the 
Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University.  Paul has 
previously worked at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
and Management Sciences for Health (both in Afghanistan and the 
US) 
Courtenay 
Dunn and 
Laura 
Lucas* 
Pakistan Desk State 
Department  
6 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
 
Robert 
Hathaway 
Director, Asia 
Program 
Woodrow 
Wilson Centre 
7 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Director since 1999.  Prior to joining the Wilson Centre he served 
for twelve years on the professional staff of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the US House of Representatives, where he 
specialised in US foreign policy towards Asia.  
Michael 
Kugelman 
Program 
Associate, Asia 
Program 
Woodrow 
Wilson Centre 
7 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Responsible for research, programming, and publications on South 
and Southeast Asia. His most recent work has focused on Pakistan's 
2013 elections, India-Pakistan relations, U.S.-Pakistan relations, and 
security challenges in India. Mr. Kugelman received his M.A. in 
law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He 
received his B.A. from American University's School of 
International Service.  
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Dr Zubair 
Iqbal 
Adjunct Scholar Middle East 
Institute 
8 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Prior to joining the MEI as adjunct scholar in 2008, Dr. Zubair Iqbal 
worked with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for thirty five 
years, retiring in 2007 as Assistant Director of the Middle East and 
Central Asia Department.   
Ted Craig* US Embassy, 
Political 
Section, Served 
in Islamabad 
State 
Department 
8 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
 
Stephen 
Cohen 
Senior Fellow, 
Foreign Policy 
Brookings 
Institution 
8 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Expert on Pakistan, India, and South Asian security.  He is a senior 
fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and an 
emeritus professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.  He has authored, co-authored or edited at least 12 
books, has been named as one of America's 500 most influential 
people in foreign affairs, and is a fixture on radio and television talk 
shows. 
Sajit Gandhi Senior 
Professional 
Staff Member 
House Foreign 
Relations 
Committee 
9 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Senior Professional Staff Member since 2010.  Prior to this he 
worked at Deputy Director of Communications to the Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and at the State Department.  
Ambassador 
Wendy 
Chamberlin 
President Middle East 
Institute  
9 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
President of the Middle East Institute since 2007. Previously, as 
deputy high commissioner for refugees from 2004 to 2007, she 
supervised the administration of the U.N. humanitarian 
organization. A 29-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service, and 
Ambassador to Pakistan from 2001 to 2002, when she played a key 
role in securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the U.S.-led campaign 
against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the wake of the terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. on September 11. 
Adnan 
Mazarei  
Country 
Director for 
Pakistan 
International 
Monetary Fund 
9 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Former IMF Mission Chief in Pakistan 
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USAID* Roundtable with 
members of the 
Pakistan Desk 
USAID 9 March Washington 
DC 
 
  
Shamila 
Chaudhary 
South Asia 
Analyst 
New America 
Foundation 
12 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Senior Advisor to Dean Vali Nasr at the School for Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University and is a 
senior South Asia fellow at the New America Foundation.  Director 
for Pakistan and Afghanistan on the National Security Council from 
2010-2011. Prior to her work at the NSC, she worked on the 
Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff, where she advised 
Secretary Clinton and the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Chaudhary served on the State 
Department’s Pakistan Desk from 2007-2009. 
Fatema 
Sumar 
Senior 
Professional 
Staff Member 
Senate Foreign 
Relations 
Committee 
12 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where she served as a 
Senior Professional Staff Member for then-Senator John F. Kerry 
(D-MA) and Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ). At the committee, 
her responsibilities included oversight of U.S. foreign policy and 
foreign assistance in South and Central Asia, particularly 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, and global Muslim engagement 
issues. 
Joshua White Analyst, South 
Asia; PhD 
Candidate 
United States 
Institute of 
Peace/SAIS 
12 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
White has spent extensive time in South Asia, and has held short-
term visiting research fellowships at the U.S. Institute of Peace 
(USIP), the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), 
the International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIUI), Pakistan's 
National Defence University (NDU), and the Institute for Defence 
and Strategic Analyses (IDSA) in Delhi. 
Danielle 
Pletka 
Vice President, 
Foreign and 
Defence Policy 
American 
Enterprise 
Institute for 
Public Policy 
13 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations senior professional staff 
member for the Near East and South Asia, Pletka was the point 
person on Middle East, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan issues. As 
the senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at 
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Research AEI, 
Steve Coll President New America 
Foundation 
13 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Journalist, author, and business executive. He is currently the dean 
of Columbia Journalism School. He is a former president and CEO 
of New America Foundation, and has been a staff writer for The 
New Yorker.  He is the recipient of two Pulitzer Prize Awards, two 
Overseas Press Club Awards, a PEN American Center John 
Kenneth Galbraith Award, an Arthur Ross Book Award, a 
Livingston Award, a Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award, a 
Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year 
Award, and the Lionel Gelber Prize. In 2012, he was elected to the 
Pulitzer Prize Board. 
Michael 
Krepon 
Senior 
Associate, South 
Asia 
Stimson Centre 13 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Co-founder of the Stimson Centre. He worked previously at the 
Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, and on Capitol Hill. 
His areas of expertise are reducing nuclear dangers, with a regional 
specialization in South Asia. 
Salman 
Assim* 
Analyst, 
Pakistan 
World Bank 13 March 
(for 
background) 
Washington 
DC 
 
  
Bruce Riedel Senior Fellow, 
Foreign Policy 
Brookings 
Institution 
14 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, 
part of Brookings’ new Center for 21st Century Security and 
Intelligence. In addition, Riedel serves as a senior fellow in the 
Center for Middle East Policy. He retired in 2006, after 30 years of 
service, from the Central Intelligence Agency, including postings 
overseas. He was also a senior advisor on South Asia and the 
Middle East to the last four Presidents of the United States in the 
staff of the National Security Council at the White House. He was 
also deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Near East and 
South Asia at the Pentagon and a senior advisor at the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels.  
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Marvin 
Weinbaum 
Scholar in 
Residence 
Middle East 
Institute 
14 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, and served as analyst for Pakistan and 
Afghanistan in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003.  
Dr Robert 
Lieber 
Professor of 
Government and 
International 
Relations 
Georgetown 
University 
14 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown 
University, where he has previously served as Chair of the 
Government Department and Interim Chair of Psychology. In 
addition, he chairs the Executive Committee of Georgetown’s 
Program for Jewish Civilization. He is author or editor of sixteen 
books on international relations and U.S. foreign policy, and he has 
been an advisor to several presidential campaigns, to the State 
Department, and to the drafters of U.S. National Intelligence 
Estimates. 
Kalpana 
Kochhar  
Chief 
Economist, 
South Asia 
Region 
World Bank 15 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Deputy Director in the Strategy, Policy and Review Department of 
the IMF. Between 2010 and 2012, she was the Chief Economist for 
the South Asia Region of the World Bank. 
Ernesto May Director, South 
Asia Poverty 
Reduction and 
Economic 
Management 
Network 
World Bank 15 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Sector Director for Poverty Reduction and Economics Management 
Dr Paul R. 
Pillar 
Researcher, 
Centre for Peace 
and Security 
Studies 
Georgetown 
University 
15 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving 
from 1977 to 2005. He is now a non-resident senior fellow at 
Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies, as well as a 
nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Center for 
21st Century Security and Intelligence 
Polly Nayak Author of Consultant 15 March Washington Independent consultant. She retired from government in 2002. From 
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Woodrow 
Wilson report 
“Aiding without 
Abetting: 
Making US 
civilian 
assistance work 
for both sides 
2012 DC 1995-2001, she 
was the US intelligence community’s senior expert and manager on 
South Asia, 
Shuja Nawaz Director, South 
Asia Centre 
Atlantic Council 15 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
First director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in 
January 2009.  He has worked for the New York Times, the World 
Health Organization, and has headed three separate divisions at the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Ambassador 
Robin 
Raphel* 
Former 
Ambassador for 
Economic 
Assistance, 
Pakistan 
State 
Department  
16 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Until November 2, 2014, she served as coordinator for non-military 
assistance to Pakistan, carrying on the work of the late Richard 
Holbrooke, whose AfPak team she joined in 2009. In 1993, she was 
appointed by President Bill Clinton as the nation's first Assistant 
Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, a newly 
created position at the time designed to assist the U.S. government 
in managing an increasingly complex region. Later served as U.S. 
Ambassador to Tunisia from November 7, 1997 to August 6, 2000, 
during President Bill Clinton's second term in office. She retired 
from the State Department in 2005 after 30 years of service. 
Michal 
Phelan*  
Senior 
Professional 
Staff Member 
Senate 
Committee on 
Foreign 
Relations 
16 March 
2012 
Washington 
DC 
Works for Chairman Richard Lugar, where his portfolio includes 
African Affairs, Afghanistan, and Post-Conflict 
Stabilization/Reconstruction. Prior to his current position, Michael 
completed his Masters degree at The Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy at Tufts University in 2002, and worked as a Fellow at 
Conflict Management Group developing grass roots peace-building 
programs. 
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Tom Gregg* Fellow, 
Afghanistan 
Regional Project 
New York 
University 
20 March 
2012 
New York Fellow and Associate Director Afghanistan-Pakistan Regional 
Project. Prior to joining NYU he served for four years with the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan as Special 
Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 
as the Head of UNAMA's Southeast Region. 
S. Akbar 
Zaidi 
Visiting 
Professor, South 
Asia  
Columbia 
University 
22 March 
2012 
New York Visiting Professor for 2010 – 2011. He holds a joint appointment 
with SIPA and the Department of the Middle Eastern, South Asian, 
and African Studies. His research focuses on development, 
governance, and political economy in South Asia. 
David 
Speedie 
Senior Fellow; 
Director, US 
Global 
Engagement 
Program 
Carnegie 
Council for 
Ethics in 
International 
Affairs 
22 March 
2012 
New York Director of the Council's program on U.S. Global Engagement.  In 
2007–2008, Speedie was also a senior fellow at the Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. 
Jake 
Sherman* 
Deputy Director 
for Programs, 
Conflict 
New York 
University 
23 March 
2012 
New York Deputy Director for Programs Conflict at the Centre on 
International Cooperation.  From 2003-05 he was a political officer 
for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.  
Alexander 
Evans* 
Senior Fellow, 
Jackson Institute 
for Global 
Affairs 
Yale 24 March 
2012 
New York In July 2011 he was appointed the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in 
Foreign Policy at the Library of Congress. Until then he worked as a 
senior advisor to Ambassador Marc Grossman, and previously to 
the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He focused on U.S.-
Pakistan relations and developing a political process in Afghanistan. 
David 
Rohde* 
Journalist Thomson 
Reuters 
27 March 
2012 
New York Investigative journalist for Thomson Reuters. While a reporter for 
The Christian Science Monitor, he won the Pulitzer Prize for 
International Reporting in 1996 for his coverage of the Srebrenica 
massacre. From July 2002 until December 2004, he was co-chief of 
The New York Times ' South Asia bureau, based in New Delhi, India. 
He shared a second Pulitzer Prize for Times 2008 team coverage of 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan. While in Afghanistan, Rohde was 
kidnapped by members of the Taliban in November 2008, but 
managed to escape in June 2009 in Pakistan after seven months in 
captivity. 
 
  
74 
 
 
 
 
Pakistani  Eli te Participants (in order of interview date)  
 
* denotes hand written notes taken rather than transcript from audio recording 
Name Title Workplace Date of 
Interview 
City  Biographical Details 
Salma Malik Assistant 
Professor, 
Department of 
Defence and 
Strategic Studies 
Quaid-i-Azam 
University 
3 October 
2011 
Islamabad Prior to joining QAU, she worked as a Research 
Officer at the Institute of Strategic Studies, 
Islamabad, Pakistan from June 1996 to August 
1999. She has also been on the Visiting Faculty 
list of the Intelligence Bureau Directorate and has 
rendered lectures as a guest speaker at the PAF 
Air War College, Karachi, National Defence 
University, Islamabad, Fatima Jinnah Women 
University, Rawalpindi and Command and Staff 
College, Quetta. 
Khalid Rahman Director General Institute of Policy 
Studies 
6 October 
2011 
Islamabad Editor of the Institute of Policy Studies journal 
and a member of social and development 
organisations. 
Dr Maria Sultan Director General South Asian 
Strategic Stability 
Institute 
7 October 
2011 
Islamabad Media work has also included time as an anchor 
person in country's political television and radio 
programmes. She earned her PhD in Political 
Science from the Bradford University, and her 
thesis contained work on "Pakistan's nuclear arms 
control policy process." Also serves as professor 
at the National Defence University where she 
currently teaching in nuclear policy, weapons, and 
energy development.  
Dr Zafar Jaspal Associate Quaid-i-Azam 10 October Islamabad Areas of research interest include: International 
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Professor, 
Department of 
International 
Relations 
University 2011 Politics, Strategic Studies; Nuclear and Missile 
Proliferation, Biosecurity, WMD, Arms Control/ 
Disarmament; Asymmetric Conflict, Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism; and Pakistan’s Domestic 
Politics, Foreign/Strategic Policy 
Ambassador Ali Sawar 
Naqvi 
Retired 
Ambassador/ 
Executive 
Director 
Centre for 
International 
Strategic Studies 
11 October 
2011 
Islamabad Founding Executive Director of the Centre. 
Established in October 2010 the Centre for 
International Strategic Studies (CISS) as an 
independent and autonomous think-tank for 
research and analysis of current regional and 
international strategic issues from a Pakistani 
perspective, to contribute to the national and 
international discourse, and thus create greater 
understanding between Pakistan and other 
countries.  Diplomat from 1970 to 2006, which 
culminated in senior Ambassadorial positions, 
served at the United Nations, both in New York 
and Vienna, and in Washington D.C, London, 
Paris and Brussels. 
Dr Tahir Amin Chair, 
Department of 
International 
Relations 
Quaid-i-Azam 
University 
11 October 
2011 
Islamabad Former Iqbal Chair at the Centre for International 
Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 
UK.  He holds a PhD in Political Science from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1988), a 
Masters in International Relations from Carleton 
University, Canada (1978), and a M.Sc. in 
International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam 
University (1976). He received a King Faisal 
Scholarship to study at MIT, and a Fulbright 
Award at Harvard University (1992). He was a 
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visiting Fellow at the Watson Institute of 
International Studies, Brown University, 
Providence, USA (1996), and at the Center for 
International Affairs (CFIA) at Harvard 
University.  His research focuses on questions of 
world order, Pakistan's foreign relations, domestic 
politics of Pakistan, Kashmir, terrorism, and the 
politics of South and Central Asia. 
Imtiaz Gul Executive 
Director 
Centre for 
Research and 
Security Studies 
17 
November 
2011 
Islamabad Executive Director of the Islamabad-based 
independent Centre for Research and Security 
Studies that he founded in December 2007, with 
the support of Germany’s Heinrich Boell Stiftung. 
The Centre is a research and advocacy outfit, 
focused primarily on security, radicalization and 
governance.  
Asad Umar CEO; 
President 
Engro; 
Pakistan Business 
Council  
18 February 
2012 
Islamabad Pakistani lawmaker and former business 
administrator . He served as CEO and President of 
Engro Corporation for 8 years during a 27-year 
career with the company. He resigned from his 
post at Engro and joined Imran Khan’s political 
party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf on April 2012.. 
Khurram Hussain Journalist The Express 
Tribune 
20 February 
2012 
Karachi Leading business and economy journalist in 
Pakistan, based in Karachi. He has taught at the 
prestigious Lahore University of Management 
Sciences in the past. He writes a widely read 
column in Dawn, Pakistan’s leading English 
language newspaper and in television has been a 
contributor to the BBC, providing short features 
on economic issues as well as appearing as an 
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analyst for English and Urdu language services. 
Ambassador Qazi 
Humayan  
Retired 
Ambassador 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
1 March 
2012 
Islamabad Mr. Humayun joined the Pakistan Foreign Service 
in 1973.  He was also Ambassador to Afghanistan 
and Turkey, and Additional Secretary - Middle 
East and Africa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
at Islamabad.  
General Jehangir 
Karamat 
Former Chief of 
Army Staff; 
Former 
Ambassador to 
the United 
States 
Current position: 
Director, 
Spearhead 
Research 
4 May 2012 Lahore Retired four-star rank army general, military 
academic, and a former professor of political 
science at the National Defense University who 
held four-star assignments– the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1997 to 
1998, and as the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan 
Army from January 1996 to October 1998. After 
retiring from military service, he continued as a 
professor of Political science at the National 
Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad. In 2004, 
he was appointed as Pakistan Ambassador to the 
United States where he served from November 
2004 until June 2006 
Moeed Yusaf South Asia 
Advisor 
United States 
Institute of Peace 
14 July 
2012 
Islamabad Director of South Asia programs at the U.S. 
Institute of Peace. Yusuf has been engaged in 
expanding USIP’s work on Pakistan/South Asia 
since 2010.  
Lieutenant-General 
Asad Durrani 
Former Chief of 
the Inter-
Services 
Intelligence 
Now retired 8 January 
2013 
Islamabad Retired 3-star rank general in the Pakistan Army 
and presently an intelligence commentator. 
Durrani previously served as the Director-General 
of the Inter-Services Intelligence and former 
Director-General of the Pakistan Army's Military 
Intelligence.  
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Ambassador Akram 
Zaki 
Retired 
Ambassador; 
former Senator 
and Chair of the 
Senate Foreign 
Affairs 
Committee 
Now Retired 21 January 
2013 
Islamabad He has held the role of senior leader of the 
Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PLM-N) and 
chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.  Zaki also served as Pakistani 
ambassador to China, Nigeria, Canada and the 
United States, during a long career with the 
Foreign Service that spanned throughout the 
reigns of Z.A. Bhutto and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. 
Dr Farooq Sattar  Head of Party Muttahida Quami 
Movement 
(MQM) 
23 January 
2013 
Islamabad Pakistani politician, and parliamentarian. He was 
elected a member of national assembly on a ticket 
of Muttahida Qaumi Movement from NA-257 
(Karachi) in Pakistani general election, 2013.  He 
is Deputy Convener and Parliamentary leader of 
the political party MQM. He has also served as 
Provincial Minister in the Sindh Cabinet for Local 
Bodies and is one of the senior Members of the 
MQM Co-Ordination Committee. Also heads the 
Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate. On 16 
March 2008, he was nominated as a candidate for 
the seat of the Prime Minister of Pakistan by the 
MQM. 
Ayaz Amir Politician Pakistan Muslim 
League – Nawaz 
(PML-N) 
5 February 
2013 
Islamabad Prominent Pakistani journalist, columnist and a 
senior politician.  He was previously elected a 
Member of National Assembly representing 
Chakwal in 2008 as a candidate of Pakistan 
Muslim League (Nawaz), he resigned from the 
party on 19 April 2013 after fell foul of articles 62 
and 63 and he was refused a ticket for the National 
Assembly for the 2013 general elections 
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Dr Javid Leghari Chairman  Higher Education 
Commission 
15 February 
2013 
Islamabad Chairperson of the Higher Education Commission 
of Pakistan from Aug 2009 to Aug 2013. He was 
previously Senator of Pakistan from the Pakistan 
Peoples Party. Dr Leghari has been a member of 
the Pakistan Peoples Party, a socialist democratic 
party.  
Moneeza Hashmi President Commonwealth 
Broadcasting 
Association 
16 February 
2013 
Lahore (via 
Skype) 
Born in 1946 to Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Alys Faiz. 
Currently in her second term as President of the 
Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, UK; is 
handling the international relations of HUM TV as 
General Manager, Pakistan; is Project Advisor to 
LightStorm Entertainment; and Trustee of Faiz 
Foundation Trust and Faiz Ghar. Recipient of 
various National and International Awards, one of 
the most prestigious one that she received is the 
President of Pakistan's Pride of Performance 
Award in 2002 for her contribution in portrayal of 
women on the electronic media of Pakistan.  
Ambassador Ayaz 
Wazir 
Retired 
Ambassador  
Now retired 20 February 
2013 
Islamabad Former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan 
Group of Economists Pakistan 
Institute of 
Development 
Economics  
Quaid-i-Azam 
University 
20 February 
2013 
Islamabad  
Faisal Karim Kundi Former Deputy 
Speaker in PPP 
Government 
(2008-2013) 
Seeking re-
election in by-
elections at the 
time of interview 
27 May 
2013 
Islamabad Elected Deputy Speaker, National Assembly of 
Pakistan on 19 March 2008 (youngest in 
Pakistan’s history). 
Comes from a well-known political and 
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agriculturist family of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
province of Pakistan.  
Lieutenant-General 
Talat Masood 
Retired 3-star 
General 
Now retired 28 May 
2013 
Islamabad Retired three-star general and a career Army 
Engineer Officer in the Pakistan Army Corps of 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (EME). 
Raza Rumi  Director, Policy 
and Programs 
Jinnah Institute 29 May 
2013 
Islamabad Pakistani columnist, policy analyst and journalist. 
Consulting editor of The Friday Times, senior 
fellow at Jinnah Institute and most recently 
affiliated with the United States Institute of Peace.  
Raza is also an anchor and host Express News 
show "Khabar Se Agay". 
Ahmed Bilal Mehboob Secretary 
General 
Pakistan Institute 
for Legislative 
Development and 
Transparency 
29 May 
2013 
Islamabad The founder President of PILDAT, Mehboob has 
over 25 years experience in senior management 
and advisory positions and over 8 years 
experience in design, planning and 
implementation of projects in the field of 
Parliamentary development, strengthening 
democratic institutions, democratisation, political 
discourse, election monitoring and dialogues for 
reconciliation. Considered an authority on 
political, legislative and electoral affairs of the 
country. 
Dr Tariq Fazal 
Chaudhary 
Politician Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz 
(PML-N) 
31 May 
2013 
Islamabad Elected as a Member of National Assembly on the 
ticket of Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) from 
the Constituency No 49 Islamabad II in 2008. 
Senator Abbas Afridi Politician Independent 31 May 
2013 
Islamabad Member of upper house of Pakistan Parliament 
currently serving as Federal Minister of Textile 
Industry.  He was elected to the Senate of Pakistan 
in March 2009 as an Independent candidate. He 
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was a member of Senate Standing Committees on 
Rules of Procedures and Privileges, Science and 
Technology, Water and Power, Finance 
Committee, Parliamentary Affairs, Defense 
Production.  
Shafqat Mahmood Politician Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf (PTI) 
4 June 2013 Islamabad Pakistani Politician, Columnist, and a retired civil 
servant who is serving as the Member of 
Parliament of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf from 
Lahore's Constituency NA-126.  
Zahid Hussain Journalist Freelance 5 June 2013 Islamabad Award-winning journalist and writer, a senior 
editor with Newsline and a correspondent for The 
Times of London, Newsweek and The Wall Street 
Journal. He has also covered Pakistan and 
Afghanistan for several other international 
publications, including the Associated Press (AP) 
and The Economist. His book Frontline Pakistan: 
The Struggle With Militant Islam has won 
widespread acclaim as a seminal text on the 
subject.  
Ayesha Siddiqa Consultant Freelance 14 June 
2013 
Islamabad Pakistani civilian military scientist, geo-strategist, 
author, former bureaucrat and political 
commentator. She regularly writes critical 
columns for reputable English language 
newspapers, including Dawn newspapers, Daily 
Times and Express Tribune. Her column appears 
every Friday. She previously served as a Visiting 
Scholar at the Johns Hopkins University 
AR Jerral Retired 
Brigadier 
Now retired 19 June 
2013 
Islamabad Regular columnist for conservative Pakistani 
English language press. 
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Abdur Rauf Khan 
Gandapur 
Country 
Director 
Oxford Policy 
Management 
19 June 
2013 
Islamabad Over 18 years' experience in program 
management with expertise in aid coordination, 
financial management and general management 
skills. 
Dr Simbal Khan Analyst Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute 
11 July 
2013 
Islamabad Pakistan Scholar 2012-2013 Woodrow Wilson 
Centre, Washington DC, and Senior Research 
Fellow, Islamabad, Policy Research Institute, 
Pakistan. She is the CEO of Indus Global 
Initiative (IGI), a private sector enterprise focused 
on promoting regional connectivity in South-
Central Asia. 
Safiya Aftab Aid Consultant Freelance 17 July 
2013 
Islamabad Islamabad-based consultant with degrees in 
economics and public administration, who has 
worked extensively with a wide range of 
development agencies and research institutions. 
Her work covers economics, governance and 
political economy issues. 
Ikram Seghal Chairman Pathfinder Group 
(Security 
Contractors) 
25 July 
2013 
Islamabad Regular contributor of articles in newspapers that 
include: The News and the Urdu daily Jang. In 
addition, he appears regularly on current affairs 
programs on television in his capacity as a defense 
and security analyst. He is currently Chairman, 
Pathfinder Group Pakistan, which includes two of 
the largest private security companies in the 
country. Also involved in various national and 
international organizations. He is Member World 
Economic Forum (WEF); International 
Organization for Migration (IOM); Director, East 
West Institute (EWI), a US-based think-tank; and 
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Member, WEF Global Agenda Council (GAC) for 
counter-terrorism. 
Shahzad Bangash Secretary  Planning and 
Development 
Commission, 
Federally 
Administered 
Tribal Areas 
(FATA) 
25 July 
2013 
Islamabad Public servant. 
Amina Khan Analyst, South 
Asia 
Institute of 
Strategic Studies 
Islamabad 
29 July 
2013 
Islamabad Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic 
Studies (ISSI), Islamabad, focusing on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Tribal Areas (FATA). 
She has also been a visiting fellow at the SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs 
(2011). She has authored a book titled FATA: 
Voice of the Unheard: Path Dependency and Why 
History Matters (2011) 
Senator Hameed Ullah 
Jan Afridi 
Politician Independent 21 August 
2013 
Islamabad Independent member of National assembly elected 
from NA- 46 Khyber agency in Federally 
administered Tribal areas, Pakistan. 
Ejaz Haider* Journalist Freelance 23 August 
2013 
Islamabad Former executive director of Jinnah Institute and 
Senior Journalist. He is a Columnist in Express 
Tribune and The News. He hosts program 
‘Belaag’ on Capital TV. 
Adnan Aurangzeb Former 
politician 
 24 August 
2013 
Islamabad Former member of Parliament and the pretender 
of the former Swat princely state.  He is the eldest 
son of Miangul Aurangzeb and the eldest 
grandson of Miangul Jahan Zeb (the last ruler of 
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Swat), and General Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first 
military ruler. 
Senator Mushahid 
Hussain 
Politician, Chair 
Senate Defence 
Committee 
Pakistan Muslim 
League – Quaid 
(PML-Q) 
24 October 
2013 
Islamabad Conservative journalist, political scientist, 
geostrategist, and a former media mogul, currently 
serving as the senator on a Pakistan Muslim 
League (Q) platform to Senate of Pakistan. 
Secretary-General of the Pakistan Muslim League, 
a centrist party. 
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Chapter Three: What does Pakistan 
need? Divergent perspectives on its 
wicked nation-building challenge  
 
 
 
 
“Pakistan is a guy sitting on a keg of dynamite, he swallowed poison, a deadly snake 
is writhing towards him, there is an earthquake in the vicinity, a jet plane is about to 
crash in his area and somebody is shooting at him with a rifle. So what is going to get 
him first? How do you sequence the problem?”  
 
Stephen P. Cohen, Brookings Institution (Interview: 8 March 2012) 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter begins our examination of the relative importance of the nation-building 
and realist objectives of US aid to Pakistan by identifying what the US and Pakistani 
elite see as Pakistan’s biggest challenges.  The next chapter examines what the same 
groups identify as what the US most wants from Pakistan.  Using the argument 
developed across the first two chapters, if there is a convergence in answers to both 
questions around nation-building challenges and solutions, then I will conclude that 
US aid is perceived to be primarily given with a nation-building objective.  But if 
there is a divergence, I will conclude that there is a perception that the realist 
objective dominates.  I am particularly interested in this, as in the other results 
chapters, in divergences or similarities between the views of the two elite groups. 
 
To summarise, the research question posed in this chapter is: What do the Pakistan 
and US elite see as the main challenges facing Pakistan? 
 
The key interview question drawn on to answer this question is: “What are the biggest 
challenges facing Pakistan?”  This question was placed at the beginning of the 
interview given its relatively straightforward nature.  This allowed me to build rapport 
with the interview respondents prior to more complex questions on the bilateral 
relationship, aid and leverage (Dunne 1995, p.67).  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, there is a large Pakistan studies literature covering a range of 
subjects: from politics and foreign policy, to energy and the economy.  Many 
highlight the growing number of challenges for Pakistan.  For example, Hathaway 
and Kugelman (2009), and Kugelman (2013) systematically examine Pakistan’s 
energy challenges.  There have been few attempts, however, to learn from the 
Pakistani elite what they think are the key problems facing their country.  Lieven 
(2011) is an exception.  He provides a comprehensive analysis of contemporary 
threats to Pakistan’s stability, weaving interviews with the elite and ordinary Pakistani 
with analysis to explain challenges in Pakistan’s institutions at both the federal and 
provincial levels.  Lieven finds Pakistan to be “janus-faced”:  
Pakistan is divided, disorganised, economically backward, corrupt, violent, 
unjust, often savagely oppressive towards the poor and women, and home to 
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extremely dangerous forms of extremism and terrorism – ‘and yet it moves’, 
and is in many ways surprisingly tough and resilient as a state and society (p. 
4). 
 
The views expressed by the elite I interview certainly capture the range of problems 
Lieven surveys.  It is not difficult to characterise the future of Pakistan as a “wicked 
problem” (Rittel and Weber 1973), one which can be and is formulated in any number 
of ways.  Predominantly also, the views expressed focus on Pakistan’s internal rather 
than external challenges.  Interestingly, the view that Lieven summarises above is also 
the view shared by the US elite: as is shown later in the chapter, their concerns are 
with the economy and with governance.  They are not particularly worried about 
terrorism.  The Pakistani elites I spoke to are certainly concerned with the economy, 
and to a lesser degree with problems of governance.  But they are also very concerned 
with security-related issues.  For the most part, they are not convinced that Islamist 
extremism was being held “in check” and voiced questions about just how “tough and 
resilient” Pakistan state and society is.  I argue that this is likely a recent shift in 
attitudes in Pakistan reflecting the intensification of terrorist threats in Pakistan in 
recent years, and a crystallisation of political sentiment that terrorism is no longer a 
problem to be ignored. 
 
This chapter is organised into four sections.  Following this introduction, Section 3.2 
provides an overview of Pakistani elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges.  Section 
3.3 outlines American elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges.  Section 3.4 
discusses and compares Pakistan and US elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges.  
Section 3.5 concludes.   
 
3.2 Pakistani elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges 
 
The question itself – “What are the biggest challenges facing Pakistan?” – and the 
fact that it was open-ended results in most respondents naming more than one 
challenge.  The full sample of 40 Pakistani respondents answered this question, 
naming 102 challenges, an average of 2.5 per respondent.  
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There are various ways to analyse the responses.  Focusing on key words or 
“headings” used by respondents (see Section 2.7.4), there were 33 different 
challenges named a total of 102 times.  Table 3.1 below sets out the five most popular 
responses in terms of their mention by number of respondents.  Annex 3.1 gives the 
full list of response “headings”, as I have analysed them. 
 
Table 3.1: Top five challenges named by the Pakistani elite 
Challenge Number of Respondents 
Economy 23 
Terrorism 11 
Energy 9 
Security 8 
Afghanistan 7 
 
Slightly more than half of the elite name the economy as a challenge, with terrorism, 
energy, security and Afghanistan also named frequently.  To undertake further 
analysis, the 33 different challenges are placed into one of four categories: 
 Economic and social  
 Domestic politics and governance 
 Security-related 
 External 
 
Annex 3.1 shows the division of responses into these four categories.  For the most 
part, categorisation was straightforward.  The guidelines followed are further 
explained where necessary in the course of the following discussion.  
 
As outlined in Table 3.2 below, the most popular category of response is “economic 
and social”, with 40 per cent of responses falling within this category, followed by  
“security-related” with 30 per cent of responses, “domestic politics and governance” 
with 16 per cent of responses, and “external” with 14 per cent of responses.  Almost 
three-quarters of the elite name at least one economic/social challenge and 65 per cent 
name at least one security challenge.  Two in five interviewees name a domestic 
political and governance challenge.  This demonstrates the breadth of challenges 
perceived by the Pakistani elite.   
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Table 3.2: Pakistani policy elite perceptions of Pakistan’s biggest challenges 
Category Number of responses  
(%  responses) 
Number of respondents  
(%  total respondents) 
Economic and social 41 (40%) 29 (73%) 
Security-related 31 (30%) 26 (65%) 
Domestic politics and governance 16 (16%) 15 (38%) 
External 14 (14%) 8 (20%) 
Total  102 (100% ) 78 (196% ) 
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents  expressed as a percentage. The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above. The full sample of 40 Pakistani respondents answered this 
question. 
 
The next four sections provide a detailed analysis of the four categories of responses.    
 
3.2.1 Economic and social challenges 
 
The most frequently named challenges are within the “economic and social” category 
of response.  As noted, almost three-quarters of respondents give a response in this 
category, and 40 per cent of responses fall within it.  This indicates that respondents 
are likely to name an economic or social challenge, and then some other challenge, 
whether security-related, political, or external.  
 
Overwhelmingly, the challenges in this category are economic rather than social.  23 
of the 29 responses within this category simply talk about “the economy” as a 
challenge.  The most popular more specific response in this category referred to 
energy.  A number of other responses related to such issues such education, healthcare 
and tax reform are mentioned by just a few respondents. 
 
The economy is identified as a general challenge throughout the interview data set, 
from the first interview, in October 2011 to the last, in October 2013.  Evidently, it is 
seen as a significant, enduring challenge, not linked to any particular event in time.  
Respondents from all professional groupings (academic/think tank, retired (bureaucrat 
or military), politician, journalist, business and currently serving public servants) and 
all provinces (except Balochistan) name the economy as a challenge. 
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Many respondents simply name the economy and move on without elaboration.  For 
those respondents who do elaborate upon their response, two key themes emerge: the 
interlinkages between security and the economy, and the lack of government focus on 
the economy. 
 
The Pakistani elite tends to view the country’s poor economic health as an underlying 
cause of the poor security situation.  Author and journalist Zahid Hussain argues that:  
For the last five consecutive years we have a growth rate of less than 
3 per cent, which is basically unprecedented in the country’s history.  This has 
resulted in huge unemployment and it has also, to a certain extent, fuelled 
extremism and militancy.  Both are interconnected – militancy and economic 
revival (Interview: 5 June 2013).  
 
Akram Zaki, who served as Ambassador to China, Nigeria, Canada and the 
United States, makes a similar argument, focusing on Pakistan’s “youth bulge”:7  
Pakistan’s biggest challenge is the mismanagement of its own economy.  
Terrorism can be controlled.  We have a youth bulge where 70 per cent of our 
people are below the age of 30 and there are not enough jobs in the market.  
So there are three possibilities for our youth: those who can afford it are 
leaving the country, those who have no hope are going to disappointment and 
drugs, and those who have no hope and who are strong and angry; they are 
potential terrorists.  If we are to fight terrorism, we must reorganise our 
economic structure to absorb the youth bulge (Interview: 21 January 2013). 
 
Another common argument is that the government does not focus enough policy 
attention on Pakistan’s economic challenges.  Qazi Humayan, former Ambassador to 
Afghanistan and Turkey claims that:  
The economic challenges are very difficult and it becomes compounded by the 
fact that this government is completely nonchalant towards it.  They are just 
not interested and it is a government that has performed very badly.  They are 
compounding the problem and they don’t pay attention to anything – entire 
programs are based on government borrowing and deficit financing, while 
                                                 
7 According to the United Nations Development Program, Pakistan has one of the largest youth 
populations in the world, with 68 per cent of the population less than 30 years of age (UNDP 2013).   
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inflation is killing everyone (Interview: 1 March 2012). 
 
This is in part a complaint about general government incompetence and in part a 
concern that economic considerations are being squeezed out by a focus on terrorism.  
Ayaz Wazir, former Ambassador to Afghanistan, takes the latter view: “Before 
militancy, we used to spend a bit on our own development.  Now everything is taken 
for our protection” (Interview: 20 February 2013).   
 
Pakistan faces a massive shortfall in electricity (Imtiaz 2011), which results in some 
parts of the country without power for most of the day.  It is not surprising then that 
almost one quarter of interviewees identified energy as a national challenge.  As 
Zahid Hussain, author and journalist, puts it: “The country is facing one of the worst 
power crises in its history and there is load shedding everywhere, even in cities like 
Islamabad we don’t have a continuous supply of light.  So in this situation no 
government can be expected to revive the economy” (Interview: 5 June 2013). 
 
As mentioned, few raise social as against economic concerns, but education is 
highlighted by three respondents.  Poor education facilities and outcomes are linked to 
broader economic and social challenges.  Senator Mushahid Hussain, head of the 
Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid (PML-Q) party and chair of the Senate Defence 
Committee considers education to be the key to Pakistan’s prosperity:  
I speak as a former educationist who started his career in the university.  
Without education, this country cannot move forward, which means education 
for boys and for girls.  Education is also a vehicle for social and economic 
equality, and for upward social mobility in Pakistan (Interview: 24 October 
2013). 
 
3.2.2 Security-related challenges 
 
The second most popular category of response is “security-related”.  65 per cent of 
respondents name at least one challenge in this category (just three fewer than named 
an economic challenge).  Security-related challenges are defined here as internal 
challenges, relating chiefly to terrorism, violence and law and order.  Challenges 
relating to the war on terror, while security related, are primarily linked to Pakistan’s 
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foreign policy, and are therefore considered in Section 3.2.4 on Pakistan’s external 
challenges. 
 
Given the sheer number of terrorist attacks that occurred during the interview period 
of October 2011 to October 2013,8 it is not surprising that security features so 
strongly in interview responses.  As author and journalist Zahid Hussain puts it: 
“Community violence has cost a huge amount, in terms of human life, as well as the 
economy.  We have seen over the last several years there have been about 40,000 to 
50,000 deaths, mostly in the tribal areas.  We have to restore law and order” 
(Interview: 5 June 2013).   
 
Perhaps the reason security was not raised by even more respondents is given by 
General Asad Durrani, former head of Pakistan’s the Inter-Services Intelligence.  He 
nominates terrorism as a major challenge, but one that Pakistan is able to contain on 
its own:  
A challenge that is made out to be big for us [Pakistan] from the western 
perspective is terrorism. Most people here would say it is a problem, but it is 
manageable.  We don’t think terrorism is that big a problem.  It can’t be 
solved, but it can be contained (Interview: 8 January 2013). 
 
This is similar to the view of former Ambassador Zaki cited above who nominated the 
economy not terrorism as Pakistan’s major challenge because “Terrorism can be 
controlled.”  Such views echoes the conclusion of Lieven (2011) that Pakistan will 
survive the terrorists.  But many are more worried than this conclusion suggests.  
Raza Rumi, a Director at the Jinnah Institute, one of Pakistan’s leading think-tanks, 
clearly views domestic extremism and militancy as an existential threat:  
The biggest challenge that Pakistan faces currently has to do with the survival, 
the capacity of the state itself, because it is under attack by the home-grown 
militants and extremist strands, and it is impacting everything else; it is 
impacting the economy, it is impacting foreign policy and it is impacting the 
way the state is now viewing itself.  It is also impacting the mindset of 
                                                 
8 From January 2011-December 2013, 17,800 people (including civilians, security force personnel and 
terrorists) were killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan.  See www.satp.org for further terrorism-related 
data. 
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Pakistanis.  When faced with the genie of extremism that the State has 
unleashed itself – they want to now appease it and bow before it (Interview: 
28 May 2013).   
 
Even when security threats are not seen as existential, they are viewed as major for 
several reasons: they threaten the economy, they distract attention from other issues, 
they are particularly severe in certain regions, and they pose difficult strategic 
questions for the state. 
 
On the economy, unlike those in Section 3.2.1 who blame Pakistan’s economic woes 
on its security problems, others see the causality running in the opposite direction. 
General Jehangir Karamat, a former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States and a 
former Chief of Army Staff, the most senior position in Pakistan’s military, argues:  
Progress is not going to happen [in the economy] until we have internal 
security because we have to have a manufacturing sector if we want FDI 
[foreign direct investment] and if you are going to convince domestic 
investors that it is a good place to keep your money.  The first thing you have 
to do is [create] internal security and stability because that has been going 
down for the last seven to eight years (Interview: 4 May 2012).   
 
Independent Member of the National Assembly representing the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Hameed Ullah Jan Afridi highlights how security 
problems distract from others:  
For the last 12-13 years the law and order situation has become a major issue.  
Parliamentarians are struck by the day-to-day issues on the law and order 
situation, due to which they afford very little focus to other important things.  
Until and unless you create an environment for the locals and the foreigners - 
a peaceful environment - it will become difficult to have progress (Interview: 
21 August 2013). 
 
Note the posing of the problem by Afridi in terms of “law and order”.  Five 
interviewees put the problem in these terms, and at least some were concerned not 
only with terrorists but also with criminals.  General Karamat, Chief of Army between 
January 1996 and October 1998, immediately preceding General Pervez Musharraf, 
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complained about how in Karachi “extortionists, kidnappers and so on have been 
operating with almost a free hand.” (Interview: 4 May 2012). 
 
Imtiaz Gul, Director at the Centre for Research and Security Studies, emphasises the 
problem of countering the religio-political groups that have proliferated in Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa and South Punjab (Interview: 17 November 2011).  In Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa for example, weak governance has allowed the Taliban and other 
extremist groups to operate largely unchecked (Mehboob 2011).   
 
Finally, terrorism poses a strategic dilemma for the government.  Economic journalist 
for the Express Tribune, Khurram Husain, believes that Pakistan’s long-standing ties 
to extremist networks, used to advance its own political and geo-strategic interests, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, have now become a problem for the government:  
How do you deal with the question of whether or not you are going to divest 
yourself from involvement with extremist organisations?  It appears that 
Pakistan is going to retain links and not divest them so for the future the 
biggest question becomes how the government will manage this relationship 
with extremists.  They want to use them as a tool to project influence in the 
region, but to what extent will that influence project itself back into the 
country (Interview: 20 February 2012)? 
 
Neither a respondent’s home province nor their profession appears to have any 
obvious effect on their perceptions of terrorism, although it is noteworthy that all 
journalists raised security as a challenge, likely because of a greater awareness of the 
issues through their or their outlet’s own reporting.   
 
3.2.3 Domestic politics and governance  
 
The third most popular category of challenge is in the area of domestic politics and 
governance.  15 respondents (38 per cent) mention 16 challenges (16 per cent) in this 
category.  This was the most diffuse category, with the largest number of different 
individual responses within it: ten in all.   
 
Six respondents specifically mention governance as a challenge.  Businessman Ikram 
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Seghal sees it as the underlying challenge: 
If you reduce Pakistan’s challenges to one word, it is a lack of good 
governance.  Everything stems from a lack of good governance.  And 
unfortunately bad governance has been deliberately fostered to ensure 
corruption.  In parliament, democracy talks about one person, one vote and yet 
they do not want to devolve power to the grass-roots level, to the local bodies.  
All the provinces, without exception, do not allow that because they know it 
works against the type of bad governance.  When you have concentrated 
power, you have concentrated money, right?  If you look at it, everything else 
stems from that, you know? (Interview: 25 July 2013). 
 
A number of more specific governance and political challenges are raised by a 
number of other respondents, but none by more than one (see Annex 3.1).  
Khalid Rahman, Director General at the Institute of Policy Studies argues that the 
various political and governance challenges wind up reinforcing each other: 
We have been having military governments for more than half the country’s 
life.  Whenever there were political governments9, they were unable to 
complete their terms.  There is political instability.  And this instability has 
resulted in very poor governance.  (Interview: 6 October 2011). 
 
3.2.4 External challenges 
 
Responses within the external category are least cited by the Pakistani elite, with only 
20 per cent of respondents and 14 per cent of responses falling within this category.  
This external category houses responses that fall within the realm of Pakistan’s 
external affairs, including bilateral, regional and multilateral issues.  The main 
external concern was Afghanistan, named by seven of the eight respondents in this 
category.  The war on terror is also mentioned by three respondents.  
 
Afghanistan is the fourth most frequently named challenge overall (see Table 3.1).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of Afghanistan as a challenge for Pakistan is 
not new.  Even before Pakistan existed as an independent state, the porous border 
                                                 
9 In Pakistan, many refer to the times of civilian-led government as “political government” as opposed 
to times of military rule.  
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between British India and Afghanistan and the shared ethnic and cultural identities of 
those living in the border regions inextricably binds both states together.  The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan created negative spillover effects in Pakistan, including 
pushing weapons and conflict into Pakistan, drug proliferation and the movement of 
millions of Afghan refugees (Lodhi 2009).  Pakistan also hosts almost 1.5 million 
registered Afghan refugees – the largest protracted refugee population globally 
(UNHCR 2015).   
 
Khalid Rahman, Director General of the Institute of Policy Studies, which has a 
strong association and funding ties to the Islamic political party Jamaat Islami, 
articulates the view that Afghanistan remains a long-term, ongoing challenge for 
Pakistan: 
Side-by-side we have a war-like situation in Afghanistan for the past more 
than 30 years.  The way Pakistan and Afghanistan are situated, you can’t 
isolate them.  There are so many linkages between Pakistan and Afghanistan – 
anything happening in Afghanistan has fallout in Pakistan.  The nature of war 
and the players in the war have changed, but the way it has been going on for 
the last 30 years, it has created a lot of impact on the Pakistani people, society, 
government and the decision making process (Interview: 6 October 2011). 
 
Others within the elite are focused on the current context, in particular the impending 
US military withdrawal from Afghanistan.  Ambassador Ali Shawar Naqvi, who also 
served as the Deputy Head of Mission in the United States, lists Afghanistan as a 
challenge based on the inability to predict what will happen once the US and NATO 
military forces leave:  
Pakistan fears that the whole perspective will change because in Afghanistan 
there will be a struggle for power… The Indians are one factor in the 
uncertainty in the struggle for power… Then China and Russia are going to be 
interested.  So it is possible that there will be civil war in Afghanistan and 
every player is involved.  That is going to be very detrimental to Pakistan’s 
interests, because Pakistan wants peace and stability in Afghanistan with a 
modicum of influence.  This won’t be easy and it will have its 
repercussions…I think Pakistan has much to worry about. (Interview: 
11 October 2011).   
 97 
 
Interviewees are concerned with the repercussions of the war in Afghanistan on the 
domestic situation, Journalist Zahid Hussain highlights the effect of the war on tribal 
areas: “Whatever happens in Afghanistan will have a direct bearing on Pakistani 
peace and vice-versa also.  Because regional peace is also directly linked with how we 
deal with the problem of insurgency in tribal areas – Pakistan’s tribal areas have 
become the centre of conflict from both sides of the border” (Interview: 5 June 2013). 
 
Others point to the broader cost of the war on terror in terms of a loss of legitimacy 
and its economic costs.  Professor Tahir Amin, Chair of the Department of 
International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University, argues:  
There has emerged a very deep distrust of the state among the people.  They 
think that the government is not following our national interest, so groups 
have emerged who are trying to challenge the legitimacy of the writ of the 
state.  This is very serious (Interview: 11 October 2011). 
 
Khalid Rahman also focuses on the economic costs of the war on terror in his 
response:  
For all practical purposes, for the last ten years we have been fighting a war.  
Some would say America is practically fighting against us; they have brought 
the war from Afghanistan to Pakistan.  When there is a war, you can’t take 
long-term measures for development.  You have to focus your resources and 
energy towards the war because it is the most immediate threat to you 
(Interview: 6 October 2011).   
 
3.3 American elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges 
 
As with the Pakistani elite, the US elite were asked at the beginning of their 
interviews what they perceived to be Pakistan’s biggest challenge.  36 of the policy 
elite (out of a sample size of 38) provided 82 responses to this question, identifying 
on average 2.3 responses each. 10   
                                                 
10 One interviewee did not respond to this question, believing it was not the United States’ job to 
comment on Pakistan’s challenges and one respondent from the World Bank was not asked this 
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Using keywords or “headings”, the 82 responses can be listed as 41 different 
challenges, shown in Annex 3.2.  The five most popular responses are shown in Table 
3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Top five challenges named by the American elite 
Challenge Number of 
Respondents 
Economy 9 
Energy 6 
Afghanistan  5 
Institutions 5 
India 4 
 
The economy is the challenge most often mentioned by US interviewees as it is for 
Pakistani respondents.  Energy is the second most popular for the US, and third for 
Pakistan.  But other responses diverge, and there is nothing like the commonality of 
response seen in Pakistan.  For example, only one-quarter of US respondents mention 
the economy; some 60 percent of Pakistanis do.  Further comparative analysis is 
provided in Section 3.4. 
 
To undertake further analysis, all 82 US responses are placed into the same four 
categories as used for the analysis of the Pakistani answers: 
 Economic challenges 
 Security-related 
 Domestic politics and governance  
 External 
 
Annex 3.2 shows the categorisation of challenges into the four themes and Table 3.4 
summarises the results, listing the categories in order of popularity.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
question because he was interviewed only to provide background information on the World Bank’s 
program in Pakistan. 
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Table 3.4: American policy elite perceptions of Pakistan’s biggest challenges 
Category Number of responses  
(%  responses) 
Number of respondents  
(%  total respondents) 
Economic and social 32 (40%) 21 (58%) 
Domestic politics and governance 27 (33%) 19 (53%) 
External 14 (17%) 12 (33%) 
Security-related 9 (11%) 8 (22%) 
Total  82 (100% ) 60 (166% ) 
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents  expressed as a percentage. The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above.  36 of the full sample of 38 US respondents answered this 
question. 
 
As for Pakistani respondents, “economic and social” is the most popular category 
with 40 per cent of responses.  The ordering of the other categories was different 
however.  “Domestic political and governance” is the second most popular category 
with 33 per cent of responses, “external” the third with 17 per cent of responses, and 
“security-related” the fourth with 11 per cent of responses.   
 
3.3.1 Economic and social challenges 
 
Responses within the category of “economic and social challenges” are the most 
popular with the US elite.  40 per cent of responses fall within this category, and 
58 per cent of respondents provide a response within it.   
 
Nine of the elite talk about the economy either in general terms, or to cover a range of 
issues and problems.  A political staffer in Washington DC is in the latter category: 
“The debt crisis, inflation, gas prices, and energy shortages.  It (the economic crisis) is 
on everybody’s radar but no one has come up with a plan to get Pakistan out of it and 
it is going to impact every other piece – whether it is the security crisis, the political 
crisis or its [Pakistan’s] relationship with India” (Interview: political staffer, March 
2012.  
 
Others focus on more specific challenges.  Six respondents highlight the energy crisis.  
World Bank and International Monetary Fund staff are concerned about on two key 
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issues in energy: “First, they [Pakistan] haven’t invested enough in keeping up the 
power supply.  Second, there are problems with the institutional and regulatory 
framework for collecting whatever tariffs they charge.” (Interviews: International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, March 2012). 
 
Seven other specific economic challenges are mentioned, most by only one or two 
respondents. These include: economic growth, the provision of social services, water, 
development, tax, fiscal stability, and job creation.  
 
On the social policy side, a few in the US policy elite mention education or 
demography, in particular, the youth bulge, as both an opportunity and a challenge.  
 
3.3.2 Domestic politics and governance  
 
Almost as many respondents name domestic politics and governance as they do 
economic and social challenges: 19 versus 21.  Many different challenges are named 
within this category: institutions (five times), domestic political issues and state 
coherence (three times each), and a dozen other challenges once or twice.  Clearly, 
Pakistan’s political, like its economic, challenges are seen as multi- faceted, and 
different respondents prioritise different aspects of the problem.   
 
The concern for institutions extends beyond the government.  Robert Hathaway, 
Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, says:  
I worry a lot about Pakistan’s institutions, not simply the government… 
Educational institutions, the business sector and not only elected politicians 
but also the judicial system.  There has generally been a break down in the 
authority of traditional religion.  This is another institution in crisis right now.  
If Pakistan’s institutions don’t begin to work better, Pakistanis are going to be 
increasingly in despair (Interview: 7 March 2012). 
 
Several interviewees note Pakistan’s stop-start experience with democracy, arguing 
that frequent military rule results in the “atrophying” of civilian institutions 
(Interview: Ambassador Robin Raphel, State Department, 16 March 2012).  
According to Paul Pillar of Georgetown University:  “The internal political equation 
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is the biggest Pakistani challenge.  For Pakistan’s whole history it has never really 
solved it.  They have gone back and forth between direct military rule and sort of 
what they have right now” (Interview: 15 March 2012).   
 
Given interviews with the United States elite were conducted in March 2012, more 
than a year before Pakistan’s federal elections in May 2013, it is not surprising that 
there is a strong focus among interviewees on the consolidation of democracy. 
Shamila Chaudhary at the New America Foundation agrees rebalancing the civil-
military situation is key to improving the internal political environment in Pakistan: 
We’ve seen the relationship between the civilians and the military deteriorate 
a lot in the past couple of years.  Some of that is because of Afghanistan and 
national security issues; some of it is just because it is a bad relationship.  
Ironing out the details of the relationship in this new democratic atmosphere… 
It will be a key challenge for the [Pakistani] elite (Interview: 12 March 2012). 
 
3.3.3 External 
 
External challenges are named third most frequently by the US elite (17 per cent of all 
responses) and by one third of all respondents.  Interestingly, India featured almost as 
frequently much as Afghanistan (four vs. five responses), and nuclear proliferation is 
also raised as a concern by three respondents.  
 
Afghanistan is the third most popular individual overall response.  Several in the elite 
frame Pakistan’s biggest challenge in terms of a post-2014 US withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.   Dr. Andrew Wilder, Director of the Afghanistan and Pakistan program 
at the United States Institute for Peace, argues:  
This is coming to a bit of a head here, especially as the 2014 time-frame 
looms.  Everyone is moving into the end game scenario to protect and 
preserve their interests. I think Pakistan is increasingly nervous with the 
international community and the US in particular – anything that will speed up 
the withdrawal (from Afghanistan) is going to make getting a politically 
negotiated, durable settlement more complicated (Interview: 6 March 2012). 
 
Perspectives on Afghanistan are couched in terms of how Pakistan will cope with the 
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challenge of Afghanistan once the US withdrawals militarily.  This highlights the 
importance the US elite place on Pakistan being positively involved in a negotiated 
political settlement with its neighbors: “Some kind of political solution in Afghanistan 
and broader stabilisation will be vital to stability” (Interview: Paul Fishstein, Harvard 
Belfer Center, 6 March 2012). 
 
Shamila Chaudhary, South Asia Analyst at the New America Foundation agrees that 
Afghanistan is the biggest issue on Pakistan’s horizon:  
It will be the biggest national security issue up to 2014.  Pakistanis will have 
to worry about instability, lots of refugees, the Taliban not being as much of a 
strategic ally as in the past, and maybe not helping out Pakistan in the way that 
it expects… After 2014 all bets are off and anything can happen (Interview: 12 
March 2012). 
 
The frequent identification of Afghanistan as a significant challenge or issue for 
Pakistan is a recurrent theme throughout interviews with the US elite. 
 
Interestingly, almost as many in the American elite raise Pakistan’s longstanding 
troubled relationship with India.  Pakistan’s tendency to view its foreign and defense 
policy through the lens of India is linked to its long history of distrust and is the 
legacy of three wars fought between the two countries.  According to David Speedie, 
Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs: “It [India] is 
by far the overriding issue for Pakistan to deal with.  To some extent, it colours so 
many of the other issues that are front page news” (Interview: 22 March 2012).  The 
US elite emphasises the importance of a different sort of relationship with India: 
Shuja Nawaz from the Atlantic Council agrees economic imperatives should drive 
Pakistan to rethink its regional relations, in particular with India:  
The reordering of Pakistan’s regional relationships is going to be critical…  
The India-Pakistan relationship remains key to everything.  There is a 
disparity in the size, the growth rate and the military.  Whether Pakistan is 
successful in reordering these relationships, particularly with India, will be 
critical to how it manages itself going forward (Interview: 15 March 2012). 
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Nuclear proliferation is also named by a number of the elite as a serious challenge, 
even if one that has been pushed to the background, for now.  Bruce Riedel from the 
Brookings Institution argues:  
The US is committed to a world with no nuclear weapons.  Pakistan has the 
fastest growing nuclear weapons arsenal in the world.  This issue, before 9/11 
was the principal barrier to positive relations.  If somehow Afghanistan and al 
Qaeda went away, it will come back (Interview: 14 March 2012). 
 
3.3.4 Security-related 
 
The least frequently named set of challenges are the “security-related” category of 
response, with only eight US respondents mentioning a response in this category, 
compared to 26 Pakistanis.  Equal numbers of the elite name extremism (three 
respondents) and militancy (three respondents) as serious challenges.  Some view the 
problem as getting worse. A political staffer in Washington, with expertise in 
Pakistan, notes that:  
It has been a slow shift.  There are more extremists, a more religiously 
conservative population – that is what the trend is.  Part of the problem is that 
there are always things to multiply that – a lack of education, lack of jobs, lack 
of a stable economy.  When these things combine, it becomes a problem. We 
don’t have programs to address it [extremism] at all.  We shifted our aid to 
counterinsurgency in the tribal areas, which is too much of a band-aid 
approach (Interview: March 2012). 
 
Marvin Weinbaum, at the Middle East Institute, is one of the few who raised 
terrorism as an existential threat, not now, but perhaps in the future.  
The extremist groups, though Pakistan is sometimes in denial of them as the 
daily killings demonstrate – Pakistan does face a challenge from insurgency, 
which potentially threatens the state existentially.  It is not to that point yet… 
(Interview: 23 March 2012). 
 
Others, however, were more concerned about Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups, 
rather than terrorism itself.  Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 
argues:  
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Pakistan’s support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is an open fact.  The head of 
LeT, with its new hat as Jamaat-ud-Dawa11, travels around the country freely.  
Much more murky is their support for al Qaeda.  The question of who was 
providing or who was complicit in the hiding of Osama bin Laden, the 
question that we don’t have the answer to, but which we have a lot of 
circumstantial evidence, which points to some level of complicity with the 
Pakistani establishment (Interview: 14 March 2012). 
 
3.4  Discussion  
 
Comparing Pakistani and US elite responses is instructive, and highlights significant 
similarities and differences with respect to how Pakistan’s challenges are viewed.  
 
I begin my comparison of results by looking at the top five responses from both 
groups using the keywords deployed in the previous two sections (seven responses in 
all, since India and institutions are in the top five only for the US, and security and 
terrorism only for Pakistan).  Economy and energy are important concerns for both 
groups, but terrorism and security are much bigger concerns for Pakistanis than for 
US interviewees.  
 
Table 3.5: Comparison of most popular US and Pakistani responses 
 Number of respondents  
(%  respondents) 
Challenge Pakistan US 
Economy 23 (58%) 9 (25%) 
Terrorism 11 (28%) 2 (6%) 
Energy 9 (23%) 6 (17%) 
Security 8 (20%) 1 (3%) 
Afghanistan 7 (18%) 5 (14%) 
India 1 (3%) 5 (14%) 
Institutions 2 (5%) 5 (14%) 
Note: ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the number of respondents who made a response falling within 
that category and in parentheses their number divided by the total number of respondents. 
 
                                                 
11 Jamaat-ud-Dawa calls itself a humanitarian charity but is also seen as a front organisation for the 
banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based group that fights Indian soldiers in India-administered 
Kashmir and accused of 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 166 people. The State Department listed 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa a "foreign terrorist organisation" in June 2014.  The group continues to operate 
openly in Pakistan, and its leader, Hafiz Saeed, holds public rallies and gives interviews 
(Al Jazeera 2014). 
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One of the takeaways from Table 3.5 is that Pakistani views are more homogenous 
than US ones.  The Pakistanis name 33 different challenges versus the Americans’ 41.  
The Pakistanis also coalesce to a greater degree around the most frequently named 
challenges, namely the economy (23 respondents) and terrorism (11 respondents), 
where the US are much more diffuse in their responses.  For example, only nine name 
the economy (the most frequently named challenge) and six name energy (the second 
most frequently named). 
 
Table 3.6 continues the comparison using the four-fold categorisation used throughout 
the chapter. 
 
Table 3.6: Comparing Pakistani and US elite perceptions of Pakistan’s biggest 
challenges 
 Total number of responses   
(%  responses) 
Number of respondents 
(% respondents) 
Category Pakistan US Pakistan US 
Economic and social 41 (40%) 32 (40%) 29 (73%) 21 (58%) 
Security-related 31 (30%) 8 (10%) 26 (65%) 8 (22%) 
Domestic politics and governance 16 (16%) 27 (33%) 15 (38%) 19 (53%) 
External  14 (14%) 14 (17%) 8 (20%) 12 (33%) 
Total  102 (100% ) 82 (100% ) 78 (196% ) 60 (166% ) 
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents  expressed as a percentage. The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above. 
 
Table 3.6 shows that the majority of both the US and the Pakistani elite perceive 
Pakistan’s challenges to be economic in nature.  The US elite lists a wider range of 
specific challenges within the economic/social category.  But there is a clear emphasis 
among both groups on Pakistan’s economic woes, and a particular focus on energy.  
This is not surprising: Pakistan’s economy is not doing well, and the energy sector is 
in crisis.  Nevertheless, this economic primacy is not reflected in the majority of the 
literature on Pakistan’s challenges, which tends to focus heavily on security, foreign 
policy and political issues (see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2).   
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Both groups also in general give little emphasis to external challenges.  More 
Americans than Pakistanis mention external challenges, but even among the 
Americans only one-third do, and among Pakistanis it is only one-fifth.  
 
Apart from these commonalities, there are also significant divergences between the 
two groups of elite on what Pakistan’s greatest challenges are.  The Pakistani elite 
tends to emphasise the country’s security problems, whereas the US tends to 
emphasise Pakistan’s governance problems.  
 
Almost three-quarters (73 per cent) of Pakistanis name a security challenge, but only 
around one-fifth (22 per cent) of Americans do.  And only two Americans specifically 
name terrorism as a major challenge, whereas 11 Pakistanis do.  These are significant 
differences, which defy conventional wisdom.  As per the quote extracted earlier from 
General Asad Durrani, former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, 
terrorism is often perceived to be “a challenge that is made out to be big for us 
[Pakistan] from the western perspective” (Interview: 8 January 2013).  Given the 
United States’ policy rhetoric around countering terrorism, it is surprising that not 
more of the US elite consider terrorism/extremism to be a key challenge for Pakistan.  
I argue that there are several reasons for this difference. 
 
The first is the difference in lived experience.  From January 2011 to December 2013 
(the period within which these interviews were conducted in the US and Pakistan), 
17,800 people (including civilians, security force personnel and terrorists/insurgents) 
were killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2014).  Chart 
3.1 below plots fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan between 2003-2014, 
demonstrating the large numbers of Pakistanis killed in terrorist violence since 9/11.   
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Chart 3.1: Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan, 2003-2014 
 
Data source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm  
 
Pakistanis live through security-related challenges daily, and hear about them in the 
media constantly.  As Asad Umar, a CEO and President of the Pakistan Business 
Council puts it: “Security affects everyday citizens of Pakistan.  It is in your face, it is 
in your daily life and almost all over the country.  All the way from Peshawar and 
Karachi” (Interview: 20 February 2012). 
 
During the period of this fieldwork, there would not have been a day that went by 
without the media reporting on the terrorist attacks or violence occurring on Pakistani 
soil, including violence against ethnic minorities and violence against women.  
Although some members of the Pakistani elite reflect the earlier view of Lieven 
(2011) that extremism is being held “in check” and that Pakistan is “tough and 
resilient”, others express more pessimistic views. As summarised in Section 3.2.2, 
these include views that the security situation is weakening the economy, that it is 
crowding out other issues in terms of policy makers’ attention, and indeed even that is 
an existential threat.  
 
Second, these views may reflect a new consensus emerging in Pakistan around the 
seriousness of the internal terrorist threat.  Evidence for this is that it was not until 
January 2013, in the lead up to the May 2013 elections, that the challenges 
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“economy” and “terrorism” and/ or “extremism” were named by the same interview 
respondent.  Up until January 2013 respondents may have named one or the other in 
their responses, but not both.  This combination of “economy” and 
“terrorism/extremism” did not arise until the fifteenth interview conducted (in January 
2013) and occurred twelve times in a cluster of twenty-six interviews from January 
2013 to October 2013.   
 
This in turn can be explained by the run-up to the federal and provincial elections held 
on 11 May 2013, and the related election rhetoric.  Election winning party Pakistan 
Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif ran on a platform of 
improving the economy as well as stamping out terrorism.  Sharif’s campaign slogan 
was “Strong economy, strong Pakistan” (PML-N website, www.pmln.org).  In 
Sharif’s first televised address to the nation in August 2013 following his election 
victory, he emphasised: “Alongside Kashmir issue [sic] we will have to pay attention 
to strengthen our economy, resolve our internal and external problems and tackle the 
power crisis and terrorism” (Dawn, 19 August 2013).  Popular candidate Imran Khan, 
former Pakistani cricket star, and leader of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) vowed “to 
stamp out corruption in Pakistan within 19 days and eradicate terrorism in 90 days” 
(Express Tribune, 26 February 2012).  Both the economy and terrorism were issues 
discussed heavily in the Pakistani media during the election campaign.   
 
Pakistan’s frequent terrorist attacks and violent crime obviously did not get the same 
coverage in the United States; nor did the US elite have the same “lived experience” 
of terrorism. The US elite may be therefore much slower in responding to the upsurge 
in Pakistani terrorism than the Pakistani elite, and slower in developing a new elite 
consensus around the importance of the threat of domestic terrorism to Pakistan.  
 
Third, while the US obviously has a strong focus on terrorism in general, it may be 
more worried about certain types of terrorism than others.  In particular, terrorism that 
threatens US civilians and military likely rates more seriously than terrorism that does 
not.  From this point of view, terrorism in Pakistan is not a “headline event” unless it 
is Pakistan or Pakistani non-state actors that are threatening the United States.   
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Fourth, the inverse of a greater concern among the Pakistani elite in relation to 
security is a relatively greater concern among the US elite in relation to domestic 
politics and governance. Almost as many American respondents list a governance 
challenge as do an economic challenge (53 versus 58 per cent), but significantly fewer 
Pakistani respondents highlight governance (38 per cent). 
 
This in turn may reflect the “new” Washington consensus: that good institutions are 
fundamental for prosperity (Williamson in Besley and Zagha 2005, p.45).  It might 
also reflect US aid policy. Democratic governance is a key pillar of USAID’s 
engagement strategy, and “strengthening democracy and good governance” is listed 
second after “promote broadly shared economic prosperity” as a key goal of USAID’s 
overseas engagement (USAIDb 2015).  The US elite’s prioritisation of domestic 
political and governance challenges likely reflects the US government’s integration of 
democracy promotion and governance into its aid programming and the associated 
messaging in US domestic media.  In addition, given interviews with the 
United States elite were conducted in March 2012, more than a year before Pakistan’s 
federal elections in May 2013, it is understandable that US respondents were focused 
on the consolidation of democracy and ironing out issues between the civilian- led 
government and the military.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Pakistan’s future emerges from these interviews as a “wicked problem.”  In particular, 
as per the first of Rittel and Weber’s (1973) ten criteria for a wicked problem, there is 
“no definitive formulation” of the problems that ail Pakistan.  Hence, the huge range 
of responses to this question, and the divergences across groups as analysed in the 
previous section.  Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution perhaps best captures 
this with his response to this interview question, with which the chapter opens.  US 
respondents are particularly divided in their responses.  
 
Both groups of respondents in general give primacy to internal over external 
challenges. Some elite respondents do single out external challenges to Pakistan, most 
commonly mentioning Afghanistan, but that is only a minority, a third of Americans 
 110 
and a fifth of Pakistanis.  The majority see Pakistan’s challenges through a nation-
building lens. 
 
Both groups also tend to stress the significance of Pakistan’s economic challenges. 
This is not reflected in the majority of the literature on Pakistan’s challenges, which 
tends to focus heavily on security, foreign policy and political issues.   
 
The biggest difference between the two groups of elites is in the contrast between the 
stress on security by Pakistani respondents, and that on governance by the US 
respondents.  The Pakistani elite stress security-related challenges almost as much as 
the economy, whereas the US elite places security-related challenges much further 
down their list of priorities.  I argue that this reflects the recent upsurge in terrorism in 
Pakistan, and an emerging consensus in Pakistan, reflected also at the political level, 
that terrorism has now to be acted on, and so a shift in thinking from that revealed by 
Lieven (2011).  By contrast, the US elite are, from a distance, perhaps slower to wake 
up to the domestic terrorism threat in Pakistan, are more focused on governance, a 
traditional priority for US aid, and, when it comes to terrorism, and are more 
concerned about terrorism which threatens the US, and so less with Pakistan domestic 
terrorism. 
 
To summarise the results found in this chapter, while there is far from a single view 
on what ails Pakistan, if one had to be identified, it would be, according to the 
Pakistani elite, that their country suffers from a weak economy and a lack of security, 
and, according to the US elite, that Pakistan suffers from a weak economy and a weak 
polity.  
 
So much for what Pakistan needs.  The next chapter examines what the US wants, and 
the alignment, or lack of it, between the two.  
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Annex 3.1: Pakistani elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges 
– categorisation (number of respondents) 
 
Economic and Social Domestic politics and 
governance 
Security-related External 
Economy (23) Governance (6) Terrorism (11) Afghanistan (7) 
Energy (9) Weak institutions (2) Security (8) 
 
War on terror (3) 
 
Education (3) Survival of the state (1) Law and order (5) 
 
Overcommits on 
foreign policy (1) 
Development (2) Coordination between 
centre and provinces 
(1) 
Relationship with 
extremist groups (3) 
Aid (1) 
Health (1) Political instability (1) Extremis m (2) India (1) 
Social structure (1) Need to focus on 
domestic issues (1) 
Militancy (2) United States (1) 
Lack of social services 
(1) 
Reorienting public 
policy (1) 
Insecurity (1)  
Poverty (1) Balochistan (1) Radicalism (1)  
 Domestic politics (1)   
 Confusion of its 
identity (1) 
  
 
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
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Annex 3.2: US elite perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges – 
categorisation (number of respondents) 
 
Economic and Social Domestic politics and 
governance 
Security-related External 
Economy (9) Institutions (5) Militancy (3) Afghanistan (5) 
Energy (6) Domestic political 
issues (3) 
Extremis m (3) India (4) 
Education (3) Civil-military relations 
(2) 
Terrorism (2) Nuclear proliferation 
(3) 
Growth (2) State coherence (3) Security (1) Regional dynamics (2) 
Demographic (2) Deciding what the 
challenge is (2) 
 Better relations with 
Afghanistan and India 
(1) 
Development (1) Democratic 
consolidation (2) 
 US proxy war in 
Pakistan (1) 
Tax reform (1) National integration (1)  Relations with India 
and the US (1) 
Fiscal stability (1) Pakistan itself is its 
own biggest challenge 
(1) 
  
Water (1) Instability (1)   
Social services (1) Corruption (1)   
Sustainable growth (1) 
Decline of military 
(politically) (1) 
  
Socio-economic (1) Anti-Westernism (1)   
Job provision (1) Dissolution of state 
authority (1) 
  
 State failure (1)   
 Governance (1)   
 
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
 
  
 113 
Chapter Four: What does the US want 
from Pakistan? The realist imperative 
 
 
 
 
“You have to understand why this relationship was initiated.  It wasn’t about 
Pakistan, but for its importance to Afghanistan… The number one thing the US has 
wanted over the past ten years is for Pakistan to deliver victory in Afghanistan.” 
 
Moeed Yusuf, United States Institute of Peace12 (Interview: 14 July 2012)  
 
 
 
 
“The US has these long-term goals in Pakistan … the problem is, with these long-
term goals, if you sit down and have a conversation with State, the military or even 
Congress, they will admit that we have these long-term goals, but the short-term goals 
are all consuming.” 
 
Danny Cutherell, Centre for Global Development (Interview: 5 March 2012) 
  
                                                 
12 Yusuf is based both in Pakistan and the US. He was interviewed in Pakistan and is included in the 
Pakistani elite sample for this study. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines what the US wants from Pakistan.  As outlined in Chapter 1, in 
the decade following 9/11, the United States greatly enhanced its engagement with 
and assistance to Pakistan, both military and civilian.  What does the United States 
want from Pakistan in return from all of this increased financial and political 
attention? 
 
The motivation for this research question was first set out in Chapter 2.  I am 
interested in the relative priority given to nation-building and realist objectives in US 
foreign aid policy.  As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, little research has been conducted 
on the tension between these two aid objectives in the post-9/11 context.   
 
In Chapter 3, I examined the nature of Pakistan’s needs, and found clear evidence 
across both sets of elites that Pakistan’s economic challenges are regarded as its most 
important.  More broadly, despite some important disagreements over the relative 
importance of security and governance challenges, Pakistan’s challenges are 
predominantly viewed as internal, that is, challenges of nation-building.  In this 
chapter, I turn to the question of wants, and ask whether what the US wants from 
Pakistan is for it to surmount its nation-building challenges, or rather that it help the 
US with its realist foreign policy objectives. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, if Pakistan’s needs are found to be of a nation-building 
variety, but the US wants are found to be realist in nature, this would constitute good 
evidence that US realist objectives have trumped nation-building ones in Pakistan, 
despite the effort under President Obama to give a greater weight to nation-building, 
especially through aid.  I am also interested in whether the two sets of elites have 
similar views, or whether the US and Pakistan elites see things differently.   
 
The key interview question drawn on to answer this question is: “What do you think 
the US wants most from its cooperation with Pakistan?”  This question was posed 
following the question on Pakistan’s challenges at the beginning of the interview. 
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My analysis shows that there are stark differences between what the elite thinks 
challenges Pakistan – or what Pakistan needs – and what the elite think the US wants 
from Pakistan.  Most of the elite think of Pakistan’s challenges as economic, but of 
US wants as relating to Afghanistan and related external policy issues.  The two elites 
have similar views of US wants, except that the US elite place more weight on 
support for Pakistan political challenges, in particular domestic political stability. I 
argue this is evidence that the US does indeed have nation-building goals, but that 
these goals are ineffectively communicated and pursued because of the difficulties 
faced in pursuing a partnership with Pakistan in relation to Afghanistan and the war 
on terror.  While the two countries are in theory partners on these challenges, in 
practice their strategic interests diverge.  As in the Cold War, so too in the war on 
terror, the resulting daily grind and periodic crises suck all the oxygen out of the 
broader relationship, and render futile US attempts to pursue broader nation-building 
objectives.  
 
This chapter is organised into five sections.  Section 4.2 outlines Pakistani perceptions 
of what the US wants most from its engagement with Pakistan, and Section 4.3 US 
elite perceptions.  Section 4.4 compares and discusses the two sets of results, and 
Section 4.5 compares the results of Chapters 3 and 4.  Section 4.6 concludes.  
 
4.2 Pakistani elite perceptions of what the US wants from Pakistan 
 
The method of analysis follows that of Chapter 3.  Responses are identified and then 
categorised using the categories developed in Chapter 3. 
 
Most respondents named more than one want.  39 respondents gave 72 responses in 
total, identifying, on average, 1.8 responses per person. 13  Using keywords or 
headings, these 72 responses can be divided into 24 “headline” wants.  
 
Table 4.1 below shows the top five issues that the Pakistani elite perceives the US 
wants Pakistan’s cooperation on.  Above all else, the Pakistani elite think the US 
wants cooperation on Afghanistan, with 59 per cent (23 respondents) naming it in our 
                                                 
13 One member of the Pakistani elite did not respond to this question when asked it, so the sample size 
for this question (39) is one less than the full sample size.  
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discussion.  
 
Table 4.1: Top five US wants named by the Pakistani elite  
 Number of respondents 
Afghanistan 23  
Counter-terrorism 7  
War on terror 7  
Help the US to achieve its strategic objectives  6 
Security cooperation 4  
 
For further analysis, the 24 wants have been placed into the same categories used in 
Chapter 3 to group Pakistan’s challenges (see Annex 4.1).  An additional “other” 
category is also required.  
 
Table 4.2 below shows that, in terms of these five categories, the clear majority of the 
Pakistani elite believe that what the United States wants most is cooperation on 
external policy issues, with 74 per cent of respondents naming at least one external 
policy objective.  One third mention a security-related objective; only a handful 
mention anything else. 
 
Table 4.2: Pakistani elite perceptions of what the US wants most from Pakistan 
Category Number of responses 
(% responses) 
Number of respondents  
(%  respondents) 
External 46 (64%) 29 (74%) 
Security-related 14 (19%) 13 (33%) 
Other 5 (7%) 5 (13%) 
Domestic politics and governance 4 (6%) 2 (5%) 
Economic and social 0 0 
Total  72 (100% ) 49 (125% )  
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents expressed as a percentage . The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above.  39 of the full sample of 40 US respondents answered this 
question. 
 
The following four sections will examine each of the abovementioned categories of 
“want”, with the exception of the “economic and social” category, where no 
responses were recorded.  As in Chapter 3, the categories are discussed in declining 
order of popularity. 
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4.2.1 External 
 
The most frequently named wants are within the “external” category of response, with 
64 per cent of responses falling within this category.  Three-quarters of respondents 
give a response within this category.  They encompass a variety of external policy 
issues the US wants Pakistan’s cooperation on, including: Pakistan’s relations with 
India and Afghanistan, support in the war on terror, help with US strategic interests 
and nuclear security.  Overwhelmingly though, as Table 4.1 shows, respondents who 
focus on external issues focus on Afghanistan.  This is by far the most frequently 
named want, mentioned by 23 out of 39 respondents (59 per cent).  While some 
respondents have differing views on what specifically the US wants Pakistan’s 
cooperation for in Afghanistan, overall there is widespread agreement that the US-
Pakistan relationship has always been about Afghanistan.  This view is captured in the 
opening quote of the chapter by Moeed Yusuf.  
 
At a seminar in Islamabad hosted by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute 
entitled Violation and Threats to Pakistan’s Sovereignty and Response on 
10 October 2011, former ISI head Lt General Asad Durrani spoke on US-Pakistan 
relations, with specific reference to the United States’ short-term interests in 
Afghanistan, and argued: “What happens to Afghanistan when wars happen?  They 
[the US] come to Pakistan.  Pakistan is Afghanistan’s strategic depth”.  The irony in 
Durrani’s response was not lost on most of the audience, who were well versed in 
Pakistan’s use of Afghanistan as its own “strategic depth” against India (see Section 
1.3).  Durrani’s statement indicates both the significance, and the complexity of the 
trilateral relationship between the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 
Given the timing of the interviews, when the US exit from Afghanistan was a live 
issue, some within the elite focus specifically on the assistance the US wants from 
Pakistan in Afghanistan to facilitate the military withdrawal.  Journalist, 
Khurram Husain believes: “The United Sates wants a face saving exit from 
Afghanistan, and they want Pakistan to do whatever it can to facilitate that exit” 
(Interview: 20 February 2012).  Senator Mushahid Hussain, head of the Pakistan 
Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) and Chair of the Senate Defence Committee agrees: 
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“Today, what the US wants most from Pakistan is number one, to facilitate an 
honourable and dignified exit from Afghanistan so that there is no action replay of 
Vietnam or that kind of humiliation” (Interview: 24 October 2013).  Ikram Seghal, 
Chairman of the Pathfinder Group, a firm which houses two of Pakistan’s largest 
private security companies, argues the United States’ desire for Pakistani cooperation 
in Afghanistan leaves Pakistan with a large “strategic headache”: “The US went into 
Afghanistan without understanding the consequences of what could happen.  Now 
they are exiting out of Afghanistan and they are scared about what will happen after 
the withdrawal.  There will be a vacuum” (Interview: 25 July 2013). 
 
While there is clear recognition of the importance of Afghanistan for the US-Pakistan 
relationship, there is also an acceptance that this is not a topic on which the two sides 
see eye to eye. 
 
Moeed Yusuf, South Asia Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace, quoted on 
this chapter’s title page about the overwhelming importance of Afghanistan for the 
US in its relationship with Pakistan, goes on to say: “The way Pakistan saw itself in 
Afghanistan versus how the US saw it never converged and it all came to a 
breakdown over what India was doing in Afghanistan.  That disconnect has never 
been resolved” (Interview: 14 July 2012). 
 
Imtiaz Gul, executive director at the Centre for Research and Security Studies, has a 
similar view:  
What the US wants from Pakistan is blind compliance, including in 
Afghanistan, for the sake of its national security interests to the total disregard 
of what amounts to Pakistan’s national security interests.  The US fails to take 
into account Pakistan’s security interests by pressing for actions to defend 
long-term US interests – that is why there is a lot of mistrust between the two 
countries, which stems from the divergence (of views) of the strategic 
commitment (Interview: 17 November 2011). 
 
These arguments go back to the issue, discussed just above, of Afghanistan being 
Pakistan’s “strategic depth”.  Because Pakistan felt it had an interest in the Taliban 
returning to power in Afghanistan, or at least not being wiped out, and because 
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Pakistan was worried about possible Indian domination in Afghanistan (note the 
remark by Yusuf), Pakistan was always an unwilling ally of the US in the Afghanistan 
war.  The divergent views between the two meant that the issue continued to dominate 
the relationship.  It could not be put behind them. 
 
Six of the elite portray US wants in terms of help in achieving its strategic interests, a 
broader notion that encompasses but goes beyond Afghanistan.  Asad Umar, CEO of 
Engro Corporation and President of the Pakistan Business Council, argues that: 
“What the US wants is cooperation to achieve the strategic objectives in the region.  
Some of which is short-term, others long-term” (Interview: 20 February 2012).  
Retired Brigadier A.R. Jerral considers access to energy drives US strategic interests 
in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, through which it wants to see a gas pipeline to 
supply India from Central Asia. (Interview: 19 June 2013). 
 
Seven respondents talk about the war on terror rather than, or in addition to, 
Afghanistan.  The war on terror is included in the external category because it is a 
question of foreign and defence policy cooperation with the United States and its 
allies.  Terrorism or countering terrorism is classified as a security-related issue 
because it is a domestic issue requiring a domestic security response.  This suggests a 
broader theatre than just Afghanistan, one that extends to Pakistan itself.  
Ayesha Siddiqa, author of Military Inc., a book on the Pakistani military’s 
involvement in politics and business, expresses this broader view when she says: 
“Complete assistance and cooperation from the Pakistani Government in fighting the 
Taliban - also militancy in general; because we have other militants as well, who pose 
a threat” (Interview: 14 June 2013).  
 
4.2.2 Security-related 
 
One-third of respondents mentioned a security-related want, with 19 per cent of total 
responses falling within this category.  Responses within this category encompass a 
variety of modes of cooperation on mainly domestic security issues, including 
countering terrorism and extremism.   
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Half of these respondents talk in terms of countering terrorism.  Others talk generally 
in terms of security, Salma Malik, Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence 
and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University argues: “What the US expected 
from Pakistan was very clear-cut, all out cooperation on terrorism” (Interview: 3 
October 2011).  Ambassador Ali Shawar Naqvi agrees that the US wants to “[c]ontrol 
terrorism and militancy” (Interview: 11 October 2011).  
 
4.2.3 Other: Complaints about the US  
 
Seven responses do not fit the original four categories that were set out in Chapter 3, 
and are therefore placed in a fifth “other” category.  
 
Four respondents complain in response to this question that the US wants a purely 
transactional relationship with Pakistan, a theme that is further developed in Chapter 
6.  Their suggestion is that the US will give Pakistan something (i.e. aid) in exchange 
for something the US wants.  The elite focus is on the nature of the relationship rather 
than on what it is that the US wants.  For example, journalist Ejaz Haider considers 
that what the US wants from Pakistan is “not strategic, but always transactional” 
(Interview: 23 August 2013).  Raza Rumi, Director at the Jinnah Institute, concurs: 
“The Pakistan-US relationship is a transactional one, it barely begins strategic.  I 
mean it was a bit strategic until the Cold War… At the moment, what we have is that 
today the US wants this, and we give this; tomorrow they want this.  The day after we 
fight, after one week we make up, so it is up and down” (Interview: 29 May 2013).  
 
Indeed, the rhetoric of a US-Pakistan “transactional relationship” is not only peppered 
throughout the elite interviews, but is also present in public discussions.  At a 
conference in Islamabad hosted by the Centre for International Strategic Studies 
(CISS) entitled Pakistan-US Divergence: Can the Gap be Bridged?, Professor 
Tahir Amin, Chairman of the National Institute for Pakistan Studies at Quaid-i-Azam 
University spoke on the transactional relationship, and contrasted unfavourably 
Pakistan’s relationship with the US with that of India: “India is their [the US] long-
term strategic partner, Pakistan is their short-term transactional partner” (2 November 
2011). 
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Three of the Pakistani elite respond that the US does not know what it wants from 
Pakistan and/or that the US either had too many goals or had poorly defined goals.  
Khalid Rahman, Director General of the Institute of Policy Studies notes the 
uncertainty in US policy:  
What is the US demanding from Pakistan?  That is very confusing for me.  I 
think that the Americans are themselves not clear on what they want… Within 
the American establishment there are various lobbies that have various 
agendas (Interview: 6 October 2011).   
 
4.2.4 Domestic politics and governance 
 
Only four responses related to the “domestic politics and governance” category. 
Responses in this category revolve around stability.  Independent Member of the 
National Assembly, Hameed Ullah Jan Afridi, who represents the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, says: “What we know is that the US basically wants 
stability and peace (in Pakistan)” (Interview 31 May 2013).  Senator Mushahid 
Hussain agrees: “The US would want a stable and peaceful Pakistan” (Interview: 24 
October 2013).  
 
4.3 American elite perceptions of what the US wants most from Pakistan 
 
The US elite was also asked what they think the United States wants most from 
Pakistan.  32 respondents were asked this question. This is smaller than the full 
sample of 40 because IFI (World Bank and IMF) respondents were not asked this 
question (it was felt to be outside their remit) and two bureaucrats were not asked 
because of time constraints.  The 32 respondents gave 64 responses in total, on 
average, two responses per person.  Ignoring only minor differences in wording, these 
64 responses can be divided into 26 wants, the headings or keywords for which are 
shown in Annex 4.2.  
 
Table 4.3 below shows the top six issues that the US elite perceives the US want 
Pakistan’s cooperation on.  As with their Pakistani counterparts, above all else, the 
US elite think the US want cooperation on Afghanistan, with 53 per cent (17 
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respondents) of the elite naming this US want. 
 
Table 4.3: Top six US wants named by the US elite14  
 Number of respondents 
Afghanistan 17 
Counter-terrorism 5 
Security cooperation 5 
Pakistani political stability 5 
Secure nuclear weapons 4 
Counter militancy 4 
 
For further analysis, the 26 wants have been placed into the same categories used in 
Chapter 3 to group Pakistan’s challenges (Annex 4.2).  An additional “other” category 
is also required. Table 4.4 summarises the results.  As with the Pakistani elite, 
external wants dominate.  72 per cent of respondents name at least one external policy 
objective. 
 
Table 4.4: US elite perceptions of what the US wants most from Pakistan 
Category Number of responses  
(%  responses) 
Number of respondents  
(%  respondents 
External 37 (58%) 23 (72%) 
Security-related 12(16%) 7 (22%) 
Domestic politics and governance 8 (13%) 9 (28%) 
Other 6 (9%) 6 (19%) 
Economic and social 1 (2%) 1 (3%) 
Total  64 (100% ) 46 (144% ) 
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents expressed as a percentage. The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above.  32 of the full sample of 38 US respondents answered this 
question. 
 
  
                                                 
14 Six wants are named here rather than five because respondents equally named the top second and 
fifth wants. 
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4.3.1 External 
 
The most popular response both within this category and overall (as per Table 4.3) is 
Afghanistan with over half of the elite sample (53 per cent) naming Pakistan’s 
western neighbor as the most important motivator for US cooperation with Pakistan.  
Indeed, this is the only response15 within the entire US elite data set that is agreed 
upon by the more than half of the respondents.  It is unsurprising that the elite 
perceive Pakistan’s cooperation in Afghanistan as the United States’ number one 
priority given the protracted nature of the war, the number of US lives lost, and the 
sheer cost of sustaining this war for more than a decade.  Generally, the US elite seek 
more Pakistani cooperation on the US strategy or “end game” in Afghanistan.  
 
Unprompted, some interview respondents link Pakistani cooperation with the US in 
Afghanistan with the assistance package that the US provides to Pakistan.  This 
suggests aid, civilian or military, is clearly seen as quid pro quo for cooperation on 
US goals.  Two former Ambassadors who served in Pakistan make this argument.  
Ambassador Robin Raphel, Ambassador for Economic Assistance to Pakistan (2009-
14) states that this desire for support on Afghanistan is “the reason we are giving 
civilian assistance”.  Further, Raphel argues the US is providing aid to Pakistan in 
order to achieve short-term goals.   
 
In general, the US elite gives Pakistan a mixed score-card on their cooperation in 
Afghanistan.  Shamila Chaudhary, an analyst at the New America Foundation, 
believes: 
The US is looking for Pakistan to not be an obstacle in the reconciliation 
process with the [Afghan] Taliban – so don’t stall peace talks, don’t be a 
spoiler, work with us in the future to ensure that Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
not safe havens.  On safe havens, Pakistan has cooperated a great deal on 
minimising the al Qaeda threat in the region.  A lot of it has gone unsaid, and 
with the exception of the Osama bin Laden raid, they have a pretty good track 
record on al Qaeda, but there are still safe havens in Pakistan and militants are 
still going across the border (Interview: 12 March 2012).  
                                                 
15 To an open-ended question where non-categorical variables are the response.  
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Some are more critical.  Professor Robert Lieber at Georgetown University argues 
Pakistan has been playing a “double game” with the United States in Afghanistan: 
We want for the Pak’s (sic) to stop supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.  
Pakistan has played a very cynical game there all along, partly cooperating 
with the US, partly cooperating with various groups such as the Taliban, the 
Haqqani network and others.  The key to this has to do with the pathologies of 
Pakistan itself, especially the quasi-independent role of the ISI (Inter-Services 
Intelligence Agency) (Interview: 14 March 2012). 
 
These remarks hark back to the comments on strategic divergence made by some 
members of the Pakistani elite (see Section 4.2.1).  Clearly, one reason Afghanistan 
continues to so dominate the US-Pakistan relationship is because it is not an issue 
easily or once-and-for-all resolved.  Rather, it requires constant negotiation, and often 
gives rise to frustration on both sides. 
 
While Afghanistan is the dominant external want raised, four members of the US elite 
mention nuclear security, three India, and a number of individual respondents name 
cracking down on terrorist groups.  Nuclear proliferation is put forward as an 
enduring interest that will make Pakistan important to the US even post-Afghanistan. 
Marvin Weinbaum at the Middle East Institute puts forward this view:  
We are concerned about nuclear, obviously.  That goes to the fact that we 
can’t afford to walk away [from Pakistan] because the stability of the country 
will determine whether Pakistan is a proliferator of its weapons or technology.  
As long as the country is reasonably stable and the military is intact, the risk is 
not that great.  All bets are off if the country undergoes a severe upheaval in 
any way (Interview: 14 March 2012).   
 
Three of the elite note that the US wants Pakistan to have better relations with India, 
“Both sides clearly have an interest in seeing a less adversarial Pakistan-India 
relationship” (Interview, Robert Hathaway: 7 March 2012).  Paul Fishstein at Harvard 
thinks the US wants cooperation in: “… South Asia in the broader sense, in terms of 
coming to an agreement with India vis-à-vis Kashmir” (Interview: 6 March 2012).  
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Wienbaum at the Middle East Institute believes the US wants to prevent Pakistan and 
India from engaging in “major conflict” (Interview: 14 March 2012).  
 
Several of the elite also raise that the US wants cooperation to eliminate terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban from Pakistan’s territory given their long history 
of launching attacks on US interests in Afghanistan alongside broader cooperation in 
the war on terror.  For example, Joshua White, from the United States Institute of 
Peace, considers combatting transnational terrorism to be a medium-term interest of 
the United States, behind its short-term interest in Afghanistan: “In the medium-term 
our interest would expand to Pakistan being relatively helpful in going after militant 
groups that have a transnational interest” (Interview: 12 March 2012). 
 
Michael Krepon, Senior Associate at the Stimson Centre argues the US wants 
cooperation in the war on terror, particularly to eliminate Pakistani terrorist groups 
attacking the US in Afghanistan: 
We want things that Pakistan does not want or cannot deliver on.  We want 
strong efforts against those who carry out explosive attacks on Indian soil and 
in Afghanistan and who seem interested in carrying out explosive attacks on 
US soil.  The government doesn’t have the capability to act on this.  The 
military may or may not have the capability to act.  It doesn’t seem to want to 
put itself in the position of trying and failing.  So the military acts selectively 
against groups who turn on the military or government and not against those 
groups that focus their lethal fire on outsiders… The security apparatus knows 
that if they extend their operations beyond the Pakistan Taliban they are 
inviting a world of hurt.  So they can’t deliver, or they don’t want to deliver.  
It is not clear and I don’t see it changing (Interview: 13 March 2012).  
 
4.3.2 Security-related 
 
The second most frequently named wants are within the security-related category of 
response, with 16 per cent of total responses falling within this category.  Responses 
within this category encompass a variety of modes of cooperation on security and 
countering terrorism, and combatting militancy and extremism within Pakistan. 
 
 126 
Michael Kugelman at the Woodrow Wilson Centre argues that the US wants security 
cooperation, and this want is politically universal: “Whether you are talking to 
Democrats or Republicans, the biggest concern here is the security situation in 
Pakistan” (Interview: 7 March 2012). 
 
Most of the elite simply name countering terrorism without elaborating.  However, a 
few respondents do expand on responses linked to terrorism and extremism.  
Paul Pillar, Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown believes what the 
United States wants most from Pakistan is cooperation on reducing the extremist 
threat: “Clearly highest on the US priority list now is dealing with extremists in the 
northwest as it affects Pakistan… and that seems to have shoved everything else 
further down on the list of priorities” (Interview: Paul Pillar, Georgetown University, 
15 March 2012).  
 
4.3.3 Domestic politics and governance 
 
The third most frequently named set of wants relate to domestic politics and 
governance.  Just over a quarter of respondents raise an issue within this category. 
Responses within this category include political stability, governance and 
strengthening democracy.  
 
Five respondents name stability as a key priority for US cooperation with Pakistan.  
Many within the elite link their desire for stability with broader security goals.  Robert 
Hathaway, Director of the Woodrow Wilson Centre’s Asia Program believes the US 
wants most of all to see:  “A stable, democratic, reasonably prosperous country, 
which increasingly meets the needs of its own civilians and holds the hope for being a 
constructive regional neighbour and ceases being a refuge for extremists, including 
terrorists” (Interview: 7 March 2012). 
 
Former Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, also links the US desire for 
stability in Pakistan with security goals: “We very much need them [Pakistan] to hold 
together as a stable country so that they don’t become a proliferator or so there is no 
threat that terrorists will seize them [nuclear weapons]” (Interview: 9 March 2012).  
Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution also makes the link between Pakistan’s 
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political stability and the threat of nuclear weapons: “When we needed Pakistan they 
were very good, when we didn’t need them they were very bad.  That’s changed.  
After they tested a nuclear weapon we realised that we needed a stable Pakistan 
whether we like them or not” (Interview: 8 March 2012). 
 
4.3.4 Other: criticisms of US policy 
 
As with the Pakistani elite, several responses did not fit any of the main four 
categories, and are therefore placed in this fifth residual category, which in the case of 
US respondents is focused on the criticisms around a lack of clarity of goals. (Recall 
for Pakistani interviewees, the corresponding main complaint was that the US-
Pakistan relationship was too transactional.)  Six American responses fall within this 
category. 
 
David Speedie, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International 
Affairs, sees the United States’ inability to define US priorities in Pakistan as a 
serious problem and links it to the US not knowing Pakistan: “I think the honest 
answer is that the US doesn’t know what it wants from Pakistan – that is the big 
problem.  This gets to the heart of my position…we have no idea what the idea of 
Pakistan is for Pakistan” (Interview: 22 March 2012).   
 
Shuja Nawaz argues that the problem is due to there being too many decision makers:  
I sit in Washington and talk to people regularly – the United States doesn’t 
have a central gravity regarding decision making on Pakistan.  Nobody owns 
the Pakistan portfolio as far as I know in the US government today…I don’t 
see any concentration of decision making in the White House or in State 
anymore or even in DoD [Department of Defense] (Interview: 15 March 
2012). 
 
Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy at the American 
Enterprise Institute, contends: “I think you could get a different answer [to the 
question of what the US wants] from everyone you ask.  That is why our program is 
so ineffective” (Interview: 13 March 2012).    
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4.3.5 Economic and social 
 
The least frequently named wants fall within the economic or social category of 
response.  Only one US elite respondent, the State Department, considers that the US 
prioritised Pakistani cooperation on improving its economy.  Representatives from the 
Pakistan desk at the State Department, in addition to noting that the US wanted 
cooperation in Afghanistan, also noted that the US wanted to see a “prosperous” 
Pakistan and to see Pakistan more fully recognise the provision of US development 
assistance (Interview: 6 March 2012). 
 
4.4 Discussion – comparing elite perceptions of what the US wants from 
Pakistan 
 
Comparing Pakistani and US elite responses reveals significant similarities in how 
both groups view US priorities, but also some differences.   
 
The top five or six responses from each elite group are presented in Table 4.5 below, 
combining Tables 4.1 and 4.3.  There is considerable overlap, with Afghanistan, 
counter-terrorism, security cooperation and Pakistani stability being popular 
responses by both groups.  Afghanistan is three or four times as common a response 
as any other.  
 
Table 4.5: Comparison of most popular responses 
 Number of respondents (%  of respondents) 
 Pakistan US 
Afghanistan 23 (59%) 17 (53%) 
Counter-terrorism 7 (18%) 5 (16%) 
War on terror 7 (18%) 1 (3%) 
Security cooperation 4 (10%) 5 (16%) 
Help US achieve its strategic objectives  6 (15%) 0 (0%) 
Pakistani political stability 3 (8%) 5 (16%) 
Secure nuclear weapons  1 (3%) 4 (13%) 
Counter militancy 0 (0%) 4 (13%) 
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Table 4.6 continues the comparison using the five-fold categorisation used throughout 
the chapter. 
 
Table 4.6: Comparing Pakistani and US elite perceptions of what the US wants 
from Pakistan 
 Number of responses   
(%  responses) 
Number of respondents  
(%  respondents) 
Category Pakistan US Pakistan US 
External 46 (64%) 37 (58%) 29 (74%) 23 (72%) 
Security-related 14 (19%) 19 (30%) 13 (33%) 7 (22%) 
Other 5 (7%) 6 (9%) 5 (13%) 6 (19%) 
Domestic politics and governance 4 (6%) 8 (13%) 2 (5%) 9 (28%) 
Economic and social 0 (0%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
Total  72 (100% ) 64 (100% ) 49 (127% ) 46 (144% ) 
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents expressed as a percentage. The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above. 
 
Both groups of elite name, on average, a similar number of wants.  Overall, about 
three-quarters of both sets of elite think that what the US most wants from Pakistan is 
co-operation on external challenges, typically Afghanistan.   
 
When examining the results per respondent, shown in the second set of two columns 
in Table 4.6, some differences between the two elite groups do emerge, in particular 
in relation to the domestic political and governance category.  More than three times 
the number of US elite (25 per cent) think that the US wants cooperation on domestic 
politics and governance policy issues than do the Pakistani elite (8 per cent).  Clearly, 
Pakistan’s internal challenges are important to at least some parts of the US 
establishment, but this is not being communicated effectively to Pakistan.  This is not 
just a public-relations issue.  Rather, the problem is that America’s external and 
security goals have become all-consuming for Pakistan.  This in turn goes back to the 
earlier discussion of the strategic divergence between the two countries when it comes 
to Afghanistan and the war on terror.  In theory, they are partners, and that partnership 
should not exclude cooperation on, or even prioritisation of, other, domestic issues.  
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But in practice, the partnership is fraught, and tested on an almost daily basis.  This 
“daily grind” makes it impossible to pursue other longer-term issues. 
 
Danny Cutherell from the Center for Global Development captures this well. He was 
quoted in brief on the title page of the chapter. The full quote reads as follows: 
The US has these long-term goals in Pakistan … the problem is, with these 
long-term goals, if you sit down and have a conversation with State, the 
military or even Congress, they will admit that we have these long-term goals, 
but the short-term goals are all consuming.  In Pakistan, the short-term 
narrative is that the terrorists will strike tomorrow, that is the headline and that 
always takes precedent when you are setting policy … there are a series of US 
short-term goals – we have a big goal, and we promise a large amount of 
money if they help us to achieve that.  We either achieve it or we don’t, the 
issue fades and the development money goes with it (Interview: 5 March 
2012).  
 
4.5 Discussion – Pakistan’s needs vs. US wants  
 
Table 4.8 below provides a summary comparison of Pakistani and US elite responses 
in Chapters 3 and 4 relating to Pakistan’s needs (or challenges) and US wants, 
respectively.  The radical disconnect between the two is shown by the simple fact that 
for both groups the top-ranked category of challenges is the bottom-ranked category 
of wants (the economic and social category) while the top-ranked category of wants is 
the bottom-ranked category of challenges (the external category).  
 
Table 4.8: Comparing Pakistani challenges and US wants by category: Which 
issues dominate? 
 Pakistan’s challenges  
(% respondents) 
US wants 
(% respondents) 
Category Pakistan US Pakistan US 
Economic and social 73% 58% 0% 3% 
Security-related 65% 22% 33% 22% 
Domestic politics and governance 38% 53% 5% 28% 
External 20% 33% 74% 72% 
Other NA NA 13% 19% 
Sample size 40 36 39 32 
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The differences between the needs uncovered in Chapter 3 and the wants explored in 
Chapter 4 are stark.  The economy is named only once in 71 interviews (by an 
American respondent) as an issue that the US wants or prioritises cooperation on.   
 
It should be conceded that the phrasing of the question “What does the US want from 
Pakistan?” might have biased respondents in the direction of identifying realist goals.  
If we had asked “What does the US want for Pakistan?” we might have got different 
answers.  Nevertheless, the question did not exclude the option of giving a nation-
building response, as shown by the fact that some respondents did. (The US wants 
better economic policy from Pakistan, or more stability, and so on.)  Moreover, the 
very striking discrepancies in results between needs and wants suggests that the 
answers do reveal very basic discrepancies in outlook. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Taken together with Chapter 3, this chapter demonstrates that elite perceptions of 
what the US wants from Pakistan do not coincide at all with what their perceptions of 
Pakistan’s challenges.  Despite 73 per cent of Pakistani and 58 per cent of US 
respondents naming an economic issue as the biggest challenge facing Pakistan, none 
of the Pakistani elite and three per cent of the American elite believe it is a top 
priority for the United States to help Pakistan to address its economic challenges.  
Rather the perception is that, when it comes to Pakistan, the US is mainly focused on 
external goals, in particular in relation to Afghanistan, even if these are not of great 
intrinsic importance to Pakistan itself. 
 
Despite these commonalities, the analysis of this chapter does also reveal some 
differences in the views of the two elites.  In particular, US respondents tend to give 
more importance when asked what the US wants to domestic Pakistani politics and 
governance. 
 
What can we conclude from these findings relating to our research interest relating to 
US realist and nation-building objectives in Pakistan? The responses of the US elite 
support the argument that the US did have nation-building objectives for Pakistan 
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over the period of analysis.  And indeed, without such objectives it would be difficult 
to explain the build-up of civilian aid over this period, and the passage of the KLB 
legislation.  However, the findings also suggest that in practice the nation-building 
objectives seem to have been trumped by the realist objectives.   
 
Looking at the responses of the elite (in particular, see Section 4.2.1) and the events 
of this period, it would seem that this crowding out is because of the contentious and 
disputed nature of the partnership between the two countries in relation to 
Afghanistan and the war on terror more broadly.  The continual renegotiation of the 
relationship over these issues, the never-ending flashpoints and disputes kept the 
spotlight on the realist objectives and undermined the pursuit of nation-building 
objectives.  
 
In the end, the results of these two chapters provide an eerily clear echo of the 
conclusions of Burnett writing more than two decades earlier in 1992.  As quoted in 
Chapter 2, Burnett wrote in 1992: “The tension between long-term goals (economic 
self-sufficiency, democracy, social reform) and short-term Cold War goals in Pakistan 
became a serious drawback” (p. 9).  Replace ‘Cold War’ by ‘war on terror’ and the 
quote serves as well to sum up this research on US-Pakistan relationships in the 2010s 
as it did Burnett’s of US-Pakistan relationships in the 1980s. 
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Annex 4.1: Pakistani elite perceptions of what the US wants 
most from Pakistan - categorisation 
Economic and 
Social 
Domestic politics 
and governance 
Security External Other 
 Stability (3) Counter-terrorism 
(7) 
Afghanistan 
(23) 
Transactional 
Relationship (4) 
 Peace (1) Security (4) Cooperation on 
war on terror 
(7) 
Needs long term 
policy (1) 
  Compliance on 
security issues (1) 
Help US 
achieve its 
strategic 
objectives (6) 
Not clear (1) 
  Delink from 
terrorist groups (1) 
Pakistan to 
have good 
relations with 
India (2) 
Varies a lot (1) 
  Reconciliation 
with Taliban  (1) 
Access to 
Afghanistan 
and Central 
Asia (1) 
 
   Access to 
logistics 
supply line (1) 
 
   Break away 
from China  
(1) 
 
   Stable 
partnership 
with the US (1) 
 
   US violates 
Pakistan’s 
sovereignty (1) 
 
   Counter Iran 
(1) 
 
   Pakistan to be 
stabilising 
influence in 
the region (1) 
 
   Military 
cooperation (1) 
 
   Secure nukes 
(1) 
 
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
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Annex 4.2: US elite perceptions of what the US wants most 
from Pakistan – categorisation 
Economic and 
Social 
Domestic politics 
and governance 
Security External Other 
Prosperity for 
Pakistan (1) 
Stability (5) Counter-terrorism 
(5) 
Afghanistan 
(17) 
US doesn’t know 
what it wants (2) 
 Strengthen 
democracy (2) 
Security (5) Better relations 
with India (3) 
Not clear (2) 
 
 
 
 Governance (1) Counter militancy 
(4) 
Secure nuclear 
weapons (4) 
 
Too many goals - 
would get a 
different answer 
from everyone 
you ask (1) 
  Extremis m (1) Regional 
security and 
stability (2) 
US conflicting 
goals (1) 
   Better relations 
with India and 
Afghanistan 
(1) 
 
   Cooperation on 
war on terror 
(1) 
 
   Recognise US 
aid (1) 
 
   Catch Taliban 
(1) 
 
   Pakistan to 
cease relations 
with Taliban 
(1) 
 
   Eliminate 
terrorist safe 
havens (1) 
 
   Cooperation to 
use drones (1) 
 
   Catch al Qaeda 
(1) 
 
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
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Chapter Five: Aid leverage: the frozen 
spigot? 
 
 
 
 
“Aid assistance of any kind gives leverage…most of the US agenda related to 
Pakistan is always security in nature and the leverage the US demanded was mostly 
in the security field.  It has been the case through and through.” 
 
Simbal Khan, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (Interview: 11 July 2013)  
 
 
 
 
“Conditionality usually makes the donor feel good…there are people who think we 
can buy [leverage in Pakistan], but we are lucky if we can rent.  You should not 
provide assistance on the argument you are building leverage, you will be 
disappointed in most cases, certainly the Pakistani case.” 
 
Bruce Riedel, Brookings Institution (Interview: 14 March 2012) 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the United States’ use of aid to get leverage in Pakistan.  As 
outlined in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.3.3 and Figure 1.1), post 9/11 the United States 
has greatly increased the size and scope of its foreign aid program to Pakistan.  Some 
of this aid, in particular the military aid, has had explicit conditionality attached to it.  
The United States also supports the efforts of multilateral institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank to negotiate economic reform packages with Pakistan.  But do 
these conditions work?  
 
The period of time during which this research was conducted was significant in the 
US-Pakistan aid relationship.  As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5), in 2009 the 
Obama Administration announced the passage of the Kerry Lugar Berman (KLB) Bill 
or the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.  The KLB package promised 
US$1.5 billion annually for five years for civilian aid to support Pakistan’s economic 
and social development.  This was a significant shift in US policy, which to date had 
primarily focused its aid relationship on the military. 
  
US aid leverage has normally been directed to security and foreign policy goals.  As 
noted in Chapter 1, aid conditions have been more often applied to military rather 
than civilian aid.  However, the Congress also imposed various, typically security-
related conditions on its annual appropriation of KLB funds.  Moreover, the US 
supports multilateral efforts to aid reform in Pakistan, in particular through the IMF 
and World Bank, as noted in Section1.5.  As noted in Chapter 1, Pakistan has 
participated in a number of IMF programs.  
 
Ahmad and Mohammed (2012) note that all but one of the IMF programs Pakistan 
has participated in were initiated upon the cessation of US bilateral assistance and 
sanctions.   Ahmad argues the various IMF programs failed to bring about reform. He 
notes that “all programs, barring one, failed in meeting the macroeconomic targets 
and were aborted.  Only one was “concluded” satisfactorily and that too because of 
the influx of US assistance, reinstated after 9/11” (p. 11).  On the most recent 2008-11 
IMF program, Ahmad notes that it:  
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… permitted loans of US$8 billion, or more than twice as much as was 
purchased in the entire 20-year period since 1988.  This mega program only 
had two conditions – fix the VAT to reverse the slide in domestic resource 
mobilisation and ensure the independence of the central bank…The failure of 
these conditions does not say much for the true “ownership of the program”.  
It also does not say much for the continued involvement of the IMF (together 
with the World Bank) in ensuring structural reforms, or reducing vulnerability 
of the country to external shocks or domestic “meltdowns” (2012, p. 10) 
 
As noted in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4), there are a number of studies on the impact of 
aid conditionality, with most concluding that conditionality does not work, or has a 
limited impact upon leveraging policy change (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 
2001; Killick 2004).  Of particular relevance to this study is the analysis of Burnett 
(1992).  As noted in Chapter 2, Burnett likens aid to water flowing through a spigot 
(or tap), and argues that if a country is perceived to be important by the US, then “the 
spigot is frozen in the open position” and “the influence the United States derives 
from the aid sinks close to zero.”  Burnett also argues based on his Cold War research 
that if the donor is pursuing multiple goals, and some are viewed as “vitally 
important” then “leverage is destroyed relative to the other goals.”  
 
Testing these two arguments of Burnett is the aim of this thesis.  
 
I begin with a preliminary question, asking respondents about whether US aid to 
Pakistan, specifically the KLB aid, should have conditions attached.  Second, to get at 
the frozen spigot issue, both groups of elite were asked: “Do you think the United 
States’ aid program achieves any leverage over Pakistani policy?”  To delve deeper 
into Pakistani elite perceptions, I asked this group if the leverage was in relation to 
foreign and security policy and/or domestic and economic policy.  Third, I asked both 
groups of elite specifically about economic conditionality.  Since this is not a 
particular feature of US aid, the question was asked in more general terms: “Does 
conditioned aid or loans from bilateral and multilateral donors bring about economic 
policy reform in Pakistan? Can you provide examples of success?” 
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To anticipate the findings, both countries’ elite generally agreed that aid should have 
conditions.  This does not mean that they necessarily like it, or think it works, but they 
generally view the presence of conditions as an inevitable part of aid.  Interestingly, 
views differ on whether the aid spigot is frozen in the open position, with the US elite 
generally arguing that it is, and the Pakistani elite generally arguing that it is not.  I 
resolve this discrepancy in views by noting that the spigot is only partially frozen, and 
that both sides focus on their frustrations: the Pakistani elite that the US is able to buy 
some influence through its aid, the US elite that it is not able to buy more.  Finally, 
views on the efficacy of economic conditionality are evenly divided within both 
groups.  More think it has no effect than some, and one dominant reason given is 
precisely that the credibility of economic conditionality is undermined by US strategic 
considerations. 
 
This chapter is organised into five sections. Section 5.2 examines Pakistan and US 
elite perceptions of the appropriateness of conditionality on US aid to Pakistan.  
Section 5.3 analyses elite opinion of the efficacy of conditionality in general, and 
Section 5.4 focuses on economic conditionality.  Section 5.5 discusses the results of 
this chapter and Section 5.6 concludes.  
 
5.2 Elite perceptions of the appropriateness of conditionality on US aid to 
Pakistan 
 
Both groups of elite were asked in the context of the 2009 Kerry Lugar Berman aid 
bill if they thought US aid to Pakistan should have conditions attached.  Table 5.1 
below summarises responses.  
 
Table 5.1: Attitudes of the elite towards imposing aid conditionality on US aid 
to Pakistan 
 Pakistan (number of 
respondents (% )) 
United States (number of 
respondents (% )) 
Conditions should be imposed 21 (64%) 23 (79%) 
Conditions should not be imposed 12 (36%) 6 (21%) 
Total 33 (100% ) 29 (100% ) 
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33 Pakistani respondents were asked this question.  Seven respondents were not asked 
this question because, as discussed in Section 2.7.1, interview questions put to 
Pakistani respondents were changed slightly following US field work.  29 US elite 
were asked this question.  Four respondents from the IMF and World Bank and three 
bureaucrats were not asked this question given it is the policy of their employer to 
impose conditions on foreign aid.  Two additional participants were not asked due to 
time constraints.  
 
The table shows that almost two-thirds of Pakistani respondents and almost four-fifths 
of the US elite believe US aid to Pakistan should have some form of conditionality 
attached.  Both sets of responses are examined in detail below. 
 
5.2.1 Pakistani elite views 
 
At first glance, this result that two-thirds of the Pakistani elite support the imposition 
of conditions on US aid is surprising in view of the general dissatisfaction reported in 
the Pakistani media of the United States’ engagement in Pakistan.  During my period 
of research, front page headlines in the English language media brimmed with 
dissatisfaction: “America stabs Pakistan in the back, again” (The Nation, 12 
November 2011, p.1), and “Obama braced for Pak battle” (The Nation, 5 May 2011, 
p.1).  Much reporting on the KLB Bill in the Pakistani press in late 2009 expressed 
concern over the level of conditionality attached to the Bill.  For example, Dawn 
newspaper reported that the military had “serious concerns” on some of the clauses of 
the bill that they believe would affect “national security” (Dawn, 8 October 2009, 
online edition).  Many of country’s elite often express public disapproval towards 
aspects of US engagement in Pakistan, across both aid and security spheres.  For 
example, the military responded sharply to conditions imposed on the Kerry Lugar 
Berman aid package, with the New York Times reporting the Pakistani Army’s anger 
towards the conditions in the package, saying it “interfered with Pakistan’s national 
security” (Perlez and Khan 2009).   
 
Despite this public anger, only about one-third of Pakistani’s elite is opposed to US 
aid conditionality on aid to Pakistan.  There are three key reasons cited by those who 
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oppose aid conditionality.  The first is that conditionality violates Pakistan’s 
sovereignty.  Journalist Zahid Hussain argues:  
Some clauses [in the KLB Act] were unnecessary, like civilian control of the 
military.16  This is a very stupid thing to say because even if both of the 
political parties would like to have control, when it comes from outside, what 
the hell are you doing? This policy of trying to divide the two sides, that was 
very stupid.  Policy to divide military and civilian leadership can’t come from 
the US; it is up to the people of that country” (Interview: 5 June 2013).   
 
Similarly, Senator Mushahid Hussain from Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid party 
(PML-Q) and Chair of the Senate Defence Committee argues: “Aid shouldn’t have 
security preconditions.  That is unacceptable and they’re too intrusive.  That is 
interference in our internal affairs.  They [the US] have no business meddling in our 
armed forces or our security system” (Interview: 24 October 2013). 
 
Second, the imposition of conditionality is seen as contrary to the humanitarian nature 
of aid.  Retired Brigadier, AR Jerral uses an analogy to explain his perspective: “Aid 
is aid – I need food, and somebody comes and gives me food, because, this is aid.  
But if he comes and says I’ll give you a piece of bread, but you have to go and kill 
that guy, it’s not aid.  Whether the US sees it from our perspective or not, I don’t 
know” (Interview: 19 June 2013). 
 
Third, the argument is made that US aid is in fact compensation to Pakistan for the 
costs it has incurred in the war on terror.  As compensation, rather than a gift, and 
moreover as inadequate compensation at that the funds should come without 
conditions.  Ambassador Ayaz Wazir argues: “I think we have incurred more than 
$80 billion in this war on terror – and how much have we received? Comparing the 
two is peanuts” (Interview: 20 February 2013).   
 
This is a key theme.  In several interviews, the elite argue that Pakistan’s terrorism 
problem can be traced back to Pakistan agreeing to fight the war on terror with the 
United States, and therefore it should be financially compensated through the civilian 
                                                 
16 KLB required the Secretary of State to submit reports to Congress on, among other issues, the degree 
to which Pakistani’s civilian leaders exercised effective control of the military (Markey 2013, 141). 
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and military aid program for the loss of life, heavier security requirements, and 
economic hardship suffered by Pakistan.  For example, Khalid Rahman of the 
Institute of Policy Studies, argues that the war on terror:  
… has created a situation in which you can’t expect the economy to run 
smoothly.  For all practical purposes, for the last ten years, we have been 
fighting a war.  The US has bought the war from Afghanistan to Pakistan… 
When there is a war, you can’t take long-term measures for development.  
You have to focus your resources and energy towards the war because it is the 
most immediate threat to you… When it comes to losses the country has faced 
– in terms of human life and economic deficiencies – they are huge…And we 
get $10-15 billion along with payment for services provided.  It is ridiculous 
to say that America is giving aid to Pakistan (Interview, 6 October 2011). 
 
The importance of the view that sees aid as compensation is discussed further in 
Chapter 6, where it is shown to be one reason why aid has not been successful in 
winning hearts and minds in Pakistan. 
 
Despite their popularity in the media, such views disparaging the use of conditionality 
are expressed only by a minority of the Pakistani elite.  Almost two-thirds of the elite 
think that the US should condition its aid to Pakistan, arguing either that it is 
inevitable or that will help Pakistan along the path of reform – a path it would 
otherwise by unlikely achieve on its own.  
 
Within the first group – those who believe conditionality is an inevitable part of aid –  
Lieutenant-General Talat Masood, who served in the Pakistan Army for over 40 
years, says:  
I think we would very much like not to have conditions, but I don’t think any 
country gives assistance without conditions.  Pakistan has to accept the reality 
if it wants to receive assistance, so it is up to them to take it or leave it 
(Interview: 28 May 2013).   
 
Bilal Mehboob, Secretary-General of the Pakistan Institute for Legislative 
Development and Transparency agrees it is a donor country’s “right” to attach 
conditions:  
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A country which is making a sacrifice, and making taxpayers money available 
to another country, are [sic] well within their rights to make it expressly clear 
their expectations from the people who receive that money (Interview: 29 May 
2013).   
 
Those who made this argument tend to qualify it to complain about excess 
conditionalities.  For example, politician Dr. Tariq Fazal Chaudhary says: “They have 
the right to see aid is given to projects where they really want to give.  But if there are 
a lot of strings attached, definitely the people and the government will not feel 
comfortable” (Interview: 31 May 2013). 
 
Within the second group, several in the elite advocate for conditions to be attached to 
aid in order to get Pakistan to pursue reform.  Dr. Farooq Sattar, head of the political 
party Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), wants conditions on aid in order to stamp 
out corruption:   
One thing that affects any assistance or aid that comes from abroad is 
corruption in the federal and provincial governments and in the bureaucracy… 
I would press for some conditionalities, either direct or indirect…  [If there are 
no conditionalities] the ruling elite will get off scot free if they are not kept in 
check or under some kind of pressure.  Conditions allow them to reform and 
transform Pakistan and to optimally use the assistance which is coming from 
outside (Interview: 23 January 2013). 
 
5.2.2 US elite views 
 
The US elite are even more supportive of the use of conditionality than their Pakistan 
counterparts, with almost 80 per cent responding positively to this question, compared 
to less than two-thirds of Pakistanis. 
 
The US policy elite gives three key reasons why conditions should be attached to US 
aid: conditions are an essential or inevitable part of aid; distrust of Pakistan; and 
domestic sentiment towards Pakistan. 
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First, aid conditionality is viewed by several of the US elite (as it is by several of the 
Pakistani elite) as an essential part of any aid program and a necessary check and 
balance on the aid recipient to ensure aid is used in a transparent way, consistent with 
US objectives: “The US needs to use some sort of conditions so our aid is not just a 
blank cheque” (Interview: political staffer, March 2012).  
 
Second, part of the desire to see conditions on aid to Pakistan stems from the 
United States’ distrust of Pakistan.  There is a strong perception among the elite that 
the United States cannot trust Pakistan.  While much of this “trust deficit” is 
completely unrelated to the aid program, broader perceptions of the relationship 
matter.  US mistrust in Pakistan has grown steadily in the years following 9/11, with 
perceptions of double-dealing, unreliability and “spoiler” actions affecting both the 
civilian and military aid programs.  Michael Krepon from the Stimson Center, a think-
tank focusing on global security, argues, “so much has happened now [between the 
United States and Pakistan] that the notion of aid without conditions is inconceivable” 
(Interview: 13 March 2012). 
 
Third, the policy elite made it clear that conditions are essential for domestic reasons: 
“Conditions are supposed to be for the New York Times and that level, and for the US 
public as well.  It is for domestic consumption” (Interview: S Akbar Zaidi, Columbia 
University, 22 March 2012).  Even some who are otherwise opposed to conditions 
concede that “politically you can’t get away from it [conditionality].  It is where 
public chest beating has its impact on policy” (Interview: Walter Andersen, Johns 
Hopkins University, 6 March 2012).   
 
The question put to the policy elite concerned conditionality in general and did not 
explicitly ask respondents to provide views on either type of conditionality. 
Nevertheless, it was clear from responses that there was particular support for security 
conditionality.    
Civilian assistance should not be subject to certification [conditions]… though 
it is important to have certification [based on conditionality] on military aid – 
it averts a lot of public relations disasters … it is either the Pakistanis are 
being supportive in the war on terror or they are not.  If not, then we should 
call a spade a spade and say you aren’t getting any of this military financing or 
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assistance. That is entirely reasonable (Interview: political staffer, March 
2012).   
 
Michael Kugelman at the Woodrow Wilson Centre has a similarly strong view 
towards security aid: “[W]e have the right to attach conditions to security-related aid 
because there are very specific goals that we want this military aid to be used for” 
(Interview: 7 March 2012).  Some respondents recall the misuse of US military aid in 
the early 2000s, when the Pakistan military used aid to build up conventional forces 
and weaponry at the expense of the intended objective of improving Pakistan’s ability 
to militarily undertake counterinsurgency operations.   
 
A smaller number of the policy elite (21 per cent) argue that aid should be given 
without conditions.  Respondents contend that the conditions imposed on US aid to 
Pakistan are counterproductive for three reasons: they exacerbate distrust and 
undermine relations between the two countries; they are for a domestic audience 
rather than for Pakistan; and they are mostly unrelated to development objectives. 
 
On the issue of trust, while some (quoted earlier) argue that conditions are necessary 
because the US cannot trust Pakistan, others within the elite argue that conditions 
exacerbate distrust in the relationship and have become counterproductive.  
Pulitzer Prize winning author Steve Coll, President of the New America Foundation 
argues: “Given the trust deficits and the high stakes – the prospect of Pakistan’s 
success or failure – I think it would be better for the US not to give aid than to give it 
with a course of conditions” (Interview: 13 March 2012).  Paul Pillar, a Professor of 
Security Studies at Georgetown and a 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, echoes this sentiment, linking the imposition of conditionality as a signal that 
the United States cannot trust Pakistan: “Explicit conditions are always seen on the 
other end, particularly the Pakistani end, as kind of an insult ” (Interview: 15 March 
2012).  Andrew Wilder of United States Institute of Peace agrees: “The process of 
developing and enforcing conditionality is a huge irritant” (Interview, 13 March 
2012).  
 
Second, some respondents are critical of the fact that conditions appear to be imposed 
for domestic US reasons. Shamila Chaudhary disagrees with the imposition of 
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conditionality, yet notes conditions are difficult to get away from: “Conditions are a 
symbolic gesture that came from Congress – we have been giving you [Pakistan] a lot 
of money and have overlooked a lot of things, but we are fed up with certain issues 
and we are putting these conditions in here because we want you to know that we are 
watching you, so you should moderate your behavior” (Interview: 12 March 2012). 
 
Third, some are critical of US conditionality design, and of links to security rather 
than development objectives.  Steve Coll at the New America Foundation argues that:  
Conditions that associate the release of aid with performance by other sectors 
of government other than those targeted to receive it right now are so 
counterproductive that coercion is not going to be achieved.  The resentment 
that it will engender will be greater than any benefits that would come from 
delivering aid set along those conditions (Interview: 13 March 2012).   
 
Shuja Nawaz at the Atlantic Council agrees: “All aid has to have conditions, but the 
conditions should relate to the effective use of aid and not to extraneous factors” 
(Interview: 15 March 2012).  Danny Cutherell from the Center for Global 
Development argues that the imposition of security conditions on economic aid sends 
a signal that: “Development is always going to be about just one more way to 
convince a country to do what is in the United States’ short-term interests.  That 
precludes doing good development work…Security conditions on economic 
development are pointless, and it is just clarifying the fact that this [aid] is a bribe” 
(Interview: 5 March 2012). 
 
In general, both sets of elites are generally supportive of the imposition of 
conditionality, viewing it as part of the reality of aid (a necessity) and perhaps as 
something that could be helpful.  
 
But does conditionality work?  The following two sections will examine elite 
perceptions around aid and leverage.  
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5.3  Elite perceptions on aid’s ability to leverage policy change in Pakistan 
 
Following my discussion with the elite on the appropriateness of conditionality, I 
turned the focus towards aid’s ability to achieve policy leverage in Pakistan.   
 
Table 5.2 below shows that the Pakistani and US elite have significantly different 
opinions when it comes to aid’s ability to achieve leverage.  Their respective views 
are discussed in the two sub-sections following. 
 
All 40 of the Pakistani sample were asked this question.  31 of the US sample were 
asked: four IFI respondents and one USAID respondent were not asked this question 
given sensitivities; two members of think-tanks were not asked this question due to 
time constraints.    
 
Table 5.2: Does US aid to Pakistan achieve leverage over Pakistani policy? 
 Pakistan (number of respondents 
(%)) 
United States (number of 
respondents (%)) 
Yes 37 (93%) 8 (26%) 
No 3 (7%) 23 (74%) 
Total 40 (100% ) 31 (100% ) 
 
This section explores policy leverage in general.  (I did ask the Pakistani, but not the 
US elite for their thoughts on the type of leverage US aid provided, and whether it 
was more in relation to international or domestic policy.)   
 
5.3.1 Pakistani elite views 
 
Table 5.2 above shows almost all of the Pakistani elite believe aid gets the 
American’s some sort of influence over Pakistan’s policy making: there are only three 
dissenters to this proposition out of 40 interviewees. 
  
Most of the elite think that this leverage is primarily in relation to foreign/security 
policy in Pakistan and in particular in relation to the military.  This is for several 
reasons.  First, the military is what the US really cares about: “The United States’ 
objectives in the region are military.  There are no other objectives…” (Interview: Dr. 
Zafar Jaspal, Quaid-i-Azam University, 10 October 2011).  Likewise, think-tank 
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analyst Simbal Khan argues: “[M]ost of the US agenda related to Pakistan is always 
security in nature and the leverage the US demanded was mostly in the security field.  
It has been the case through and through” (Interview: 11 July 2013).   
 
Second, there is a perception that military aid is much bigger than civilian aid and 
therefore more influential.  As Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 shows, this was certainly true 
for the early post 9/11 years when military aid was about two-thirds of the total, 
though from 2010 onwards the share of was typically slightly more than half.  
However, the perception of an aid program heavily skewed to the military remained.  
Aid consultant, Safiya Aftab says: “The size of military aid is huge compared to what 
comes in for civilian areas.  I would assume they are getting some bang for their buck 
for that otherwise why would they be doing that much spending?” (Interview: 17 July 
2013).   
 
Third, the military is perceived as being dependent on US aid.  Raza Rumi, Director 
of Policy at the Jinnah Institute, argues the US achieves leverage because of this:  
The real leverage of aid is all in the military.  That, I repeat, is a fact.  The 
military says we are proud, we don’t need anybody’s aid, but that is a public 
statement and in reality they are dependent on the US.  This mutual 
dependence of Pakistan and the US military is not new – it’s been there since 
the 1950s when the US wanted Pakistan to be a frontline ally in the 
Cold War… The unfortunate side of history is that the three longest 
dictatorships in Pakistan were completely backed by the US because all three 
of them were serving the United States’ strategic interests: Ayub Khan in the 
Cold War, Zia ul Haq in the Afghan Jihad and Pervez Musharraf in the war on 
terror.  It is a coincidence or something more? (Interview: 29 May 2013). 
 
Fourth, the US exercises military leverage not only through aid but through intensive 
relationships at the leadership level.  Khalid Rahman, head of the conservative think-
tank, the Institute of Policy Studies, contends:  
It is difficult for the military leadership to define a clear policy in the interests 
of the country… Mike Mullen [US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] had 
27 meetings with General Kayani in two years.  27 meetings.  I think 
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Mike Mullen might not have had as many meetings with his own Generals on 
a one-on-one basis (Interview: 6 October 2011).  
 
Some within the elite argued that this military leverage translates into broader policy 
leverage because of the influence of the military in Pakistan: “The leverage is 
definitely over the military, and the military has leverage over public policy.  So they 
have so far used the military to leverage everybody else.  ” (Interview: Shafqat 
Mahmood, Politician, 4 June 2013).  Ambassador Ayaz Wazir also thinks domestic 
and foreign policy are closely linked: “You can’t have an exclusive foreign policy, if 
you have an influence in one, it influences other parts of policy.  Influence is large on 
both the civilian and military establishment.” (Interview: 20 February 2013). 
 
Businessman (now PTI politician) Asad Umar, CEO of Engro and Chair of the 
Pakistani Business Council, argues leverage is mostly economic, and this leverage is 
hurting Pakistani interests:  
The leverage is on economic interests.  Even where economic interests clash, 
they clash for political reasons.   Energy is the best example – the Iran 
pipeline.  It is patently in the interest of Pakistan, and Pakistan is being 
punished by it not being built.  This is the kind of thing that goes against this 
whole idea of hearts and minds.  I love you, I want your economic well-being 
and yes, energy is the biggest crisis you have.  I am going to help you revamp 
two turbines in Ghudu which will have an economic impact of about this much 
(indicates small amount) and I will fight tooth and nail to ensure that the best 
source of imported energy you can have [from Iran], which will have an 
impact this big  (indicates large amount) will never happen.  So on purely 
economic issues, it is always the old hat of politics where the problem lies… 
US foreign policy in the region has created conditions, which can lead 
Pakistan into serious trouble.  Not because they [the US] have a desire to 
destroy us, but because they are pursuing their own strategic interests.  
Pakistan needs to say thank you, but we don’t want your aid.  That would 
mean giving up their perks and privileges and going through fundamental 
reform, which the elites are not ready to do (Interview: 20 February 2012). 
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The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline has been a contentious issue between Pakistan and the 
United States, particularly given the United States’ hardline stance towards Iran, and 
the significant economic sanctions it imposes.  In 2010, it was reported that US 
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, met 
Pakistani Petroleum Minister Syed Naveed Qamar and asked if Pakistan would 
abandon its pipeline accord with Tehran in exchange for extensive American energy 
assistance (Gas and Oil Connections 2010). 
 
Despite these possible spillover effects, many nevertheless felt the leverage was 
greater in military areas.  Gandapur, for example, argues that the US has no domestic 
policy leverage: “It is [leverage in] military policy of course.  Americans have the 
muscle to influence our [military] policy…when it comes to economic policies, 
frankly, USAID is not influencing us” (Interview: 19 June 2013). 
 
Some had more subtle views of leverage going beyond funds and conditions.  Former 
Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat notes the US has achieved a level of 
influence through their military training programs: “The influence is there though 
because we have all trained in the US.  I was in Fort Knox and Leavenworth and 
[General] Kayani was in Leavenworth.  Most of us have had our education in the 
United States, in that sense the lobby is there and it is pro-US and it is helpful” 
(Interview: 4 May 2012). 
 
Politician Ayaz Amir sees the influence of the US as one of incubating ideas for 
reform in Pakistan: “[It achieves leverage on] economic policy.  What USAID does, 
above all, it doesn’t help set up projects or doesn’t raise any sky scraping towers, in 
fact, and it gives the US a kind of intellectually ascendancy.  Pakistani officialdom 
doesn’t start mouthing or parroting the same phrases, but it starts recycling the same 
ideas.  Economic policy has been affected by this” (Interview: 5 February 2013).  
Moeed Yusaf, from the United States Institute of Peace, is less convinced: aid gives 
certain ideas a hearing, but doesn’t guarantee that they will prevail: “Civilian aid to 
Pakistan opens the door for the US.  It buys them a conversation.  But if you take 
away the aid, you essentially signal that you are no longer interested.  But keeping the 
aid will not do much more than buy a conversation” (Interview: 14 July 2012). 
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Not all of those who thought that aid gives the US leverage are happy with this fact. 
Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, quoted earlier, goes on to say: “If you can influence 
another, you would love to influence it.  But the fault lies with us and not with them.  
We have to correct ourselves.  People would love to buy us, and we are available for 
sale.” 
 
A small group of the policy elite (just three individuals or 7 per cent) dissents from 
the majority and argues aid from the United States does not achieve any leverage over 
Pakistan’s international or domestic policy.  They appeal to experience, to limited US 
aid volumes, and to Pakistan’s powerful negotiating position. 
 
Imtiaz Gul, author and head of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, argues 
that history teaches us that aid doesn’t give the US leverage:  
If you look at military aid, and if it was a tool to buy leverage, then the 
Pakistani military would have long ago gone into North Waziristan, but they 
haven’t.  If it were a tool, the Pakistan Army would have long ago severed its 
contacts with the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba, but it hasn’t… It is 
not like the US can give them $10 billion and they will change overnight 
(Interview: 17 November 2011). 
 
Journalist, Khurram Hussain, argues that US civilian aid is too small and its military 
aid too unimportant to achieve leverage for the United States in Pakistan:  
The amount of civilian aid being dispersed is so small that it doesn’t give them 
any serious leverage.  No one takes the threat that the US will cut off civilian 
aid very seriously.  Regarding military aid, because the army has privileged 
access to fiscal resources, if the US were to cut off some amount of coalition 
support funds, the army is able to replenish that amount from the domestic 
exchequer for national security reasons.  Therefore, the army is not as 
responsive to threats to cut off external aid as the Americans would like 
(Interview: 20 February 2012).   
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Senator Mushahid Husain argues that Pakistan has the upper hand: “The US has very 
little leverage in Pakistan.  They try.  For seven months, Salala was closed,17 what 
could they [the US] do? Where was the leverage?  The US needs us more than we 
need them for the next two to three years.  Without Pakistan, they will not have a 
dignified, honorable or peaceful exit from Afghanistan” (Interview: 24 October 
2013). 
 
5.3.2 US elite views 
 
Quite in contrast to the Pakistani views, three-quarters of US elite respondents 
consider that the United States is unable to exert any kind of leverage over Pakistani 
policy-making.  Five key themes emerge to explain the limitations of US leverage: the 
divergence in strategic objectives between the two countries; the credibility of US 
demands; the number of and conflict between US goals; the size of the US aid 
program; and Pakistani leverage.   
 
Concerning the divergence in strategic objectives, the view put most frequently by the 
elite for the failure of US aid to achieve leverage is simply that the issues where the 
US is asking for change are perhaps just too important for Pakistan to change position 
on.  The aspect of Pakistan’s behavior and outlook that the US most frequently tries to 
influence relates to how it views India and Afghanistan, and its use of extremist 
networks in both countries to maintain its interests.  For example, Pakistan has been 
accused of providing safe havens for groups who have attacked American and 
coalition troops in Afghanistan.  Ending such behavior is specifically listed as part of 
the conditionality attached to the KLB aid package: “Ceasing support…to any groups 
that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan” 
(Enhanced Economic Partnership with Pakistan Act, 2009).  But, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, Pakistan has deep strategic interests in working with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.  The US policy elite recognises this, and does not think that the US 
could change the strategic calculus or “red lines” for Pakistan through its aid program 
with any lasting impact: “We can’t leverage change.  The idea that we could change 
Pakistan’s concept of its national interest seems to me like the least realistic thing that 
                                                 
17 Following the NATO attack that accidently killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in Salala, close to the Afghan 
border, Pakistan shut the NATO supply lines through Pakistan for seven months.  
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could happen” (Interview: Polly Nayak, 15 March 2012).  Bruce Riedel echoes this 
sentiment: “If we think that the threat of removing aid is going to compel good 
behavior then people haven’t read the history of US relations with Pakistan” 
(Interview: 14 March 2012).   
 
Second, some believe that the US is not credible and that this undermines its leverage.  
Danielle Pletka from the American Enterprise Institute argues: “It is only leverage if 
they understand you clearly and if you mean it.  And of course they [Pakistan] don’t 
understand us and clearly we don’t mean it.  We have lost our leverage” (Interview: 
13 March 2012). 
 
US policy decisions give weight to these views.  For example, in October 2012, US 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, issued a waiver on conditionality on military aid to 
Pakistan.  This waiver allowed US$2 billion of aid to continue to flow, which 
otherwise would not have given Pakistan failed to meet certain counter-terrorism 
requirements outlined in the Kerry Lugar Berman Bill.  The waiver was issued on 
“national security” grounds (Murphy 2012).  Whether or not it was justified, the 
issuance of such exemptions certainly undermines the potency of the conditionalities 
in place. 
 
Credibility, and therefore leverage, is also undermined by the fact that the US is seen 
to be unable to make a long-term commitment.  Many hoped that the KLB aid, and its 
focus on building a relationship between governments and civilian institutions, would 
help to normalise the relationship.  As Shamila Chaudhary explains, the belief was 
that “if we can just focus on development issues, then Pakistan will cooperate with us 
on all of these difficult security issues – CT, Afghanistan.”  But, as Chaudhary 
explains, this was a misplaced hope.  “[I]t just didn’t work.  For Pakistanis it was not 
quid pro quo, it was another way to get more out of the US and a short-term 
relationship they knew would end one day” (Interview: 12 March 2012).   
 
Third, there is a perception that the United States has too many goals in Pakistan.  
This has had an impact on the United States’ credentials as an aid donor and on 
Pakistan’s ability to prioritise, given the goal posts keep shifting:  
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KLB doesn’t get leverage because we ask so much of the Pakistanis on so 
many fronts. If we only had one thing to ask of the Pakistanis and we used 
KLB as one of the carrots then it might be more effective.  Our needs and 
desires for Pakistan are so many that it serves to diminish the efficacy of any 
single instrument of US power…Civilian assistance has had very little impact 
in improving the relationship, or diffusing anti-Americanism, or otherwise 
supporting US objectives (Interview: Robert Hathaway, Woodrow Wilson 
Center, 7 March 2012). 
 
Not only are there many goals, but they are conflicting.  Shamila Chaudary at the 
New America Foundation argues that:  
There was pressure from Washington to focus on the hot issue of the day and 
using aid money for that, it rendered USAID’s ability to support reforms 
ineffective.  Overall, the program itself [KLB] and the level of money was too 
intrinsically attached to the CT (counter-terrorism) campaign and Pakistan’s 
cooperation.  When everything hinges on that you can’t really do anything 
sustainable by the way of reform (Interview: 12 March 2012). 
 
Fourth, the United States does not actually give Pakistan that much aid.  While the 
United States is the largest bilateral donor to Pakistan, civilian aid works out to 
around 800 rupees per capita (around US$7.80).  A political staffer argues that: 
“[U]sing aid as leverage is not ever going to work. We don’t give them that much 
money” (Interview: March 2012).  Andrew Wilder, Director of the Afghanistan and 
Pakistan programs at the United States Institute of Peace, agrees and references the 
military aid program: “The billion dollars is not a lot of money to get Pakistan’s 
military to change its security calculus.  It is naïve to think that trinkets are going to 
make the natives behave” (Interview: 6 March 2012). 
 
Fifth and finally, many of the policy elite perceive that the balance of power within 
the US-Pakistan relationship had shifted and Pakistan now has more leverage than the 
US, arguing that the US position in Afghanistan has placed it in a weak bargaining 
position: “Leverage has shifted.  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, given the 
presumed rightness of the US in pounding the table, saying you are with us or with 
the terrorists, leverage was a little bit more with the United States.  But as the 
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practical considerations of waging a war in Afghanistan have become more important, 
it has tended to shift the other way [toward Pakistan]” (Interview: Paul Pillar, 
Georgetown University, 15 March 2012).  So long as the United States continues to 
place importance on a smooth transition out of Afghanistan, Pakistan will be in a 
position of power given its potential to play either a constructive or spoiler role. 
 
One example of Pakistani leverage was the suspension of aid when Pakistan refused 
to reopen NATO supply lines after they closed them following a NATO strike on 
Pakistani soil that killed 24 soldiers in November 2011.  It took almost six months of 
tense negotiations, and the promise of more aid, to get Pakistan to reopen the supply 
routes that the US depends on to get military supplies through Pakistan to 
Afghanistan.   
 
Despite the preponderance of negative views on the question, one-quarter of the US 
elite (26 per cent) believe that US aid to Pakistan is able to help the US achieve some 
policy leverage in Pakistan.  
 
Some of the elite believe the US can influence Pakistan’s military elite.  However, 
even among this sub-group, there is a perception that leverage was much easier to 
achieve in the initial years following 9/11 under General Musharraf’s military 
dictatorship because of his centralisation of power.   
 
Some of the US elite view the Pakistani state as mercenary, and able to be bought.  
S. Akhbar Zaidi had a cynical view of how leverage is achieved in Pakistan: 
“[T]hrough aid, America has been able to buy its influence.  After 2014 if they want 
Pakistan to do something for them, they just have to pay them.  It is a mercenary state 
of the elite” (Interview: 22 March 2012). 
 
Zaidi also argues that the elite are pro-American and are heavily influenced by aid, in 
particular, the rents they can extract from aid: 
The elite in Pakistan, whether they are English speaking, or from different 
ethnic groups, have a desire to be seen as pro-American. They benefit 
financially.  Most generals, when they retire, move to Virginia.  Pakistan is 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world.  If you are corrupt, it is very 
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easy to be bought off.  Money, power, influence, the ability to invite Pakistani 
leaders to the US – they are all enticing means.  There is support for US 
interests in Pakistan at a very private, personal, ‘what can I get out of this 
level’ (Interview: 22 March 2012). 
 
But even those who think aid can buy the US leverage admit to its limitations.  
David Speedie of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs thinks that 
US aid has leverage, but concedes that “Americans would clearly hope that their aid is 
buying more than it is getting” (Interview: 22 March 2012).  Marvin Weinbaum has a 
similarly nuanced view: “Yes, we might have received some benefits; but we would 
like them to do something with regard to the Taliban, Haqqani and so on” (Interview: 
14 March 2012). 
 
In general, answers to this question provide the clearest case of a disconnect between 
the two elites.  The reasons for this are discussed in Section 5.5.  
 
5.4 Elite perceptions on aid’s ability to achieve economic reform in 
Pakistan 
 
This section examines US and Pakistani attitudes towards the ability of aid 
conditionality to achieve economic reform.  The question was asked in relation to aid 
in general, rather than US aid in particular (since the latter does not make heavy 
reliance on economic conditionality) and the elite were asked to substantiate their 
responses (if positive) with examples of success.  Table 5.3 below demonstrates that 
both groups of elite had largely the same views, with a slight majority believing that 
aid could not engender economic reform in Pakistan.  The next two sub-sections will 
explore Pakistani and US responses in turn. 
 
Table 5.3 – Can conditions bring about economic reform in Pakistan? 
 Pakistan US 
Yes 13 (40%) 10 (43%) 
No 20 (60%) 13 (57%) 
Total 33 23 
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33 Pakistani elite were asked this question.  7 respondents were not asked this 
question because these participants were interviewed prior to the questionnaire being 
changed, as outlined in Chapter 2.  23 of the US elite were asked this question. 14 US 
elite respondents were not asked this question for a number of reasons. For some the 
interview ran out of time; others were foreign policy specialists and were asked 
different foreign-policy rather than aid questions.  One IFI respondent provided 
background information only. 
 
5.4.1 Pakistani elite views 
 
More than half of the Pakistani elite (60 per cent) questioned believe conditions on 
aid would not spur on economic reform in Pakistan.  Three common themes emerge – 
that reform has to be indigenous to be successful; criticism of the multiple failed IMF 
programs to Pakistan; and the undermining of economic conditions by strategic 
calculations.  
 
A recurring theme among respondents is the need for reform to come from within, or 
for reform to occur indigenously, often expressed with the rhetoric Pakistan needs to 
get its own “house in order” or that Pakistan needs to do its own nation-building.  
Bilal Mehboob, Secretary General of the Pakistan Institute for Legislative 
Development and Transparency argues: “Basic and lasting reforms can only come 
when the initiative for that reform comes from within.  As long as it does not come 
from within Pakistan, I don’t think these changes can be lasting, even if they are 
started” (Interview: 29 May 2013).   
 
As part of getting Pakistan’s own house in order, Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, advocates 
for Pakistan to change its outlook:  
To bring about change, I don’t think you can do it with a begging bowl…We 
should tighten the belt and start to live with the limited resources that we have, 
rather than go around and beg for money.  That money [aid] is not spent 
properly anyway, it is stolen also.  Our country, as an agriculturalist country, 
is rich.  The only thing that we, in our last 65 years of history did not have was 
a sincere leader.  If a leader with dignity and honour comes and says, I have 
tightened my belt, I am here to help – in five to ten years things would be 
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totally different.  Now, it is like throwing things into a black hole, you don’t 
see anything (Interview: 20 February 2013). 
 
Javid Leghari, head of the Higher Education Commission, supports the view that 
change needs to come from within:  
You can’t have outside forces come in and tell us what to do.  First of all we 
have to put our own house in order.  Why should the IMF tell us that we need 
to widen our tax base?  I want the tax base widened.  Why should the 
Australians, Americans or British taxpayers pay us for our development while 
we refuse to pay taxes?  I don’t think these types of things should be coming 
from the IMF, they should be coming from us… We should not even need 
IMF and World Bank money, I think we can generate enough resources here 
through widening the tax base and getting rid of corruption, then we can take 
care of our own problems (Interview:15 February 2013). 
 
A number of the elite are critical of the IMF programs in Pakistan, particularly of the 
conditionalities the IMF imposes, and their track record of failure (as discussed in 
Section 1.5 in Chapter 1).  Journalist Zahid Hussain believes Pakistan has been 
dependent on aid for too long and has not had to think for itself about its own needs 
for economic reform: “Conditionalities are quite high – we have never completed an 
IMF agreement, never.  All the agreements have been abandoned halfway through – 
why?  Because Pakistan refuses to take on reform.  I think it would be a good thing if 
aid to Pakistan is either stopped or given differently” (Interview: 5 June 2013).  
 
The IMF is seen by some as failing not only in Pakistan, but around the world.  
Raza Rumi, Director at the Jinnah Institute, is critical of the IMF’s ability to use loans 
or aid to achieve lasting reform:  
Find me a country where it has worked, the thing is – no [it hasn’t].  The 
answer to IMF-led reform and the experience of policy-based lending 
generally is that it has been a colossal failure since the 80s.  90 per cent of 
structural adjustment programs have failed.  Either the conditions were not 
fulfilled, or if they were they had huge social and economic costs … The IMF 
really needs to review the way it works because it has failed in so many 
countries … You can’t ask the vested interests to undertake reforms, because 
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you know they are hoodwinking you.  They take the money, they won’t do 
anything and they’ll move onto the next package.  So the approach is wrong  
(Interview: 29 May 2013). 
 
Ambassador Akram Zaki criticises the nature of the conditions: “The IMF and others 
are so elitist that the conditions that they impose support the business class and upper 
class, but put the burden on the lower classes – for example on electricity price 
increases” (Interview: 21 January 2013). 
 
Third, many believe that the United States had the final say on whether or not the IMF 
would provide a structural adjustment package to Pakistan, and that therefore these 
agreements are ultimately about politics and strategy rather than economic reform.  
Head of political party MQM, Dr. Farooq Sattar, thinks the IMF’s agenda “serves the 
purpose of the big powers, like the United States” (Interview: 23 January 2013).  
Retired Brigadier AR Jerral contends: “The IMF and World Bank are both 
subservient to the United States.  The President of the United States appoints the 
World Bank President.  The IMF, I don’t know, it must also have been.  Their [IFIs] 
aid is also conditional and in our experience we have found that whenever we went 
again the Americans, the World Bank and IMF openly denied more aid” (Interview: 
19 June 2013).  Similar in sentiment is politician Ayaz Amir who believes: “When we 
have a warm relationship with the US, for a very brief fleeting moment they think 
Pakistanis are the best people in the world – then the IMF becomes very helpful, the 
World Bank becomes very helpful, the ADB becomes very helpful” (Interview: 5 
February 2013).  These perceptions of the political nature of the IMF’s programs to 
Pakistan demonstrate how the credibility of economic conditionality can be 
undermined.  If Pakistan thinks IMF aid is controlled by the United States, conditions 
become less credible because access to funds, even multilateral funds, is perceived to 
be linked not to economic performance, but the political desires of the United States.  
 
A substantial minority of Pakistan’s elite (40 per cent) nevertheless consider 
conditioned aid can produce economic reform in Pakistan, though they tend to claim 
only modest results.  Politician Shafqat Mahmood believes aid in this instance works 
only as a “stop-gap” and says in a similar vein to those who did not believe that 
conditional aid could deliver reform: “Yes it can, but we have to improve our own 
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fundamentals.  We cannot keep going to the Americans, Western countries and the 
IMF, we have to do things internally” (Interview: 4 June 2013). 
 
As part of this question on the utility of economic aid conditionality, respondents 
were asked to name examples of the success of conditionality.  Few of the elite could 
point to specific examples of when conditional aid has resulted in economic reform in 
Pakistan or elsewhere.  A group of economists interviewed at the Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics in Islamabad, provide the example of Central Bank reform, 
citing “the independence of the Central Bank, as well as the generation of some 
reforms regarding the financial sector as successes of IMF programs.”  They also note 
the reform of the GST, which almost got off the ground: “The reformed GST – we 
had almost implemented under the cover [of IMF conditionality], so some 
conditionalities are not bad in that sense” (Interview: 20 February 2013). 
 
Politician turned businessman, Adnan Aurangzeb, cites the example of the free flow 
of currency in the early 1990s as a success of aid conditionality:  
In Pakistan, foreign exchange was very tightly controlled.  Previously, if you 
had to travel abroad as a Pakistani, you had to take permission from the State 
Bank to be allowed $500 on your visit abroad because currency was not 
available on the open market.  The 1990s government of Nawaz Sharif did 
bring in quite a few economic reforms, which made the free flow of hard 
currency and credit available.  I never thought in my lifetime that I would have 
a Visa card in Pakistan (Interview: 24 August 2013). 
 
5.4.2 US elite views 
 
23 of the US elite were asked for their views on conditionality and economic reform.  
As shown in Table 5.3, as is the case for the Pakistani elite, over half (57 per cent) 
believe conditionality cannot achieve economic reform.   
 
Overall, the US elite perceive that conditions could not achieve economic reform for 
political reasons, citing two key explanations, both reasons are also stressed by the 
Pakistani elite: the overriding importance of strategic considerations, and political 
roadblocks in Pakistan. 
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Some argue that, because of its strategic circumstances, Pakistan has become used to 
a reliable stream of aid from the United States and other bilateral and multilateral 
donors, especially the military.  Dr. S. Akbar Zaidi from Columbia University, who 
was interviewed for this research, has written: “The Pakistani military is the main 
beneficiary from this [aid] relationship, exploiting the pathology of too big—and too 
important—to fail” (Zaidi 2011, p. 1).  Pakistan has embraced its “too important to 
fail” moniker and since 9/11, the United States has enhanced this belief, through aid, 
high-level visits, and by linking Pakistan so intricately with its strategy in 
Afghanistan.  
  
Second, significant political roadblocks exist and the political environment in 
Pakistan is unpredictable.  It is difficult for conditionality to effect change if 
economic reform is not a priority for the government and consensus building among 
the community is not taking place.  One IFI analyst summarises the problem:  
Money talks, but money talks only so much.  The IFIs cannot want reform at 
the end of the day more than the authorities.  Money doesn’t move people 
unless they are in really dire shape … Reform will be built on consensus.  We 
can’t have reformists being in the minority or have the international 
community being the only ones pressing for reform (Interview: March 2012). 
 
Strong arguments were made that the vested interests of the elite in Pakistan are an 
impediment to economic reform, regardless of the strength of conditionality imposed.  
Shamila Chaudhary at the New America Foundation argues:  
Doing any kind of long-term economic reform doesn’t really suit or benefit 
the political elite… There are a few hundred families running the government, 
not just civilians – they are linked to the military, they are linked to political 
parties – and they all rotate in and out.  They are not going to change to a 
system that disadvantages them.  That is what the US didn’t realise when they 
tried to push reforms (Interview: 12 March 2012).  
 
While the problem is long-standing, prospects for reform in 2013 were seen as 
particularly negative.  The May 2013 elections heralded the first time a 
democratically elected government was replaced with another democratically elected 
 161 
government in Pakistan’s history.  The key political parties scrambled to secure votes, 
promising a better economic future, but included no details on what they would do 
specifically.  Shuja Nawaz at the Atlantic Council argues that this kind of 
electioneering took the focus off reform: “This government [led by the Pakistan 
Peoples Party (PPP)] is resorting to deficit financing at a staggering rate.  Particularly 
now, with the elections coming up they are going to throw money at people in order 
to win the elections.  They are going to dig a deeper economic hole and I am not sure 
it will be worth anyone’s while to win this election” (Interview: 15 March 2012). 
 
Electioneering, sectarian tensions and a poor security environment are seen to have 
consumed the Pakistani leadership.  One IFI analyst argues that inaction on economic 
reform stems from the Pakistani government’s inability to focus on anything but 
security: “It really comes from paralysis. Everybody is so consumed with other 
problems.  Everyone recognises that revenue is an issue and energy is an issue, yet we 
aren’t able to do anything” (Interview: IFI Analyst, March 2012).   
 
While there were many naysayers on conditionality’s ability to achieve economic 
reform, there were nevertheless a significant minority amongst the policy elite who 
argued that conditions could solicit economic reform.   
 
Some agreed in the abstract that conditions could bring about economic reform in 
Pakistan provided that there is some domestic will.  Shuja Nawaz from the Atlantic 
Council believes: 
If there is policy-oriented assistance, particularly from multilateral donors like 
the IMF and World Bank, yes, it can create the environment for change.  In 
the end, aid is a catalyst: the critical element has to be the desire on the part of 
the administration in Pakistan to actually make changes to the economic 
relationship within the country (Interview:15 March 2012).  
 
There was greater confidence in the IFIs to be able to get Pakistan to undertake 
economic reform because the outcomes the IFIs want in Pakistan are less politicised 
than the outcomes sought by the United States.  Josh White argues that IMF programs 
have been worthwhile in promoting reform: “US conditionality doesn’t provide the 
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same kind of leverage that certain structural aid and loans that IFIs might use to 
change fiscal or monetary policy” (Interview: 16 March 2012).   
 
Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin also agrees that the IFIs have achieved reform 
outcomes, albeit “narrow” successes: “IMF conditionality to the Ministry of Finance 
to have them impose taxes makes sense…It is unsustainable to keep giving aid if the 
country itself isn’t willing to change its own finance.  I don’t know how successful it 
is yet, but the IMF is on the right path on conditioning loans to tax revenues” 
(Interview: 9 March 2012). 
 
5.5  Discussion  
 
Comparing Pakistani and US elite views on conditionality and leverage demonstrates 
that both groups of elite share the similar perspectives on the need for conditions on 
US aid to Pakistan.  Section 5.2 showed that the two-thirds of the Pakistani and four-
fifths of the US elite agree that some form of conditionality should be placed on US 
aid to Pakistan.  That more of the US elite considered conditions to be an integral part 
of US aid policy can be explained by the fact that aid donors in general are more 
likely to want to see their taxpayer-funded foreign aid spent appropriately and not 
wasted.  It is surprising that almost 65 per cent of the Pakistani elite wanted 
conditions on aid from the United States, given that in general it is portrayed in the 
media that Pakistan wants less interference from the United States.  Despite this 
public posturing, most of the Pakistani elite accept that aid from the US should be 
conditioned, or at least that it will be conditioned, because it is the donor’s right to 
attach conditions, and because in the end conditions might be able to help Pakistan to 
undertake difficult reforms. 
 
Just because someone believes that aid should have conditions does not mean that 
they believe those conditions will work. Views are starkly divided on whether they 
do, with nearly all (93 per cent) of the Pakistani elite arguing that US aid does give it 
leverage, and most of the US elite (three-quarters) claiming to the contrary that it does 
not.  This is an unexpected result.  One could reasonably expect that the aid donor, in 
this case the United States, might think its aid program achieved policy leverage 
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especially given the large volume of US aid given to Pakistan.  One could also 
reasonably expect the aid recipient to underplay any leverage that aid achieves, so the 
recipient appears independent and cannot be bought or influenced by more powerful 
aid donors.  Neither of these assumptions are borne out by the data. 
 
Why is there this difference?  Both sides put forward very different arguments, with 
the Pakistani side stressing the military leverage the US has in particular, due to the 
sums of money involved and the long-standing relationship between the two 
countries’ armed forces.   
 
The US elite on the other hand tends to explain its failure to exercise leverage through 
a range of factors, from the relative smallness of its aid through to its lack of 
credibility, and the existence of too many and conflicting goals, a shift in the balance 
of power in the relationship to Pakistan, and a belief that what the US is asking from 
Pakistan is simply too expensive to buy. 
 
How can these diverging perspectives be resolved?  Clearly, the US has got some of 
what it wanted from Pakistan, but not everything.  In such a situation, it would appear 
that the US interviewees are focusing on what leverage it has not achieved, and 
Pakistani on what it has.  Perhaps that in turn is what is most grating: for Pakistanis, 
that the US does have influence; and for the US that it doesn’t have enough influence. 
 
Another explanation may be that the US elite does not want US aid to be seen as only 
wanting to “buy” cooperation or leverage using its aid program, whereas the Pakistani 
elite are much more pragmatic about the impacts of US aid on policy making in 
Pakistan.  Viewing aid as buying something undermines the value of the gift, and 
therefore reduces the status of the donor relative to the recipient.  Perhaps then aid 
recipients are more likely to recognise the influence of aid while donors will perhaps 
undervalue its impact.   
 
Turning specifically to economic reform, views were more similar between the two 
groups, but more divided within, with a small majority on each side claiming that aid 
could not purchase economic reform.  The Pakistani elite appears clearly more 
convinced that US aid purchased military than economic leverage.  The US elite seem 
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more convinced of the power of multilateral aid than their own aid to exert influence, 
but even in relation to the former they are not too confident, and for good reason.  The 
majority on both sides who argued economic conditions do not work had similar, and 
persuasive arguments.  They argue that domestic political will is lacking, and that the 
credibility of economic reform conditionality is undermined by the importance 
attached to security goals.  Those who claim economic conditions could work are 
generally modest in their claims, arguing that they could make a small but not 
decisive difference. This seems consistent with the disappointing track-record of IMF 
programs in Pakistan, as analysed by Ahmad and Mohammed (2012). 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this concluding section, I consider the findings of this chapter in relation to 
Burnett’s “frozen spigot” metaphor.  It is evident that most of the Pakistani elite 
consider that the spigot is not frozen open.  To the contrary, 93 per cent believe aid 
does achieve leverage.  Interestingly the US elite are more likely to view the spigot as 
frozen open, with most arguing that the US lacks leverage in Pakistan. 
 
Recall Burnett’s argument: “[I]f the receiving country believes that the spigot is 
frozen in the open position, that for reasons of strategic necessity or domestic politics 
it is not feasible for Washington to close the spigot, the influence the United States 
derives from the aid sinks close to zero” (1992, p. 5).  Although it is true that in 
Pakistan for the period of research (and indeed for the entire post 9/11 period) it was 
not possible for Washington to credibly “close the spigot” (withhold its aid), one 
cannot conclude that US influence or leverage was “close to zero”.  This would 
indeed be the conclusion one reached if one listened only to US elite opinion.  But 
Pakistani elite opinion points us in quite a different direction, overwhelmingly 
arguing that the US does have influence through its aid.  I reconcile this disagreement 
(in the previous section) by arguing that US aid does have some leverage though not 
as much as the US would like, and therefore conclude, contrary to Burnett, that the 
spigot is not frozen. 
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While it may be the case that the US does get some leverage from its aid, that 
leverage is limited by a number of factors stressed by both sides, ranging from 
strategic divergence, to a lack of credibility and a limited aid budget.  Overall, the 
finding suggest that one should view the aid-leverage relationship as a matter of 
degree (aid has more leverage or less), not as a zero-one dichotomy (aid either has or 
does not have leverage). 
 
While Burnett’s first conclusion needs to be modified in this way, his second 
conclusion that conditionality in relation to nation-building goals can be undermined 
by the pursuit of realist ones is confirmed by this research.  Both sets of elites are in 
general skeptical about the role of economic conditionality.  While they do not in 
general write it off altogether, they were more likely to think that aid provided 
security rather than economic leverage, and several respondents explicitly confirm 
that economic conditionality was undermined by US realist goals which tend to take 
priority.  
 
In summary, this research suggests that aid does have some leverage in Pakistan.  If 
so, then, the value and reach of this leverage should not be underestimated, as the US 
elite perhaps does.  However, we should not be too demanding in our expectations.  
Expecting aid to promote economic reform as well as provide strategic leverage may 
be one expectation too far in a situation where realist objectives dominate. 
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Chapter Six: (Not) winning whose hearts 
and minds? 
 
 
 
 
“The US is trying to win the hearts and minds of the elite, because the ordinary 
Pakistani has no say in larger scheme of things and he is not significant.  Because he 
is not part of your work force, and your business is not related to him and he is not 
working in some American factory here – so there is no economic interest that the US 
has with the ordinary Pakistani.  So far the US only has military interest.” 
 
Adnan Aurangzeb, former politician and prince of the Swat Valley.  
(Interview: 24 August 2013) 
 
 
 
“If the US is going to have a chance at success it will have to be with the middle 
class, and they are trying.” 
 
Danny Cutherell, Centre for Global Development. 
(Interview: 5 March 2012) 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The United States’ desire to win hearts and minds overseas has spanned many 
decades, many theatres and many different actors.  From Korea and Vietnam, to Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the United States has attempted to influence public opinion of itself.  
This chapter examines the United States’ drive to win hearts and minds in Pakistan in 
the post 9/11 period.   
 
Given the clear unpopularity of the US in Pakistan, the chapter takes as its starting 
point the failure of the US to win hearts and minds.  Despite the increase in US aid to 
Pakistan, during this period of research, Pakistani public support for the United States 
declined steadily.  A Pew Global Attitudes survey showed that 64 per cent of 
Pakistanis viewed the US as more of an enemy than a partner in 2009.  This increased 
to 69 per cent in 2011 and 74 per cent in 2012 (2012, p.1).  Why was the US so 
unsuccessful in building public support?  Did the realist objectives of US aid 
undermine its ability to win hearts and minds? 
 
The interview question used to answer this question is: 
Pakistani opinion of the United States is negative, despite the large US aid 
program.  Why can’t the US improve its image in Pakistan? 
 
Since I thought the Pakistani elite would better understand Pakistani public opinion, I 
asked this question only to the former group. 
 
Hearts and minds campaigns centre on winning over the people in an aid recipient 
country (Fitzsimmons 2008) – but which people?  Societies are complex and difficult 
to categorise; however, for the purposes of a great deal of public opinion research, it 
is convenient to divide society simply into “the masses” and “the elite” (Bottomore 
1964).  
 
As I argued in Chapter 2, whom the US targets with its aid programs presents a 
quandary.  Does the US take the nation-building road and target the masses to 
improve public opinion - for example, to get the ordinary person to feel better about 
the US, and less likely to take to extremist or terrorist causes?  Or does it take the 
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realist road and focus its efforts on the elite to gain political influence, and affect 
policy decisions in order to obtain maximum influence – for example to get the aid 
recipient country to vote with the US in the United Nations?  Or a combination of the 
two?  This chapter also attempts to answer these questions.  
 
The Obama Administration’s aspirations to win the hearts and minds of the masses 
are well documented.  In 2015, in an opinion editorial in the LA Times, 
President Obama writes: “Our campaign to prevent people around the world from 
being radicalised to violence is ultimately a battle for hearts and minds” (2015). 
 
In the Pakistani context, as noted in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.2), President Obama 
appointed Richard Holbrooke, as the United States’ first Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Holbrooke clearly believed in the importance of nation-
building in Pakistan to long-term stability in the region, and in the importance of 
winning hearts and minds at the mass level to this goal.  Nasr explains Holbrooke’s 
perspective: 
Average Pakistanis had to see a benefit in having a relationship with America. 
It is easy to be angry at America if you think you don’t get anything from the 
relationship other than drone strikes and retaliations for them in the form of 
devastating suicide bombings (2013, p.79). 
 
The answer, in Holbrooke’s view, was: “simply giving Pakistan more (much more) 
aid for longer (far longer)” (Ibid). 
 
The second question for this chapter is to what extent the efforts of those such as 
Holbrooke were able to convince the elites of the two countries that the US was 
concerned to win the hearts and minds of the masses.  To answer this second question, 
both groups of elites were asked the question: 
Is the US trying to win hearts and minds?  Whose hearts and minds in the US 
trying to win in Pakistan - the elite or the mass public?  
 
My interviews suggest that US aid to Pakistan is impotent to influence Pakistani elite 
views in the face of much larger, and negative forces.  According to the Pakistani 
elite, aid cannot undo the negative impacts of US foreign policy, whether in Pakistan 
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or worldwide, today or in the past. Not only is aid impotent in the face of broader 
forces, but the aid itself is not necessarily popular.  The Pakistani elite tend to believe 
that aid is not based on what Pakistan needs, that it is still heavily skewed to the 
military, that it is invisible and ineffective, and that it is lacking in tangible 
achievements.  They saw it as given quid pro quo, for leverage, and as inadequate 
compensation.  From these responses, it would seem to be clear that the realist 
objectives of US aid clearly did undermine its potential for winning hearts and minds. 
 
On the second question of whose hearts and minds, I find a strong majority of the 
Pakistan elite (74 per cent) believe that US aid targets the elite, whereas the US elite 
are much less sure and more divided on this issue.  Why is the US unable to convince 
Pakistan of its intent to reach the masses, and improve public opinion?  The simple 
answer would seem to be that the realist lens through which the Pakistan elite views 
the US engagement with their country.  The Pakistani elite view the US aid as focused 
on getting Pakistan to behave in certain ways, and, given this, it must be focused 
mainly on the elite.   
 
Section 6.2 analyses the failure of the US hearts and minds campaign in Pakistan. 
Section 6.3 investigates whether it is the elite or the masses that are being targeted. 
Section 6.4 discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
6.2 The failure of the United States’ hearts and minds campaign in 
Pakistan 
 
39 members of the Pakistani elite were asked why the US has been unable to improve 
its image in Pakistan using the aid program.  One interview respondent was not asked 
this question due to time constraints.   
 
Most respondents provided multiple responses to this question, with 106 total 
responses provided, or 2.7 responses per respondent on average.  Focusing on 
keywords or “headings”, there were 70 different reasons provided as to why the US 
has been unable to improve its image in Pakistan.  These are listed in Annex 6.1. 
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I was able to group these reasons into three categories.  One related to how aid is 
delivered in Pakistan and two to how US foreign policy is conducted   Annex 6.1 
shows how each response was categorised.  Table 6.1 summarises the results, which 
are discussed in the next three sub-sections under the headings used in the table, 
namely: US aid policy; US foreign policy in Pakistan; and US global foreign policy.  
 
Table 6.1: Despite aid, why can’t the US improve its image in Pakistan? 
Category Number of responses  
(%  responses) 
Number of respondents 
(%  respondents)* 
US aid policy 62 (59%) 34 (87%) 
US foreign policy in Pakistan 33 (31%) 20 (51%) 
US foreign policy globally 11 (10%) 8 (21%) 
Total responses/respondents 106 (100% ) 62 (159% ) 
Note: ‘Number of responses’ denotes the number of responses within the category, and in parentheses 
the percentage of total responses falling within that category. ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the 
number of respondents who made a response falling within that category and in parentheses their 
number divided by the total number of respondents  expressed as a percentage. The ‘Total’ row adds 
together the numbers in the columns above. 39 out of 40 Pakistani respondents answered this question. 
 
6.2.1 US aid policy 
 
87 per cent of respondents referenced aid in their response to the question as to why 
the US cannot improve public opinion of itself in Pakistan.  62 responses were 
provided in this category – almost double the number in the next most popular 
category.  Aid is seen to be either ineffectual in improving public opinion, or, worse, a 
negative.  A large catalogue of reasons was presented as to why this is the case. 
 
A common view is simply that aid is not up to the task of overcoming the political 
differences between the two countries.  Retired Lieutenant-General, Talat Masood, 
puts it simply: “The negative image of the US in Pakistan is so strong that any amount 
of assistance cannot compensate for that” (Interview: 28 May 2013).  CEO of the 
Pakistan Business Council, Asad Umar says something similar:  
You cannot make people like you by spending money when they never liked 
you to begin with.  If it is political choices that result in them not liking you, 
then spending money is not going to change that.  So either change policy or 
reconcile to the fact that people will not like you (Interview: 20 February 
2012).  
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Going beyond the intrinsic limits of aid, there are a number of complaints about the 
specifics of US aid policy, which were seen to be undermining the potential of aid to 
buy good will.  Several interviewees respond that US aid is not visible.  
Dr Maria Sultan, head of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute says: “Not one 
single major project the US is doing in Pakistan is visible to ordinary Pakistanis, or 
has led to the benefit of the people of Pakistan” (Interview: 7 October 2011). 
 
Interestingly, Secretary-General of the Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development 
and Transparency (PILDAT) Bilal Mehboob provides a counter-argument with the 
claim that there is too much emphasis on branding: 
USAID puts a lot of emphasis on visibility and on recognition.  It insists on a 
certain size of the logo and the size of the acknowledgement.  That sometimes 
evokes a negative reaction.  I think some of the advertisements, which are 
running on television now - they are insensitive to the fact that people do not 
like to be reminded time and again how much money someone has given to us.  
I know that the United States has done a lot of good work, and as far as 
possible it should be acknowledged – but really, should you be over-
emphasising it? I don’t think that is the right thing to do (Interview: 29 May 
2013). 18 
 
                                                 
18 Mehboob provides an interesting and specific example of his experience with USAID branding: 
“Recently, USAID funded a project under which strategic plans of the National Assembly and four 
Provincial Assemblies were produced.  They are excellent documents and it is a very positive 
contribution.  But they (USAID) insisted that the printed version of the strategic plan have a very 
visible USAID logo.  It is an Assembly document; it’s the sovereign house of an independent country 
and putting the logo of USAID on that conveys a very negative message... The National Assembly 
secretariat is very shy of even sharing that printed document with anyone, so people rarely know that 
such a strategic plan exists and it has never been implemented.   Contrary to that, if you see the 
strategic plan for the Election Commission, which was also done with USAID assistance, they did not 
insist on a (USAID) logo.  The only strategic plan, which is being implemented and thriving, and that 
people know about is the strategic plan of the Election Commission.  I am not saying that logo or no 
logo is the only reason, but these things sometimes play a very important role” (Ibid). 
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Journalist Khurram Husain argues aid fails to boost the US image because it is 
ineffective.  It tackles difficult problems such as energy, which it is unable to solve:  
For the mass public, they are not really looking past the fact that they have 
energy shortages.  They are not particularly interested in the problems 
upstream in the energy sector.  They have very little patience for discussion on 
the fuel mix and power generation.  They don’t care – they want electricity. 
The Americans will have a hard time getting the people who are sitting at 
home without electricity to understand that we [the US] have a marvelous 
program that will identify leakages in the supply.  They don’t want to hear 
about it - they want to know when their lights will come back on.  That is not 
an answer that the Americans can give through their engagement (Interview: 
20 February 2012). 
 
Ayaz Amir, a journalist and a federal PML-N politician representing the Punjab, also 
argues that US aid is ineffective but because it is too focused on capacity building and 
is spent in Islamabad:  
What has KLB (Kerry Lugar Berman aid package) done? I don’t know – I 
keep reading ads (sic) about USAID, but I can’t figure out what they mean. I 
can’t decode the language.  They are talking about capacity building.  But 
there have been drips here and capacity building there.   There is a whole elite 
in Islamabad that does very well out of USAID.  All the fancy speaking people 
you meet – with fancy cars and SUVs.  Sure it helps prop up the lifestyles of 
certain people – you won’t get anyone against that (Interview: 5 February 
2013). 
 
In addition to the complaints that US aid is invisible and ineffective, there is also a 
clear sense emerging from the interviews that the capacity of aid to win hearts and 
minds is undermined by the realist objectives of US aid.  Several aspects of aid are 
relevant here: its focus on the military; its use as leverage, its transactional nature, and 
the perception of aid as a bribe and as compensation.  
 
Dr Maria Sultan, head of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, who was quoted 
earlier on the invisibility of US aid, also highlights its military focus: 
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The US does not even spend a single dollar that is not linked to its security 
concerns… The Kerry Lugar Berman package, which had the maximum 
hopes, is so strongly referenced to security related conditions and so many 
infringing clauses on Pakistani sovereignty, that it is not even funny to call it a 
trade or economic assistance bill (Interview: 7 October 2011).   
 
Some in the elite argue that when the US tries to use aid as leverage, it loses its ability 
to use aid to win hearts and minds.  Raza Rumi, of the Jinnah Institute, an Islamabad-
based think-tank argues that:  
When you start using aid as a strategic tool you lose the big picture, … it 
leaves no credibility.  As an aid partner you have to say here is something for 
you, and even if we fight, we are going to keep this as our engagement zone.  
The US always says we will offer you aid but then takes it away.  I think using 
aid as a short-term negotiating lever is a bad idea.  It has backfired upon them 
(Interview: 29 May 2013). 
 
In a similar vein, author Ayesha Siddiqa sees the US-Pakistan aid relationship as a 
transactional relationship – cash for support.  The result might be more Pakistani 
support for US policies, but not more US popularity:  
We have a security relationship.  We get paid [with aid] because of security 
reasons. It’s warfare, so the expectation at the level of policy making is that, 
yes, part of the transaction is we get money … And as part of our cooperation, 
we get to do what we want to in terms of technology or military plans, with 
the US not objecting to it… at the end of the day we are trying to extend this 
relationship as long as we can because they [the US] know that at the end of 
the day we’ll be running out of money and they will be running out of support 
(Interview: 14 June 2013).   
 
Several in the elite referred to aid as a bribe.  If aid is seen in this way, this 
undermines its legitimacy.  Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani says:  
If they [the US] want something done, they will go bribe the leadership; you 
get it done and then walk out.  After all, how long can you (foreigners) stay in 
a place like Pakistan?  When 9/11 happened, we go back to the bigger [aid] 
package … if the United States wants action tomorrow, they do something.  
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After it is over, they go somewhere else and if they need you again they will 
come back (Interview: 8 January 2013). 
 
Another common explanation for why aid is unable to promote US popularity is that 
it is compensation, and inadequate compensation at that.  One of the themes that 
emerged from the discussion of Pakistani challenges and US wants (covered in 
Chapters 3 and 4) was the perceived high cost of Pakistani support for the US.  
Moneeza Hashmi, President of the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association puts it 
this way: 
… both of these challenges that I have mentioned [terrorism and lagging 
economy] are partly due, not partly due – mostly due, to the fact that we are so 
heavily indebted to the USA and receive financial support (Interview: 16 
February 2013). 
 
Pakistan is viewed as not getting proper credit, or sufficient compensation, for the 
sacrifices it is being asked to make.  In the words of Member of the National 
Assembly, Dr Tariq Fazal Chaudhary, the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) 
representative in Islamabad:  
Pakistan is not given the proper reward from the world community.  The 
sacrifices and the efforts, which Pakistan has put to fight against terrorism are 
not properly recognised all over the world.  The US also is not recognising 
what we are sacrificing and what we are giving…Losses which Pakistan is 
facing are never paid off… And of course there is no price to the precious 
human lives… I mean in terms of aid, Pakistan should have been properly 
compensated, that is the first most thing (Interview: 16 February 2013).  
 
Dr. Simbal Khan at the Institute of Policy Research Islamabad contends that the shift 
to civilian aid is too little too late:  
People in the United States do not realise the extent of the operational logistic s 
role Pakistan played in this war and how it rolled out.  A lot of the money 
went to support it [the war], but it left Pakistanis out cold, it left the general 
people untouched by it… It looked like an attempt to buy public opinion rather 
than to sweeten a bad pill.  It’s basically a bribe…  President Obama clearly 
tried to engage Pakistan’s civilian side [with the KLB aid package], but by 
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that time it was too late.  Pakistan, internally, had exploded with internal 
domestic insurgency, militancy and it is debatable whether this was 
completely related to Afghanistan or not – but in popular imagination, you are 
talking about Pakistani perceptions.  It is completely related to what spillover 
affects them. It is very difficult to disengage what is their [US] spillover and 
what is our spillover.  (Interview: 11 July 2013). 
 
The narrative of aid as transactional and used as either a bribe or as compensation is a 
common theme throughout this research on Pakistani elite opinion.  The 
compensation angle plays out in both discussions with the elite, as well as in the 
media during fieldwork conducted from 2010 to 2013.  For example, the English 
language daily, The Express Tribune, reported Pakistani Government research into 
the cost of the war on terror and concluded that US aid is not doing enough to 
compensate Pakistan for the economic and human losses endured in the decade 
following 9/11 (Rana 2011).   
 
6.2.2 US foreign policy in Pakistan 
 
The second most popular category of response, provided by more than half of 
Pakistani elite respondents is that US foreign policy in Pakistan negatively impacts 
public opinion of the United States.  33 responses are provided in this category.   
 
In terms of the specifics of unpopular US foreign policy, many of the elite criticise the 
United States’ use of unarmed aerial vehicles (drones) on Pakistani territory: “The 
drone attacks have played a very important role in shaping the mindset of Pakistani 
people and in shaping the war on terror” (Interview: Khalid Rahman, Institute of 
Policy Studies, 6 October 2011).  Amina Khan, an analyst at the Institute of Strategic 
Studies Islamabad, believes that the dislike of the US goes beyond drones, but that the 
drones crystalise negative sentiment.  She says that even mentioning the United States 
provokes a negative reaction among Pakistanis: “They know the amount of hatred that 
is there… it’s so easy, the drones are just one simple example” (Interview: 29 July 
2013). 
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A number of the elite point to specific US foreign policy actions which are believed to 
have undone any good work done by US aid.  Three in particular are highlighted: 
Raymond Davis, the Salala attack, and “OBL” (the US raid that killed Osama bin 
Laden in Abbottabad on 2 May 2011). 
 
Raymond Davis was a CIA contractor who shot and killed two armed Pakistani men 
in Lahore.  A third Pakistani was killed by a US embassy vehicle attending the crime 
scene.  The diplomatic furor that erupted following US claims that Davis was 
protected by diplomatic immunity reached the highest levels, with President Obama 
asking that Davis not be prosecuted because he was protected by diplomatic immunity 
– immunity the Pakistanis disputed Davis was entitled to.  Charges were dropped and 
Davis was released and sent back to the US after payment to the families of the two 
people he had shot.  He was released under a legal and commonly-used principle of 
Sharia Law that allows murder charges to be dismissed when diyya is paid to the 
deceased’s families.  At a seminar in Islamabad on 10 October 2011, entitled 
Violation and threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty and response, journalist 
Syed Talat Hussain highlighted the incompetence of Pakistani authorities in bringing 
Davis to justice: “In Pakistan, Raymond Davis got away with murder, in the United 
States he couldn’t even get away with a minor assault charge”.  (Hussain is referring 
to the fact that after Davis returned to the US, he was arrested and convicted of assault 
with a two-year probationary sentence following an altercation over a parking space 
in Colorado.) 
 
The ‘Salala incident’ refers to the accidental US-led NATO attack on Pakistani 
military forces in November 2011 on Pakistani territory close to the Afghan border, 
which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.   
 
Salma Malik at Quaid-i-Azam University expresses the common view that these three 
incidents undo the good work of aid and damage the United States’ image in Pakistan: 
“When people hear about these incidents - we are a sensationalised, very emotive and 
emotional nation – it really upsets the entire balance.  No amount of good work can 
really do that type of damage control” (Interview: 3 October 2011). 
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General Jehangir Karamat, Chief of Army Staff (1996-98), Chairman of the Joints 
Chiefs of Staff (1997-98) and Ambassador to the United States (2004-06), blames the 
media for blowing these events up: “An incident happens, the media takes over, the 
blame game starts, conspiracy theories – and the whole thing turns into a fiasco” 
(Interview: 4 May 2012).  
 
These incidents are not seen as isolated, but as symptomatic of deep underlying 
problems.  Former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Turkey, Qazi Humayan, names all 
three of the abovementioned incidents and says that they are reminders of the 
inequality in the US-Pakistan relationship:  
Last year, three incidents in particular have got us into serious trouble with the 
US: the Raymond Davis issue, Osama bin Laden and the NATO Salala 
incident… The Americans said that if they had shared intelligence [on 
bin Laden], that we [Pakistan] would have tipped bin Laden off.  The message 
that the US conveys, while sitting in Afghanistan, is that US troops can attack 
Pakistan at any point.  That is the worst thing for our relations…the basic 
philosophy in the US is that we are a super power, we spend trillions of 
dollars, we can get away from our commitment, but you can’t get away from 
your commitment.  It is an unequal relationship (Interview: 1 March 2012).   
 
Others take a longer-term, historical perspective.  Salma Malik, an Assistant Professor 
at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, 
believes the historical record of US-Pakistan relations explains the strong anti-
American sentiment that persists today:  
What has really embedded this [anti-Americanism] in Pakistani thought is the 
long and warped history we have had with the US.  We see that the US 
professes to be our best friend, and then they go back and they do what they 
have to do.  For a common person to be told that this is all politics is very 
difficult because you are promised the moon and you are not even given the 
earth (Interview: 3 October 2011).  
 
Dr Javed Leghari, Chairman of the Higher Education Commission, cites the 
United States’ support for military dictators throughout Pakistan’s history as a key 
reason aid could not improve public opinion:  
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If America supports dictators, which they have historically done for their own 
strategic interests, and this goes against the wishes of the people of that 
country, if the dictators lead the country towards corruption and nepotism and 
everything that is evil and bad –then all of the evils of the country, whether it 
is poverty, unemployment, corruption or insecurity, I think it is indirectly 
blamed on Americans for supporting the dictator (Interview: 15 February 
2013). 
 
6.2.3 US global foreign policy 
 
Other members of the Pakistani elite, when they reflect on US unpopularity, turn not 
so much to history as to the US’s global role.  Eight respondents suggest that public 
opinion in Pakistan is negatively impacted by global US foreign policy.  In particular, 
US foreign policy in Israel and Palestine is raised a surprising number of times as an 
issue important to Pakistan.  Raza Rumi, Policy Director at Islamabad-based think-
tank the Jinnah Institute argues:  
Aid cannot remove the deep distrust of the US, which is not new.  The roots of 
it clearly have to do with the Palestinian issue, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
Well, to put it clearly, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and the clear 
alliance of the US with Israel… It’s nothing new and it has been there in the 
public consciousness, transferred from generation to generation.  And 
unfortunately it has been fueled by al Qaeda’s narrative in the last twenty or so 
years.  The rise of Islamism and its various hues and shades has led to this 
complete domination of anti-US narrative, where the centerpiece is Israel and 
the Middle East conflict, followed by the blunder committed in Iraq and 
followed by an even more ridiculous war in Afghanistan (Interview: 29 May 
2013). 
 
6.3 Whose hearts and minds?  
 
Both groups of respondents were asked whether the US is trying to win hearts and 
minds, and, if so, whose - the elite or the mass public/ordinary Pakistani.  Responses 
are categorised as: elite, mass public, both, neither, or don’t know.  Table 6.2 below 
provides a comparison of US and Pakistani elite views using this categorisation.  
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Some clear contrasts are immediately evident: three-quarters of the Pakistani elite, but 
less than one-third of the US elite think that the US is focused on winning the hearts 
and minds of the elite.  The views of both sets of elites are examined in Sections 6.3.1 
and 6.3.2 respectively.  When a respondent answered ‘both’, the response is recorded 
in this category. However, the discussion of responses is presented just under the two 
elite and mass public categories because, more often than not, interviewees even if 
they respond with ‘both’ only go on to highlight one group specifically.  
 
35 Pakistani respondents were asked this question.  Five were not asked as they were 
interviewed before the questionnaire changed to reflect the questions posed to the US 
elite.  (See Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) for further details.)  31 US respondents were asked 
the same ‘whose hearts and minds?’ questions.  Seven were not: four IFI respondents 
were not asked because our discussion focused more on economics and broader aid 
policy, while two think-tank staffers and two bureaucrats were not asked this question 
due to time constraints. 
 
Table 6.2: Whose hearts and minds is the United States trying to win? 
 Pakistan United States 
Number of respondents  
(% respondents) 
Number of respondents  
(% respondents) 
Elite 26 (74%) 9 (30%) 
Mass public 2 (6%) 6 (20%) 
Both 3 (9%) 12 (40%) 
Neither 4 (11%) 2 (7%) 
Don’t know 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
Total 35 (100% ) 31 (100% ) 
Note: ‘Number of respondents’ denotes the number of respondents who made a response falling within 
that category and, in parentheses, their number divided by the total number of respondents , expressed 
as a percentage.  
 
6.3.1 Pakistani elite views 
 
Almost three-quarters of Pakistani respondents believe US aid is focused on winning 
the hearts and minds of the elite.  The Pakistani elite clearly sees the US aid as realist 
in its nature, and many critique it on these grounds.  
 
The views of Senator Mushahid Hussain, Chair of the Senate Defence Committee and 
a member of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) party, are typical: “They 
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(the US) have been working only on the elite.  A 10-mile radius of Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi” (Interview: 24 October 2013).   
 
The US is seen to focus on the elite because the elite has the power.  Ambassador 
Ayaz Wazir states evocatively:  
If we look at the history of the country, they are focusing on those who are 
controlling the government – at the top.  When they have the machinery in 
their hands, who cares about the poor people, they can go to hell.  We want to 
control the top (Interview: 20 February 2013). 
 
Several of the Pakistani elite think the United States is concentrated on winning the 
hearts and minds specifically of the military elite or those close to the military 
because of the overriding importance of security and military goals.  For example, 
Dr. Simbal Khan says:  
I think it started with just the elite, because that has been the US approach – 
that you fund the policy elite, and especially the military elite, because usually 
some kind of security agenda is underlying this engagement – these are the 
episodes of engagement that we have had.  The main audience is always the 
security establishment (Interview: 11 July 2013). 
 
Several are derisive of the United States’ lack of interest in engaging and aiding the 
masses.  Journalist, Ejaz Haider, is scathing of the fact that that the US does not even 
try to reach out to the ordinary Pakistani – “This is what is wrong with Pakistani-
American relations” – and cites US security policy as an obstacle: “Given US security 
protocols, they aren’t in a position to reach out to anyone…the Brits [sic] interacted 
with the local people, they don’t confine themselves to their castles” (Interview: 23 
August 2013).  Former Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat agrees that the 
US focuses on the elites because it is easier and the US “gets to hear what it wants to 
hear” (Interview: 4 May 2012).  Author Ayesha Siddiqa does not think the US is even 
“pretending to try” to reach the masses with its aid: “It is the elite they want, people 
who can be bribed, who can be affected with their [US] money.  Ordinary people, 
they are not even bothered with reaching out to them” (Interview: 14 June 2013).   
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Indeed, many express unhappiness with this focus on the elite.  Journalist 
Zahid Husain says: “The US is always trying win over the elite because they have a 
good relationship with the military, but that is not actually the purpose to be served.  
Now, instead of looking at the people, they are more focused on the elite…as a 
country, I feel ashamed when they always expect something” (Interview: 15 June 
2013). 
 
Businessman Ikram Seghal gives the view that the focus on the elite is unnecessary as 
their hearts and minds have already been won: “It is wrong.  The elite will always be 
pro-America in that sense.  I tell people in discussions show me an anti-American 
demonstration and I will set up a booth to give them all visas [to the United States] 
and I’ll see how long the demonstration lasts” (Interview: 25 July 2013). 
 
Only five respondents argue that the US is trying to win over the masses, or both the 
masses and the elite.  Bilal Mehboob, Secretary-General of the Pakistani Institute of 
Legislative Development and Transparency, an organisation that works with USAID, 
points to evidence of the efforts the US is making.  He believes the United States 
“wants all Pakistanis, not necessarily the elite.”  Mehboob argues the US has made 
sincere efforts to improve its image in Pakistan: 
I saw one former US Ambassador painting a primary school herself, and 
asking the media to come, because they want to show they care.  It is not 
something which they are just putting up as an act; I think they sincerely want 
to win over Pakistanis.  I think their effort is to reach everyone, the critical 
mass at least (Interview: 29 May 2013)  
 
Others think that the US is trying to reach the masses, but that this goal is undermined 
by conflicting policy efforts.  Raza Rumi from the Jinnah Institute says:  
To give credit to the civilian, State Department view, they want them both 
[elite and masses], but the problem is that the US does not have a monolithic 
policy, it has three policies: the Pentagon policy, the CIA policy and the State 
Department policy – there is a fourth, the sort of converged balancing act by 
the Oval Office.  Part of that chaos is also reflected in the way they want to set 
out to win hearts and minds.  (Interview: 29 May 2013). 
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Four respondents think that the United States is not trying to win hearts and minds at 
all.  Those in this category subscribe strongly to an (even more) realist view of US 
policy: for example, a view that the US is simply pursuing particular military and 
security goals, with a focus on Afghanistan.  Amina Khan from the Institute of 
Strategic Studies in Islamabad says:  
I don’t know whether they are trying to [win hearts and minds] because they 
are very busy in Afghanistan and at the end of the day, I am wondering do 
they even really need to?  I question their effort since there is so much that 
they can do, but I don’t think that they have done much towards making a 
sincere effort over the past 12 years (Interview: 29 July 2013).   
 
6.3.2 US elite views 
 
As Table 6.2 shows, US responses starkly contrast with responses given by the 
Pakistani elite and are evenly divided between the elite (30 per cent), mass public (20 
per cent), and both the elite and mass public (40 per cent).  Only 7 per cent of 
respondents do not think the US was trying win over either group.  The different 
responses are examined in this section.  
 
30 per cent of the elite argue that the United States is focused on wining the hearts 
and minds of the elite in Pakistan.  A wide variety of justifications are given.  Some 
make the point that winning the hearts and minds of the elite is important to achieving 
US realist goals – and this has been the case throughout history.  Shuja Nawaz points 
to research he has done tracking aid flows and types of government in Pakistan: 
They end up working with the elite…We tracked US assistance to Pakistan 
over the past 40 years.  If you juxtapose on that the governments that existed 
during those periods, you will see assistance peaks when there is a military 
government, but there are minor leads and lags…That is not lost on the 
Pakistani population.  It is lost in the US - that this is the way they are 
perceived.  Ten years of Musharraf was perfectly fine for the US, they 
probably wanted him to stay on (Interview: 15 March 2012). 
 
Some of the US elite are comfortable with what they perceive as a focus on the elite, 
or indeed argue that more should be done to win over the elite, particularly in the 
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context of drawing down US engagement in Afghanistan because the US will need 
Pakistan more; not only for logistics reasons, but to create an environment where the 
US, the Taliban, and the Afghan and Pakistani governments can constructively 
engage on political settlement talks: “Ideally we would like Pakistan to help in the 
reconciliation process with the Taliban” (Interview: Joshua White, 12 March 2012).  
Others are critical of what they see as the emphasis on the elite.  Zubair Iqbal, who 
worked at the IMF for 35 years and served in missions to 54 countries, says: “They 
[the United States] don’t need to win the hearts and minds of the elite, they are 
already in their pocket.  Why should the elite bite the hand that feeds them?  The US 
considers the common man as the enemy, the minute you do that, you have lost it” 
(Interview: 8 March 2012).  Danny Cutherell at the Centre for Global Development 
argues that the US targets the elites simply because it is easier: “They [the US] have a 
lot better chance with the elites than with your average Pakistani” (Interview: 5 March 
2012).  S. Akbar Zaidi, a professor at Columbia University, concurs adding: “The 
elite are easier to buy off and they can do it through different means – like processing 
visas quicker, which keep the elite very happy.  If the US comes to set up a women’s 
shelter [in Pakistan], few people know about it and few people care about it” 
(Interview: 22 March 2012).  The Pakistani elite also make this critical observation, as 
outlined in Section 6.3.1. 
 
One-fifth of respondents consider the US is focusing on winning the hearts and minds 
of the ordinary Pakistani or the mass public, and two-fifths that the US seeks to win 
the hearts and minds of both the masses and the elite.  
 
Some take what they perceive to be the US government’s fixation on polling as a sign 
the US wants to win over the masses.  Andrew Wilder from the United States Institute 
of Peace has conducted hearts and minds research in Pakistan (Wilder 2005), and 
suggests: “The interest now is the mass public, the US is very fixated on polling 
numbers and that is not an elite thing” (Interview: 6 March 2012). 
 
Steve Coll at the New America Foundation, who has visited Pakistan more than 70 
times recounts an example of the United States’ focus on polling in Pakistan:  
I remember sitting in the [US] Ambassador’s office [in Islamabad] in 2009 
and an aide walked in and said ‘we got the latest polls, great news, our 
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favorability rating has doubled from 3 per cent to 6 per cent’.  Does the US 
really want to spend all of that time, energy, talent and money on trying to get 
people to like us? (Interview: 13 March 2012). 
 
Coll’s perception noted above reflects the frequent polling that the United States does 
conduct in Pakistan.  For example, a survey that was conducted in 2012-13 of 2,500 
Pakistanis showed that 45 per cent of respondents had heard of USAID and 15 per 
cent could name a specific sector of US assistance.  Embassy staff note that awareness 
of the United States’ aid program was trending upwards, which they interpret as a 
positive shift in acceptance of the aid program (Interview: US Embassy Islamabad, 
February 2013). 
 
Coll also argues that the US focus on the masses is to try to create circumstances 
where aid is seen as a positive in the event that the Pakistani might have to do 
something that is perceived as negative by its people, a point which emerged in 
Chapter 4:  
By and large the [hearts and minds] policies are based on the assumption that 
bottom up support for America’s partnership will somehow create a 
favourable context for complicated bargains with the [Pakistani] elites that are 
sometime politically hard for the elite to sell.  So they can lie about them to 
their own people, or they are locked into doing things that they might do if the 
US wasn’t such a bogeyman for their constituencies and so on (Interview: 13 
March 2012). 
 
While not explicitly stated, the inference is that aid is meant to make the public better 
disposed to the US so as to reduce the cost of cooperation by Pakistan on drone 
strikes and other US realist policy goals.  
 
A small group of the elite (7 per cent) posit that it has never been the intention of US 
policy to win hearts and minds in Pakistan.  Wendy Chamberlin, former US 
Ambassador to Pakistan and now President of the Middle East Institute, says: “Of the 
major concerns the US has, winning hearts and minds is not one of them…I don’t 
think American popularity is what we really care about.  We would like Pakistan’s 
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government to be popular.  We would like it to provide for its own people, which it is 
not doing” (Interview: 9 March 2012).  
 
Steve Coll, quoted earlier, also echoes this sentiment, agreeing that it should not care 
what Pakistan thinks about the United States.  “I don’t think what Pakistanis think 
about the US matters at all.  It shouldn’t be a priority of the United States to try to win 
over Pakistani public opinion” (Interview: 3 March 2012). 
 
US elite opinion of the United States’ approach to winning hearts and minds in 
Pakistan demonstrates that the elite does not agree on who the US is targeting nor 
why.  Chapter 3 also noted a lack of consensus when it came to identifying Pakistan’s 
challenges.  This demonstrates the differences in opinion within the US elite 
community, and is perhaps reflective of the fact that US policy is also not cohesive, as 
pointed out by a number of Pakistanis in Chapter 4.  The next section discusses the 
results presented in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
 
6.3 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The US rhetoric around “winning hearts and minds” in Pakistan is plentiful.  Why 
hasn’t aid helped win hearts and minds there? And whose hearts and minds is the US 
trying to win in any case?  
 
The first conclusion of this research is that US aid to Pakistan appears impotent to 
influence public opinion in the face of much larger, and negative forces.  Aid cannot 
undo the negative impacts of US foreign policy, whether in Pakistan or worldwide, 
today or in the past. Morgenthau (1960) was perhaps the first to note that the 
influence of aid can be undermined by perceptions of the politics of the giver.  He 
writes: 
If the recipient continues to disapprove of the political philosophy, system and 
objectives of the giver, despite the aid he has received, the political effects of 
the aid are lost.  Economic aid remains politically ineffectual as long as the 
recipient says “aid is good, but the politics of the giver are bad” (p. 535).   
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From the Pakistani elite responses, it is clear that most think “the politics of the giver 
are bad”.  Salma Malik at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad highlights this when 
she contrasts the US aid program trying to do good in Pakistan, with US foreign 
policy in Pakistan which negatively impacts the average Pakistani: 
For an average Pakistani on the street who picks up a 3Rps [3 cents] 
newspaper, it [aid] is not visible.  What is visible is the drone strike that kills 
so many people and the tragic photos.  So even if the US puts $1 trillion in aid, 
that photo of a young child killed by a drone strike would carry far more 
weight and psychological impact.  That is a very unfortunate reality.  It totally 
imbalances any good work the US does (Interview: 3 October 2011). 
 
The Pakistani elite’s views of the United States are influenced heavily not only by the 
United States’ other contemporaneous foreign policy actions in Pakistan, but by US 
foreign policy actions globally and by the US’s history in Pakistan.  Dennis Kux, in 
his history of US-Pakistan relations between 1947 and 2000, concludes his detailed 
account of engagement between the United States and Pakistan as follows:  
The legacy of past dealings with the Americans has been negative.  A sense of 
resentment and distrust of the United States pervades Islamabad… There is a 
popular saying among Pakistanis, only half in jest, that their country’s fate is 
determined by three As: Allah, the Army, and America (Kux 2001, p. 365). 
 
The research also reveals that not only is aid impotent in the face of broader forces, 
but the aid itself is not necessarily popular.  Nearly half of the Pakistani elite are 
recorded as naming both a foreign policy reason and a specific aid reason for why US 
aid cannot positively influence public opinion.  More generally, this chapter shows 
that the Pakistani elite have overwhelmingly negative views of US aid.  They tend to 
believe that aid is not based on what Pakistan needs, that it is still heavily skewed to 
the military, that it is invisible and ineffective, and that it is lacking in tangible 
achievements.  They see it as only given quid pro quo, for leverage, and as inadequate 
compensation.  In summary, the realist objectives of US aid do appear to undermine 
its potential for winning hearts and minds. 
 
Finally, on the second research question of whose hearts and minds, I find a strong 
majority of the Pakistan elite (74 per cent) believe that US aid targets the elite, 
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whereas the US elite are much less sure and more divided on this issue.  Only 30 per 
cent of the US elite believe that US aid targets the elite.  40 per cent of US 
respondents think the US is trying to win over both the elite and masses, and another 
20 per cent think the focus is on winning the hearts and minds of the masses.   
 
These results are consistent with those in Chapter 4 where the US elite was found to 
look at US aid to Pakistan more through a nation-building lens than the Pakistan elite.  
There US respondents gave much more weight to US governance and political 
objectives for Pakistan than Pakistani respondents did.  Here, they are more likely to 
agree with Special Representative Holbrooke that one aim of aid was to get “average 
Pakistanis … to see a benefit in having a relationship with America.” (Nasr, 2003, p. 
79) 
 
Why is the US unable to convince Pakistan of its intent to reach the masses, and 
improve public opinion?  The simple answer would seem to be that the lens through 
which Pakistan views the US engagement with their country.  If the US is primarily 
focused on realist objectives, then it must be focused mainly on the elite.  This view is 
expressed most clearly in the quote from Dr. Simbal Khan used earlier in the chapter 
– “usually some kind of security agenda is underlying this engagement” and in the 
opening quote from Adnan Aurangzeb – “there is no economic interest that the US 
has with the ordinary Pakistani.  So far the US only has military interest.”  
 
Shifting this perspective of US aid – convincing the counterpart of the genuineness of 
its nation-building intentions – is clearly not easy given the weight of history, and 
something that the US largely failed to do.  
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Annex 6.1: Pakistani elite perceptions of Pakistan’s 
challenges – categorisation (number of respondents) 
 
US foreign policy 
– in Pakistan 
US foreign policy 
- global 
US aid policy 
Drone strikes (6) 
 
US policy towards 
Israel-Palestine (4) 
 
Aid not visible (8) US pressure for 
aid visibility is 
negative (1) 
No contact at 
grassroots level 
(1) 
US violates 
Pakistan’s 
sovereignty, 
including through 
covert operations 
(4) 
War on terror 
policy (2) 
Too much aid 
goes to the 
military (6) 
 
 
 
US reminds 
Pakistan of aid too 
often (1) 
 
US trying to do 
too much with aid 
(1) 
Existing negative 
narratives of the 
US (particularly 
relating to US 
engagement post 
1989 after Afghan 
war) (3) 
US policy in the 
region (1) 
Aid is not flowing 
to Pakistan (3) 
 
US uses aid for 
other reasons - 
like spying (1) 
 
 
 
 
Aid not provided 
to the right sectors 
(1) 
US-Pakistan 
History (2) 
US has a non-
comprehensive 
South Asia policy  
(1) 
Aid is 
transactional (3) 
Aid used as carrot 
(1) 
Terms of aid are 
dictated by the US 
(1) 
US after 
Pakistan’s nukes  
(1) 
 
 
Deep distrust of 
US - linked to US 
policy in Muslim 
world (1) 
 
Aid seen as bribe 
(2) 
US needs to stop 
seeing aid as a 
favour (1) 
Not clear what US 
aid does for 
Pakistan (1) 
Wikileaks showed 
negative US 
policy in Pakistan 
(1) 
Negative opinion 
developed from 
first Afghan war 
(1) 
 
 
Not a significant 
proportion of the 
population has 
been positively 
influenced by aid 
(2) 
Aid should be 
balanced taking 
into account 
Pakistan’s losses  
in the war on 
terror (1) (1) 
Aid not getting to 
the masses (1) 
Interference in 
Pakistan's 
domestic affairs 
(1) 
 
US support for 
India (1) 
Aid provided is 
not enough money 
(2) 
 
 
US been trying to 
buy off opinion 
(with journalists) 
(1) 
Aid given directly 
to Pakistani 
Government (1) 
Lack of US policy 
clarity (1) 
 
 
 
 
  
Aid seen as a 
payment for WOT 
and is therefore 
not enough money 
(2) 
 
 
Need a longer- 
term program (1) 
Want 
Reconstruction 
Opportunity Zones  
(1) 
America doesn’t 
understand 
Pakistan (1) 
 
  
US created 
Pakistani 
dependence on aid 
(2) 
 
Other motives 
behind aid (1) 
Not enough 'brick 
and mortar' 
projects (1) 
US support of 
dictators in 
Pakistan (1) 
 
 To much aid going 
back to its own 
contractors (2) 
Aid used as a 
strategic tool (1) 
 
 
US doesn’t 
understand local 
issues (1) 
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US policies in 
Pakistan (1) 
 
 US not good at 
selling aid (1) 
Linkage of 
economic aid to 
military issues (1) 
Limited 
involvement of 
local politicians 
(1) 
Anti-US sentiment 
in general (1)  
 Aid too slow (1) US aid policy is 
not transparent (1) 
Civilian aid push 
too late (1) 
US double 
standards (1) 
 
 
 Aid relationship 
based on national 
security interests 
(1) 
Misperceptions of 
aid in Pakistan and 
the US (1) 
Aid can't win 
hearts and minds 
(1) 
US needs to better 
manage perception 
in Pakistan (1) 
 Information on aid 
not filtered down 
to the public (1) 
  
US policy not 
consistent (1) 
 
 
  
US trying to solve 
political problems 
with economics 
(1) 
    
US is main cause 
for Pakistan’s 
downturn  (1) 
    
US making 
Pakistan be 
involved in war 
that is not 
Pakistan’s to fight 
(1) 
    
Stop-go relations 
(1) 
   
 
Overall negative 
sentiments (1) 
   
 
Relations are 
government to 
government not 
people to people  
(1) 
    
US demands 
conflict with 
Pakistan national 
interest (1) 
    
 
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
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Chapter 7: Where to from here? Elite 
ideas for policy change 
 
 
 
 
“I would want to take a much longer term approach and say to the Pakistanis, try to 
find some common ground, but also say we are here for the long-term…This idea of 
thinking about Pakistan in the long-term rather than in the short-term is front and 
centre.  Think about the 10 to 20 year time frame, not what you want out of the 
Pakistanis next year.” 
 
Danny Cutherell, Centre for Global Development (Interview: 5 March 2012). 
 
 
 
 
“This is your country - finally stop expecting the US to solve every problem of 
Pakistan.” 
 
Senator Mushahid Hussain, Chair of the Senate Defence Committee (Interview: 24 
October 2013). 
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7.1 Introduction   
 
Previous chapters have established that, the Obama pivot towards nation-building 
notwithstanding, there is a persistent perception that the United States is in Pakistan to 
achieve its realist objectives above all else.  They have also revealed considerable 
frustrations on both sides of the relationship with US aid and broader foreign policy 
towards Pakistan.  This chapter examines what the elite would change about their 
respective government’s policy, in the context of Pakistan-US relations.  Specifically, 
it examines the support for and credibility of the often-heard view in the literature that 
the US should shift to more of a nation-building approach in Pakistan.  
  
As outlined in Chapter 2, there is a large literature on Pakistan-US relations.  Kux 
(2001) provides a comprehensive overview of Pakistan-US relations from 1947 to 
2000, including of relations under each US Administration, from Truman to Clinton.  
Riedel (2011), Schaffer and Schaffer (2011), Samad (2011), Butt and Schofield 
(2012), Haqqani (2013), Markey (2013) and Gall (2015) all describe the key themes, 
complexities and ambiguities in US-Pakistan relations in the post 9/11 period.  A 
number of these authors also include policy recommendations.  Several have a strong 
nation-building focus.  For example, Samad (2011) analyses five main players in 
Pakistan and their impact on the state: the people, the army, the Islamists, the 
politicians and the Americans.  He makes several policy recommendations, all in a 
nation-building vein:  
The White House needs to change its focus from containing Pakistan to 
transforming it… by subtly nurturing and developing good governance and 
democratic practice and persuading the country that the US is here to stay this 
time (p. 272-273).  
And 
Washington needs to move away from its singular obsession with security.  It 
is this fixation that led us into the present quagmire and the emphasis should 
be on sensitively encouraging democracy, good governance and political and 
judicial reforms, and granting access to its markets for Pakistani products (p. 
274). 
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Markey (2013) also advocates for more nation-building in Pakistan and sets out two 
options for cooperation in US-Pakistan relations going forward: a “military- first” 
option and a “comprehensive cooperation” model, more in line with nation-building.  
He comes down firmly on the side of the latter:  
Comprehensive cooperation takes seriously the notion that the only way to 
achieve long-term security goals in Pakistan is for its people to build a stable, 
more healthy society.  Measures short of that are, at best, stopgaps.  At worst, 
narrow US policies designed to meet immediate needs actually contribute to 
Pakistan’s instability (p. 222).  
And 
US assistance might be better used to assist Pakistani development, grow its 
economy, and contribute to the nation’s stability in ways that also serve the 
American interest (p. 231) 
 
Likewise, Fair (2009a) calls for “more resources and attention to rebuilding and 
professionalising Pakistan’s civilian institutions” (p.150). 
 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the nation-building arguments of those such 
as Samad, Markey and Fair.  First, how widespread is support for a greater focus on 
nation-building among the US elite?  And, second, what does the Pakistani elite think 
of this view?  
 
This chapter draws on two interview questions.  The US elite were asked: “What is 
the one thing you would change in the United States’ policy towards Pakistan?”  And 
the Pakistani elite were asked: “What is the one thing you would change in Pakistan’s 
policy towards the United States?”  These questions were posed following the 
question on Pakistan’s needs (Chapter 3) and US wants (Chapter 4) and before the 
series of questions focusing on leverage and perceptions of the US (Chapters 5 and 6).   
 
This line of questioning is a little different to that reported on in the rest of this thesis, 
in that both groups of elite were asked similar but not identical questions.  The 
question to the US elite clearly addresses the research question of this chapter: Should 
the US emphasise nation-building more?  The question to the Pakistani elite cannot 
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answer this question, but, as I will show, helps us get at the issue of whether a 
conclusion that the US should focus more on nation-building is in fact credible.  
 
To summarise the findings, this chapter does indeed find strong support within the US 
elite for the view that there should be a greater balance of nation-building in US 
policy.  About half the responses from the US elite can be classified as in support of 
nation-building.  However, when turning to the views of the Pakistani elite views, I 
find an unsupportive environment for a greater emphasis on nation-building on the 
part of the US.  What the Pakistani elite want is, in general, a more equal relationship, 
and, in particular, less aid dependency.  The Pakistani elite agrees that Pakistan needs 
improvements in governance, but it looks within for change (to get Pakistan’s own 
“house in order”, as it was often put) rather than to the US for help.  If anything, the 
US is seen as part of the problem, not the solution.  This common response on the part 
of the Pakistani elite casts doubt on the credibility of the widespread US elite position 
in support of nation-building.   
 
This chapter is organised into four sections.  Section 7.2 presents US elite ideas for 
policy change and Section 7.3 examines the Pakistan elite’s perspectives on this issue.  
Section 7.4 discusses both sets of responses and concludes.  
 
7.2 What would the elite do differently? US elite ideas for US policy 
change 
 
The US elite were asked, “What is the one thing you would change in the United 
States’ policy towards Pakistan?”  32 respondents gave 34 responses.  Six US elite 
were not asked this question.  Four IFI respondents were not asked because it was not 
within their domain to comment on US foreign policy and two think-tank respondents 
were not asked due to time constraints. 
 
I use the same method as in earlier chapters to analyse the responses, that is, grouping 
responses into similar categories.  I use nation-building reforms and realist reforms as 
two categories.  As Table 7.1 shows, just over half of the responses (19) advocate for 
a policy change that are nation-building in nature.  Almost one-fifth (7) argue for a 
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realist reform.  Not all responses cannot be categorised using this simple dichotomy.  
Eight responses argue that what is needed is more US credibility, and one argues for 
more trade.  To cater for these, “improve US credibility in Pakistan” and “other” were 
adopted as additional categories.  The grouping of responses into categories is shown 
in Annex 7.1 (where as in other chapters, responses are summarised using “headlines” 
or key words).   
 
Table 7.1: Ideas for policy change – US elite (most popular in each 
category reported) 
 Total number of responses 
(%  total responses) 
Total number of respondents 
(%  total respondents) 
Nation-building reforms 19 (56%) 17 (53%) 
Realist reforms  7 (21%) 7 (25%) 
Improve US credibility in 
Pakistan 
8 (23%) 7 (25%) 
Other 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 
Total 34 (100% ) 32 (100% ) 
 
7.2.1 Nation-building reforms 
 
A little over half of the policy elite argue for “nation-building” policy changes.  A few 
ideas were particularly popular.   
 
The most popular single response is for the US government to “take a long-term 
approach”.  Five respondents gave this view.  I categorise this as a nation-building 
reform given that most of the US realist policy goals are short-term and security 
focused.  The responses provided here indicate that the US elite wants to move away 
from this short-term, transactional cycle towards a longer-term and sustainable 
engagement.  Danny Cutherell from the Centre for Global Development, who 
provides one of the opening quotes to the chapter, is one who argues for a long-term 
approach to Pakistan, as per his remark quoted at the start of the chapter.  
Shamila Chaudhary at the New America Foundation provides a similar critique: “The 
US has no long-term strategy for its relationship with Pakistan.  They have a strategy 
based on the war in Afghanistan” (Interview, 14 March 2012).   
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The second most popular grouping of responses sees some of the US elite suggesting 
that the US should completely reset relations with Pakistan.  Again, this is categorised 
as a nation-building reform since the aim is to remove the focus from the current 
realist pre-occupations of the day.  Steve Coll, President of the New America 
Foundation would reset relations with a view to “normalising” the bilateral 
relationship to move away from the strong military to military focus that has persisted 
throughout history: “I would use all reasonable means to reduce drone strikes on 
Pakistani territory.  I would try to eliminate the program and try to find some way to 
change the partnership with the Pakistani military” (Interview: 13 March 2012).  
 
All of the other responses within the “nation-building” category are provided by only 
single respondents.  Former Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, argues that 
the US should reduce its physical presence in Pakistan to help “normalise” relations: 
“In retrospect I don’t think we should have built up such a large presence there.  We 
should not have employed all of these guys like Raymond Davis [see also Chapter 6]- 
I would have done that differently.  Not built a big compound…kept a normal profile, 
a normal [sized] embassy” (Interview: 9 March 2012).  Implicitly, the Ambassador is 
critiquing the US’s large security presence in Pakistan. 
 
Robert Hathaway at the Woodrow Wilson Centre argues that US policy should work 
harder to positively shape public opinion of the US.  Hathaway considers anti-
American narratives, both at the elite and mass public level, make it potentially 
difficult for the United States to get any policy traction in Pakistan:   
There is a near universal perception in Pakistan that America is anti-Pakistan, 
that America is the enemy and that America doesn’t care about Pakistan 
except for its own narrow interests.  Until we can get beyond that widely held 
perception in Pakistan, I don’t see much possibility of stabilising our 
relationship or building a long-term constructive partnership (Interview: 7 
March 2012).  
 
Michael Kugelman at the Woodrow Wilson Centre also thinks more needs to be done 
to improve public opinion, and suggests: “[W]hy not have [US] diplomats in Pakistan 
appear more on non-English language outlets…there is engagement on people-to-
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people levels but there is none of the United States Government engaging with the 
Pakistani people” (Interview, 7 March 2012).   
 
Consultant Polly Nayak thinks Congress has too much influence in setting aid policy 
and the conditions Congress hangs off aid are largely unhelpful, particularly with 
respect to Pakistan:  
I would cut Congress down – civilian assistance is a goodwill gesture, which 
places aspects of the relationship beyond the use of carrots and sticks.  That 
would be the best way to demonstrate to Pakistan that our relationship is 
longer than the US CT (counter-terrorism) strategy…We have to be 
appropriate, respectful and demand driven with foreign aid and that is not 
what we are doing now, which is largely determined in Washington” 
(Interview: 15 March 2012).  
 
A variety of respondents put the need to focus more on nation-building in a number of 
different ways, whether by talking about reducing drone strikes and military aid; 
calling on the US to stop viewing Pakistan through a 9/11 lens; changing the aid 
narrative so that aid is not seen as a bribe; and not trying to use economic aid to 
obtain security leverage. 
 
7.2.2 Realist policy reforms 
 
Not everyone wants more nation-building.  One-quarter of the elite advocate for a 
realist policy reform.  A wide variety of responses were grouped under this category, 
with the only response to be repeated by more than one person being the 
recommendation that the US promote peace between Pakistan and India.  Bruce 
Riedel at the Brookings Institution supports not only as a way to improve regional 
security, but as a means to improve policy outcomes in Pakistan (an interesting 
example a realist strategy with nation-building benefits!).  He says: “To me that 
[improving relations between Pakistan and India] is the single most important area to 
alter the dynamics of Pakistani decision makers” (Interview: 14 March 2012). 
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Others focus not on India but Afghanistan. Paul Pillar from Georgetown believes that 
greater attempts at regional diplomacy must be made by the US: 
I would be more active on trying to get regional diplomacy going on in 
Afghanistan and that involves the Pakistanis in a big, obvious, major way, as 
well as the Indians, as a way of trying to relieve their [Pakistan’s] concern 
about not having enough of an influential role on how the dust is going to 
settle in Afghanistan (Interview 15 March 2012). 
 
7.2.3 Improve US credibility in Pakistan 
 
About one-quarter of responses were cast not in terms of taking a more realist or a 
more nation-building approach, but in terms of bringing greater clarity and credibility 
to US policy in Pakistan. 
 
Both Shamila Chaudhary at the New America Foundation and Stephen Cohen at the 
Brookings Institution argue that the US should put its agreements with Pakistan in 
writing.  Cohen remarks: “It seems silly and stupid, but I would put things in writing” 
(Interview: 8 March 2012).  Chaudhary notes that in similar types of relationships, 
where aid is given for geo-strategic reasons, the agreements were in writing, which is 
not the case for Pakistan: 
Egypt is the best example – we have similar types of relationships with those 
counties (Jordan, Israel) where they get a huge chunk of money, with very 
little accountability, a blank cheque basically in exchange for partnership or 
cooperation on security issues.  In the case of Israel, Egypt and Jordon, a lot of 
that was based on the Camp David Accords, they were formalised.  That 
didn’t exist in the Pakistani context.  The expectations existed.  But there was 
nothing binding anyone to those expectations.  That was the problem 
(Interview: 12 March 2012). 
 
This could be interpreted as expressing a realist point of view: making it explicit that 
the relationship is about security. However, it is equally a critique of the confusion 
that is seen to surround US policy in Pakistan, and the failure to follow through on 
earlier promises, or threats.  Danielle Pletka at the American Enterprise Institute 
develops this line of argument further: 
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There is no imagination in our foreign policy… There is total continuity in the 
dumb things we continue to do, as if believing – what is the definition of 
insanity? Doing the same thing again and again and believing you will get 
different results…You can’t change history, you can’t go back.  That is the 
problem; we have trained them, [Pakistan] like we have trained the Iranians 
and the North Koreans, not to take us seriously.  We say things are 
unacceptable when they are acceptable and we accept them.  We tell them that 
they are not going to receive assistance from us if they do certain things and 
they do them anyway and they continue to receive assistance.  So A.Q. Khan 
runs the nuclear Wal-Mart around the world and there aren’t consequences… 
You harbor bin Laden and everyone down from him, you sponsor the Taliban, 
you help al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba… and we don’t do anything, so you think 
you can do it.  It is the work of decades to reestablish the relationship and that 
would require that we actually had to do these things [credibly] (Interview: 13 
March 2012).  
 
Two of the elite raise the specific option of making aid more contingent on 
performance indicators in order to improve policy outcomes.  Robert Lieber at 
Georgetown points out: “The key thing is trying to make aid more contingent and 
having performance indicators.  In effect, saying, we want to help you, we need to 
help you, but we won’t be able to help you unless the following things take place… it 
will be hard for us to provide military and civilian aid unless you are performing in a 
certain way” (Interview: 14 March 2012). 
 
This call for credibility is independent of whether the objectives of aid are for nation-
building or realist ends.  Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution agrees the United 
States should insist on “specific criteria for the aid and for specific results”.  Cohen 
would alter the way US conditionality is imposed on aid to Pakistan: “They [Pakistan] 
should be the ones telling us what they are going to do for the aid.  It shouldn’t be us.  
We shouldn’t tell them what we expect from their aid.  They should tell us what they 
can give us for x amount of aid and we should hold them to those criteria” (Interview: 
8 March 2012). 
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In summary, there is significant support among the US elite for the view, prevalent in 
the published literature, that the US should give still greater weight to nation-building 
in its objectives in Pakistan.  However, a significant minority dissent, and favour a 
more realist, or at least a continued realist approach.  And another minority argues 
that the issue is not realism or nation-building, but credibility.  
 
7.3 What would the elite do differently? Pakistani elite ideas for Pakistani 
policy change 
 
To recap, I asked the Pakistani elite the question: “What is the one thing you would 
change in Pakistan’s policy towards the United States?” and I use the answers to this 
question to shed some light on whether the widely-supported urge to give more 
emphasis to nation-building on the part of the US elite would be well-received in 
Pakistan. 
 
The sample size for this question is 36 and 39 responses were provided.  Four 
Pakistani elite were not asked this question, as they were interviewed prior to the 
questions being amended, and did not provide responses in a follow-up email process. 
(As noted in Chapter 2, the questions posed to the Pakistani elite changed slightly to 
reflect the US questions following fieldwork in the United States.)  
 
As elsewhere, responses are categorised into obvious groups. Four categories are 
required. Annex 7.2 shows how responses are categorised, and Table 7.2 below shows 
the popularity of the various categories.   
 
Note that a categorisation using the terms ‘nation-building’ and ‘realism’ is not 
appropriate with regards to this question.  These terms refer to choices donors make 
not recipients of aid.  Here, I am concerned with what Pakistan should do, not the US. 
Study of the responses resulted in a choice of the four categories shown in Table 7.2, 
namely, in order of popularity: promotion of equality and sovereignty; improvement 
in Pakistan’s policy making capabilities; improving Pakistan’s relationship with its 
neighbours; and a residual other. 
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Table 7.2: Ideas for policy change –Pakistani elite  
Category Total number of responses 
(% ) 
Total number of 
respondents (% ) 
Promote equality and sovereignty 17 (44%) 15 (42%) 
Improve Pakistan’s  policy making  12 (30%) 12 (33%) 
Improve relationship with Afghanistan or 
India 
7 (18%) 6 (17%) 
Other 3 (8%) 3 (8%) 
Total 39 (100%) 36 (100%) 
 
7.3.1 Promote equality and sovereignty 
 
Almost half of responses I classify as relating to “promoting equality and 
sovereignty”.   
 
The most popular response overall (in any of the four categories) from the Pakistan 
elite is for Pakistan to have less dependency on other countries, including in relation 
to aid.  A total of seven responses were along these lines. 
 
Some of the elite advocate that Pakistan should stop accepting aid altogether, so that 
Pakistan can stand on its own two feet: “Pakistan should not ask for aid from the US, 
the focus should be on trade and US support in Pakistan’s dealings with internationa l 
institutions” (Interview: Jehangir Karamat, former Chief of Army Staff, 4 May 2012).  
Asad Umar, CEO of the Engro Corporation and President of the Pakistan Business 
Council (now PTI Member of the National Assembly) takes an equally radical 
approach:  
I have argued that, from Pakistan’s point of view, I would rather that no aid 
flowed.  It has nothing to do with politics.  It is because Pakistan’s 
fundamental problem is refusing to take responsibility for our country.  And 
each time aid flows into the country, it allows us to postpone that 
responsibility” (Interview: 20 February 2012).  
 
Others are not against aid per se, but want to see change in the US-Pakistan aid 
relationship, in particular to a less transactional approach.  PTI politician Shafqat 
Mahmood says about the US that: “They have to start treating Pakistan as a sovereign 
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country, one that wants friendly relations with the US.  We have to stop using this 
kind of stop-start leveraging of our position – for example we open supply lines if you 
pay us $5 million.  That is a bit demeaning” (Interview: 4 June 2013).   
 
General Talat Masood, while also not advocating for a complete halt to aid, highlights 
why he thinks aid dependency is a problem: 
Pakistan has to understand that it cannot receive economic assistance or 
military assistance without a quid pro quo.  It has to understand that it has to 
surrender something; either its sovereignty or it has to accept certain demands, 
which may even be against its own wishes or contrary to its national image.  
So Pakistan has to look inwards in order to improve its relations with the US 
(Interview: 28 May 2013). 
 
Overall, there is a strong sense that aid dependency is a problem in Pakistan – and that 
it is harming Pakistan’s ability to progress and develop.   
 
One respondent focuses not on aid dependency but on psychological dependency.  
Senator Mushahid Hussain, Chair of the Senate Defence Committee wants to 
overhaul the way Pakistan makes policy vis-à-vis the United States by reducing “the 
psychological dependency syndrome of the Pakistani elite”, encompassing the 
political, civilian and military elite.  Senator Hussain downplays what the United 
States can offer Pakistan. What follows is a longer version of the quote from Senator 
Hussain, which opens this chapter: 
We should stop depending so much on the United States.  The US has very 
little to offer in terms of military support, frankly speaking…there is too much 
fear of the US, what will the US say if we do this? Forget about that and make 
our own policies… Our elite should have more national self-confidence, stand 
on their own feet and stop looking over their shoulders [to see] how 
Washington is thinking.  This is your country - finally stop expecting the US 
to solve every problem of Pakistan” (Interview: 24 October 2013). 
 
Closely related to this concern with dependency, a number of the Pakistani elite call 
for greater equality and friendship in the relationship.  The lack of “sovereign 
equality” and the failure of the US to treat Pakistan as an equal partner is noted by 
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several of the Pakistani elite.  Member of the National Assembly for the PML-N, 
Dr Tariq Fazal Chaudhary advocates for “equal, friendly relations” (Interview: 31 
May 2013).  Along similar lines, Shahzad Bangash, Secretary of the Planning and 
Development Commission in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, thinks 
Pakistan must change its policy in order to make the relationship more equal: “I 
would rebuild the relationship on equal terms and I would say that, you are our 
strategic partner, you are our development and economic partner but we should not 
be dictated to by the United States” (Interview: 25 July 2013). 
 
Third, the elite wants Pakistan to start acting in its own self-interest.  The elite are 
critical of Pakistan’s approach to its relationship with the United States, painting 
Pakistan as a “yes man” who will do whatever the US asks.  Brigadier A.R. Jerral, 
retired from the Pakistani military, and a contributor of regular opinion pieces in 
Pakistan’s English media, thinks that Pakistan needs to better spell out its interests 
and ‘red lines’ to the United States: “We need to be up front and say this is what we 
can do, and this is what we can’t do.  We also have our interests in the region.  Once 
they [the US] understand that, which I think will be difficult, I think it will be okay” 
(Interview: 19 June 2013). 
 
Similarly, Shafqat Mahmood, Member of the National Assembly for the Pakistan 
Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) says: “As long as you keep having this client-state mentality 
there will be problems.  Change has to come from both sides – they [the Americans] 
have to stop looking at us as a client state and we have to get off that mentality” 
(Interview: 4 June 2013).   
 
Finally, trade not aid is suggested in a group interview with three development 
economists from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics at Quaid-i-Azam 
University.  Dr Munir Ahmad said: “One thing that has been going on in the policy 
circles is that we want more trade rather than aid - so there is one factor which will 
help Pakistan in improving the relations, because then the relations will be on a long-
term and sustainable basis” (Interview:, 20 February 2013).  One other member of this 
group also discussed improving Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, which is 
captured in Section 7.3.3.  
 
 203 
7.3.2 Improve Pakistan’s policy making  
 
One-third of respondents provide a response relating to improving Pakistan’s policy 
making.   
 
Amina Khan from the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad argues that domestic 
weaknesses undermines Pakistan’s ability to prosecute its strategic interests and 
achieve policy clarity vis-à-vis the United States:  
First and foremost you need to get your house in order.  What the Americans 
are doing is they are following their national interest and why shouldn’t they?  
Every country is meant to do that.  I think the problem is with Pakistan’s 
policies, and we need to formulate a policy on how we want to deal with the 
US... So you need to realise that more internal consensus has to be made.  
Because openly, we love to criticise America but at the end of the day, we 
keep on going to them for aid and at the end of the day, whatever the 
Americans say we do and tend to agree with them.  So first and foremost, 
formulate a policy of your own and get your own house in order (Interview: 
29 July 2013). 
 
Clearer statements of policy intent, and better delivery of these statements would 
likely result in fewer miscommunications and misunderstandings between the US and 
Pakistan, which may reduce tensions in the relationship.  Dr Simbal Khan at the 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute believes the first step towards greater policy 
clarity is to reduce the scope for misunderstandings:  
Less ambiguity [is needed] first of all on both sides…the duality of the whole 
conflicting and cooperational aspects, of this relationship has created the need 
for a certain level of ambiguity in relations, which trickle down to all aspects 
[of the relationship].  It trickled even to security systems and counter 
terrorism, it’s trickled down into how both the counties related to the 
immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan.  That ambiguity didn’t help the US 
and it didn’t help Pakistan’s relations with the US.  I am hoping that we are 
moving to a phase where there is less divergence (Interview: 11 July 2013). 
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In addition, a number of the elite advocated for better exercise of diplomacy to find 
greater policy convergence between Pakistan and the United States.  
Ambassador Akram Zaki, who has served as Ambassador to China, Nigeria, Canada 
and the United States, as well as a Senator representing the Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML-N) considers that Pakistan needs to maximise of areas of policy convergence 
between the United States and Pakistan and advocates dialogue to improve relations: 
There are two types of people in our government – what I call the 
surrenderists and the confrontists.  I think surrender policy is wrong and 
confrontational policy is wrong.  My policy is no confrontation, no 
capitulation.  But [we need] patient, dignified and continuous negotiation and 
dialogue.  My theory of diplomacy is that the age of friends and foes is over.  
Every two countries have common interests and divergent interests.  The 
function of diplomacy is to expand the area of common interests and reduce 
the area of divergence.  So we should control the divergence and expand the 
cooperation – for both the US and India (Interview: 21 January 2013).  
 
This perception that the US is to blame for all of Pakistan’s problems was prevalent 
more broadly during interviews with the Pakistani elite, and is certainly prevalent 
throughout the media in Pakistan.  
 
There was also a perception that Pakistan needed to stand by the agreements it had 
made with the United States in order to overcome its credibility issues.  Ambassador 
Qazi Humayan argues that:  
We have also made mistakes… The folly has been more on our side in that 
sense.  If we had stood by those agreements [in reference to a number of 
issues mentioned, including Pakistan’s actions towards India during the Kargil 
war] and not done stupid things our relationship would have progressed. 
Economically we would have been better off, there is no doubt about that 
(Interview: 1 March 2012).   
 
A couple of interviewees made the point that Pakistan needs to be more pragmatic, 
less emotional, and blame the US less.  Abdur Rauf Khan Gandapur, Director at 
Oxford Policy Management, says: “The population across the board would have the 
perception that if my coat falls down, I would be blaming the Americans.  This 
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attitude is across all of society, be it military, civil society, the bureaucracy, the 
general public and the politician” (Interview: 19 June 2013).   
 
7.3.3 Improve relations with Afghanistan or India 
 
17 per cent of respondents provide a response that I classify as a policy change 
relating to Pakistan’s policy approach in Afghanistan or India.   
 
As noted in Chapter 4, cooperation in Afghanistan is noted as a major “want” for the 
United States according to both the US and Pakistani elite.  Several respondents had 
suggestions in regard to Afghanistan, though not necessarily agreement.  Ejaz Ghani, 
an economist at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics argues that 
Afghanistan deserves more attention from Pakistan:  
If I had the chance, I would first of all engage myself with Afghanistan, 
because we are two nations that will be here after the United States has left.  
We need to develop the trust between us, and once we have established this, 
then maybe the United States can come into the picture by helping us with 
whatever the issues or deficits which are still there (Interview: 20 February 
2013).   
 
Politician Ayaz Amir has the opposite view that Afghanistan overly colours 
Pakistan’s foreign policy, as it has done so throughout history: 
Afghanistan has distorted our thinking for the last 30 years.  Look at all of the 
news reports about the post-American withdrawal from Afghanistan and we 
talk about Pakistan’s influence and interests there.  Our only interest or stake 
in Afghanistan should be, regardless of who rules Kabul – the National 
Alliance, the Taliban – should be a stable Afghanistan.  But are we likely to 
get a stable Afghanistan very soon?  I don’t think so.  I think we are going in 
for a repeat of history.  A repeat of the situation as it existed after 1989 
(Interview: 5 February 2013). 
 
India is also named as an issue that the Pakistani elite would like to see policy change 
towards. Although the question was phrased in terms of changing Pakistan’s policy, 
several could not help talking about how US policy should be changed.  Consultant 
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Safia Aftab would ask the US to consider Pakistan’s position towards India more 
readily: “The US has to appreciate that Pakistan’s primary fear is always India.  And 
they have to understand that Pakistan will need assurance of peace on its eastern 
border before it’s willing to engage in a regional setting” (Interview: 17 July 2013).  
 
Pakistan’s zero-sum game mentality with respect to India is evident in several 
responses.  Any enhancement in American engagement with India is seen to be at the 
expense of Pakistan: “Pakistan has concerns with the marked India tilt in US policy 
for South Asia” (Interview, former Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat: 4 
May 2012). 
 
7.3.4 Other 
 
Two respondents indicate that change had to come first from the US, on the grounds 
that that is where the problems lie.  Abdur Rauf Khan Gandapur, Country Director of 
Oxford Policy Management, said:  
Right now, the step has to come from the Americans because to me, the 
gesture has to be from the American side. We have done everything [we can] 
but they do not trust us… (Interview: 19 June 2013). 
 
Finally, one respondent, Raza Rumi, Director of Policy and Programs at the Jinnah 
Institute, argues for a broader relationship with the US, one less dominated by 
military links: 
The problem with Pak-US relations is – and that has remained for probably 
five decades now – that it has been a military to military relationship, it has 
been CIA to ISI, and it has been a war-based or conflict-based relationship.  It 
is not a relationship where Pakistan civilian and military wings of the state are 
engaged in a particular process.  I mean, what are the key interests – public 
interests – of Pakistan as we speak? They are economic.  It has to do with the 
energy crisis; it has to do with trading, opening up of world markets, getting 
technical assistance.  It is not just about guns, F16s, defence technology.  That 
is only one part.  It is the overall engagement with the US that needs to take 
place - that still has to take place (Interview: 29 May 2013).  
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Interestingly, this response was the only one that explicitly provides any support for a 
greater emphasis by the US on nation-building.  
 
More broadly, and in summary, about half the respondents emphasis the need for 
changes in Pakistani policy to enhance the country’s sovereignty and equality vis-à-
vis the United States.  Another quarter emphasise the need to improve Pakistan 
policy-making capabilities.  
 
7.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This chapter finds broader support within the US elite for the view often found in the 
published literature that there should be a greater emphasis on nation-building 
objectives in US policy towards Pakistan.  From this perspective, the problem with 
the Obama pivot to nation-building, and with initiatives such as the Kerry Lugar 
Berman Bill is not that they were attempted, but that they did not go far enough.  
More effort is needed.  Not everyone in the US elite is convinced of this.  Some still 
place the emphasis on realist objectives, and others recognise that, as this thesis has 
found, given the emphasis on them, the pursuit of a nation-building agenda will be 
difficult if not impossible.  Nevertheless others emphasise not so much the nature of 
US objectives, but the need for greater credibility and consistency in pursuit of 
whatever those objectives are.  Still, these are minority views.  There is clearly 
substantial support for a greater emphasis on nation-building not only in the published 
literature, but in the US elite more broadly.  (This is perhaps not surprising since that 
the published literature on US policy in Pakistan is almost entirely an American 
literature.) 
 
Would a further rebalancing in favour of nation-building work?  That is a difficult 
question to answer, but we can conclude on the basis of this chapter’s findings that it 
would not be welcomed by the Pakistani elite.  Certainly, the Pakistani elite are 
critical of their own government.  But they also express resentment about being 
dependent on aid, and a desire for more sovereignty and equality in Pakistan’s 
relationship with the US.  Indeed, one of the self-critiques of the elite is that Pakistan 
fails to take responsibility: something which would only be exacerbated by greater US 
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assumption of responsibility for Pakistani governance.  The combination of these 
views leads to a sentiment in favour of getting our “own house in order” or “nation-
building DIY”.  
 
Apart from wanting a less dependent relationship, there are at least two other factors 
which would seem to undermine support for nation-building among the Pakistani 
elite.  
 
First, the Pakistani elite is skeptical of US intentions and in particular of the durability 
of the US-Pakistan relationship.  Politician Ayaz Amir is one, predicting that the US 
will “wash their hands of us” once they leave Afghanistan.  He also highlights the 
conflict in the relationship, which again would undermine a nation-building effort.  
Amir’s statement is worth reproducing at length: 
There are people in Pakistan who think seriously that all the trouble is caused 
here by the American presence in Afghanistan…After the US is gone are the 
Taliban going to contact the Pakistani Army and say ‘thank you, here are our 
weapons’?  The way Islamists talk about it is that we retreated one super 
power and now we are defeating another.  After defeating two super powers, 
what becomes of Pakistan?  The Americans are spending about $7 billion in 
Afghanistan.  But the new frontline won’t be Afghanistan, because the 
Americans walked away.  The new frontline will be Pakistan.  But they will, 
when talking about aid, wash their hands of us.  They will say that we deserve 
it because we are duplicitous deserve every bit of what comes to us (Interview: 
5 February 2013).  
 
Second, some in the Pakistani elite view the US as part of the problem rather than the 
solution. Author Imtiaz Gul singles out the United States’ aid program as negatively 
impacting Pakistan over the long-term:  
What has happened, both during Zia and Musharraf’s time, in their [the 
Americans] quest for control over beating al Qaeda or the Taliban, or the 
Soviet Union, they simply disregard transparency, accountability and 
fundamental human rights.  They disregard requirements for democracy.  The 
democratic structures get shaken and distorted as a result of the experience of 
the US.  Both times it has been the US.  I am not externalising Pakistan’s 
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problems, but I am saying we have a lot of problems, primarily driven by the 
Army and the elite, but the external factors precipitate those problems.  They 
do not help in solving that, they simply add to the problem and this is what we 
suffer from (Interview: 17 November 2011).  
 
There is little awareness on the part of the US elite that a tilt towards nation-building 
on its part might be met with skepticism and unease on the Pakistani side.  As noted 
earlier, the literature on US policy to Pakistan is very much a US literature.  This 
chapter suggests that taking Pakistani views seriously would lead to a questioning of 
the conclusions of much of that literature. 
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Annex 7.1: US ideas for policy change (number of 
respondents) 
 
Nation-building 
policies  
Realist polices  Improve US 
credibility in Pakistan 
Other 
Take a long-term 
approach to US policy 
in Pakistan (5) 
Promote peace with 
India (2) 
Put things in writing 
(2) 
Trade not aid (1) 
Reset relations (away 
from security) (2)   
Develop a broader 
policy strategy, 
particularly for 
CT/security (1) 
Make aid more 
contingent on 
performance indicators 
(2) 
 
Overhaul 
communications, have 
a more effective 
communications 
strategy (1) 
Convey that the US is 
leaving Afghanistan in 
2014 (1) 
Improve US credibility 
(2) 
 
Reduce drone strikes 
(1) 
Develop a more 
realistic policy strategy 
in line with ground 
realities (1) 
Be less trusting of 
Pakistan (1) 
 
Reduce focus on 
military aid (1) 
Promote regional 
diplomacy (1) 
Decrease Congress’ 
influence in setting aid 
priorities (1)  
Project that US isn’t 
anti-Islam in Pakistan 
(1) 
Maintain a 
transactional 
relationship (1) 
 
 
Decrease US security 
presence in Pakistan 
(1) 
Convey that the US 
doesn’t need Pakistan 
(1) 
  
Don’t use economic aid 
to get leverage for 
security policy change 
(1)  
  
Change aid narrative - 
currently it is very 
negative, that the US 
uses aid as a bribe (1) 
   
Stop viewing things 
through a 9/11 lens (1)  
  
Improve the perception 
of the US in Pakistan 
through greater public 
diplomacy (1)  
  
Better relations with 
the Pakistan civilian 
government (1)  
  
  
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
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Annex 7.2: Pakistani ideas for policy change (number of 
respondents) 
 
Promote equality and 
sovereignty 
Improve Pakistan’s 
policy making  
Improve relationship 
with Afghanistan or 
India 
Other 
Be less dependent on 
others, including for 
aid  (7) 
More clarity in 
Pakistan’s own policy 
(3) 
Take a different 
approach to policy 
approach to 
Afghanistan (3) 
US should change first 
(2) 
Have more equality in 
the relationship with 
the US (4) 
Try to get more policy 
convergence with the 
United States (3) 
Seek more US help in 
engaging and making 
peace with India (3) 
Move away from 
military-military 
relationship towards a 
more normal civilian-
led relationship (1) 
Engage more on 
Pakistan’s interests (4)  
Pakistan needs to stand 
by the agreements it 
makes (be more 
credible) (3) 
Pakistan should not 
have become an ally in 
the war on terror (1) 
  
Trade not aid (1) Be less emotional and 
more pragmatic in 
policy making and in 
interacting with other 
governments  (2) 
  
 
 
 Have more confidence 
in the Pakistani 
leadership (1) 
  
 Pakistani Government 
needs to make foreign 
policy, not the military 
(1) 
 
 
 
* As noted in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, qualitative interview responses have been categorised or coded 
into broad headings or themes in order to do some basic quantitative analysis on the data. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
“American policy over the last ten or eleven years, since 2001, is in the midst of 
transition from a policy that began in Pakistan with a near total and myopic focus on 
what the Bush Administration defined as the war on terror, to a policy in the Obama 
Administration, which sustained many aspects of the Bush Administration’s approach.  
It tried to add civilian aid to a greater degree to balance the emphasis on military and 
intelligence cooperation but never really broke the narrative, because a principal 
objective of the Obama Administration’s engagement was the outcome of its 
investments in Afghanistan.  So now there is a third phase – post-Afghanistan, which 
is evolving.  This brings this Administration, for the first time, to a cleaner question: 
after all of the disappointments, the failures and so forth a clean question of what is 
our durable relationship. Since we have had the illusion scraped from our eyes, what 
do we want to reset around?” 
 
Steve Coll, New America Foundation (Interview: 13 March 2012). 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has examined the relationship between the United States’ nation-building 
and realist (or, as discussed in Chapter 1, indirect and direct or long-term and short-
term) objectives in Pakistan, exploring US and Pakistani elite perceptions to tell the 
story of US aid to Pakistan in the post-9/11 era.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the realist 
objectives of US aid are short-term or direct.  From this perspective, aid is viewed as 
a way to bind countries to align with the US, and to increase the likelihood that they 
will make foreign policy and security decisions consistent with US preferences. By 
contrast, the nation-building objectives of aid relate to reconstruction, development 
and the strengthening of governance.  They are long-term goals, or indirect, in the 
words of Banfield (1963).  
 
The relative importance and tension between these objectives in the Cold War has 
been examined by Sietz (2012) and Burnett (1992).  However, this important aspect 
of US aid policy has not been studied in the contemporary context.  There is no more 
valuable a context within which to undertake such a study as in the post-9/11 US-
Pakistan context.  Throughout this period, the US had clear realist objectives in 
relation to Pakistan: it gave it aid, both military and civilian, to secure its cooperation 
in the war on terror, and primarily in Afghanistan.  As shown in Chapter 1 (see 
Section 1.4), during the period of research (2011-2013), the US tried to give greater 
emphasis to its nation-building objectives in Pakistan, even though it didn’t use this 
terminology.  
 
This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of this research (Section 8.2) 
and its limitations (Section 8.3).  Section 8.4 outlines this research’s contribution to 
the literature.  This chapter also considers policy implications (Section 8.5) and 
recommendations for further research (Section 8.6).  Final concluding remarks are 
made in Section 8.7. 
 
8.2  Main findings 
 
This thesis has pursued its research question primarily through interviews with the US 
and Pakistani elite. This section summarizes the findings of those interviews across 
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Chapters 3 to 6.  It then goes on to consider the implications of these findings for our 
research question concerning the relative balance and tensions between US realist and 
nation-building objectives in Pakistan.  Finally, it turns to Chapter 7 and its findings 
concerning elite views on what should be done. 
 
In Chapter 3, Pakistan’s future emerged as a “wicked problem”.  In particular, as per 
the first of Rittel and Weber’s (1973) ten criteria for a wicked problem, there is “no 
definitive formulation” of the problems that ail Pakistan.  Hence, the huge range of 
responses to this question, and the divergences across groups as analysed in the 
previous section.  US respondents are particularly divided in their responses.  
 
Both groups of respondents in general gave primacy to internal over external 
challenges. Some elite respondents did single out external challenges to Pakistan, 
most commonly mentioning Afghanistan, but that is only a minority, a third of 
Americans and a fifth of Pakistanis.  The majority saw Pakistan’s challenges through 
a nation-building lens. 
 
Both groups also tended to stress the significance of Pakistan’s economic challenges. 
This is not reflected in the majority of the literature on Pakistan’s challenges, which 
tends to focus heavily on security, foreign policy and political issues.   
 
The biggest difference between the two groups of elites was in the contrast between 
the stress on security by Pakistani respondents, and that on governance by the US 
respondents.  The Pakistani elite stressed security-related challenges almost as much 
as the economy, whereas the US prioritises security-related challenges much further 
down the list.  I argued that this reflects the recent upsurge in terrorism in Pakistan, 
and an emerging consensus in Pakistan, reflected also at the political level, that 
terrorism has now to be acted on, and so a shift in thinking from that revealed by 
Lieven (2011).  By contrast, the US elite were, from a distance, perhaps slower to 
wake up to the domestic terrorism threat in Pakistan, were more focused on 
governance, a traditional priority for US aid, and, when it came to terrorism, were 
more concerned about terrorism which threatens the US, and so less with Pakistan’s 
domestic terrorism. 
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Chapter 4 demonstrated that elite perceptions of what the US wants from Pakistan did 
not coincide at all with their perceptions of Pakistan’s challenges.  Despite 73 per cent 
of Pakistani and 58 per cent of US respondents naming an economic issue as the 
biggest challenge facing Pakistan, none of the Pakistani elite and three per cent of the 
American elite believed it was a top priority for the United States to help Pakistan to 
address its economic challenges.  Rather the perception was that, when it came to 
Pakistan, the US was mainly focused on external goals, in particular in relation to 
Afghanistan, even if these were not of great intrinsic importance to Pakistan itself. 
 
The analysis of Chapter 4 did reveal some differences in the views of the two elites.  
In particular, US respondents tended to give more importance to domestic Pakistani 
politics and governance when asked what the US wants.  This finding supports the 
argument that the US did have nation-building goals for Pakistan over the period of 
analysis.  Without such goals it would be difficult to explain the build up of civilian 
aid over this period, and the passage of the KLB legislation.  However, in practice it 
was the realist objectives that were taken most seriously, especially by the Pakistani 
elite. 
 
Chapter 5 analysed aid and leverage.  Both countries’ elites generally agreed that aid 
should have conditions.  This did not meant that they liked it, or though it worked, but 
they generally viewed it as an inevitable part of aid.  Interestingly, views differed on 
whether the aid spigot is “frozen in the open position”, as Burnett (1992) argues it 
should have been given the importance of Pakistan for the US, with the US elite 
generally arguing that it was, and the Pakistani elite generally arguing that it was not.  
I resolved this discrepancy in views by noting that the spigot was only partially 
frozen, and that both sides focused on their frustrations: the Pakistani elite that the US 
was able to buy influence through its aid, the US elite that it is not able to buy enough 
influence.  While this finding modifies Burnett’s conclusion, support was found from 
elite views for Burnett’s other prediction that the impact of aid on economic reform 
would be undermined by the US’s realist imperatives.  Views on the efficacy of 
economic conditionality were evenly divided.  More thought it had no effect than 
some, and one reason given was precisely that the credibility of economic 
conditionality was undermined by US strategic considerations. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 turned to the issue of “winning hearts and minds” in Pakistan.  
Why hasn’t aid helped win hearts and minds there?  And whose hearts and minds is 
the US trying to win in any case?  
 
My interviews suggested that US aid to Pakistan was impotent to influence Pakistani 
elite views in the face of much larger, and negative forces.  According to the Pakistani 
elite, aid could not undo the negative impacts of US foreign policy, whether in 
Pakistan or worldwide, today or in the past. This finding confirmed the argument 
made many decades earlier by Morgenthau (1960) “[e]conomic aid remains 
politically ineffectual as long as the recipient says “aid is good, but the politics of the 
giver are bad”’ (p. 535).   Further, not only was aid impotent in the face of broader 
forces, but aid itself was not necessarily popular.  Chapter 5 in fact showed that the 
Pakistani elite have overwhelmingly negative views of US aid.  They tended to 
believe that aid was not based on what Pakistan needs, that it was still heavily skewed 
to the military, that it was invisible and ineffective, and that it was lacking in tangible 
achievements.  They saw it as only given quid pro quo, for leverage, and as 
inadequate compensation.  From these responses, it would seem to be clear that the 
realist objectives of US aid clearly did undermine its potential for winning hearts and 
minds. 
 
On Chapter 6’s second research question of whose hearts and minds, I found a strong 
majority of the Pakistan elite (74 per cent) believed that US aid targeted the elite, 
whereas the US elite were much less sure and more divided on this issue.  Only 
30  percent of the US elite believed that US aid targeted the elite.  40 per cent of US 
respondents thought the US was trying to win over both the elite and masses, and 
another 20 per cent thought the focus was on winning the hearts and minds of the 
masses.  Why was the US unable to convince Pakistan of its intent to reach the 
masses, and improve public opinion?  The simple answer would seem to be that the 
realist lens through which the Pakistan elite viewed the US engagement with their 
country.  The Pakistani elite viewed the US aid as focused on getting Pakistan to 
behave in certain ways, and, given this, it must be focused mainly on the elite.   
 
The paragraphs above provide a summary of findings in terms of what the different 
groups of interviewees thought.  These are themselves intrinsically interesting and 
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important findings.  But can we go further?  What do these findings have to say on the 
relative balance between realist and nation-building objectives of US aid?  In fact, the 
findings all point in the same direction.  They provide clear evidence that realist 
objectives trumped nation-building objectives when it came to post-9/11 US aid to 
Pakistan, and even post-2009, when there was a pivot to nation-building.   
 
The responses of the US elite (in both Chapters 4 and 6) suggested that nation-
building was taken seriously as a US goal in its relationship with Pakistan, but the 
responses especially from the Pakistani side indicated that the US failed to 
communicate and demonstrate its nation-building intent.  Rather, all the results 
chapters suggested that the realist objectives continued to be taken more seriously.  In 
addition, the findings concerning leverage and goodwill in Chapters 6 and 7 suggested 
that the pursuit of the realist objectives undermined the pursuit of the nation-building 
ones, by undermining the ability of aid to support economic reform and win goodwill.   
 
How can this overall finding be explained?  While the US and Pakistan are in theory 
allies, in practice their strategic interests diverge.  In turn, this is because of the 
contentious and disputed nature of the partnership between the two countries in 
relation to Afghanistan and the war on terror more broadly.  The continual 
renegotiation of the relationship over these issues, the never ending flashpoints and 
disputes sucked the air from the pursuit of broader, nation-building goals, and 
doomed that pursuit to failure.  One might say that in the case of Pakistan under 
Obama it was not realist goals per se that undermined nation-building goals, but 
failure to achieve, and so move beyond, those realist goals.  
 
This overall conclusion of the thesis was expressed most clearly by, of all the 
interviewees, Michael Krepon at the Stimson Centre in Washington DC:  
US policy towards Pakistan is a function of ground realities.  We can hope to 
change them at the rhetorical level and have tried to do so, for example, with 
the KLB, but ground realities are a powerful corrective.  I don’t have a good 
answer, because I don’t know how to change ground realities.  That is up to 
Pakistan and they are not ready for it or capable of it…(Interview: 13 March 
2012). 
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The “ground realities” which Krepon referred to were the strategic divergences 
between Pakistan and the US on Afghanistan and issues relating to the war in 
Afghanistan. 
 
What then should be done?  Should the US try harder or should it give up nation-
building?  Chapter 7 attempted to answer that question.  It found strong support for 
the “try harder” view on the part of the US elite, which was consistent with the 
published literature.  About half of the responses from the US elite could be classified 
in support of greater emphasis on nation-building.  However, the Pakistani elite, when 
asked what Pakistan should do, emphasised concerns about aid dependency and a 
desire for greater equality with the US.  While they were critical about the weaknesses 
of the Pakistani state, they had little appetite for US assistance in fixing these 
weaknesses.  If anything, the US was seen as part of the problem rather than the 
solution, and lacking the long-term commitment required to make a difference.  This 
suggested that a greater emphasis on nation-building, as argued for in the literature 
and by many in the elite, would not be effective.  The Pakistani elite instead showed a 
preference to get its “own house in order” – that is, to do nation-building for Pakistan, 
by Pakistan, and to set a course for the country’s development on its own terms.  The 
policy implications of these findings are explored further in Section 8.5 below. 
 
8.3  Limitations  
 
This case-study of perceptions of US aid to Pakistan, conducted through interviews 
with the policy elites in Pakistan and the United States, has offered a valuable insights 
on an important foreign policy issue.  Yet it also has some limitations, which need to 
be considered.  
 
First, the interviews were conducted over two different time periods.  In Pakistan, 
owing to the fact I lived in Islamabad between July 2010 and October 2013, the 
interviews were spread out over two years (October 2011 - October 2013).  However, 
given that I had limited time and resources in the United States, the interviews were 
conducted over a three-week period.  Ideally, a longer period of time would have been 
spent in the United States to enable the development of networks and a better 
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understanding of the US foreign policy context.  Nevertheless, the length of time 
spent in Pakistan sets this research apart and gives it significant depth, particularly 
given most foreign researchers in Pakistan spend only weeks or months in the country 
owing to the difficult security conditions.  
 
Second, ideally more provincial elite should have been sampled, particularly noting 
the concentration of business elite in Lahore and Karachi.  However, at the time of 
this research, security conditions prevented extended travel outside Islamabad.  
 
Third, the findings of this survey are based on a perceptions survey, and there can be 
a large gap between perceptions and reality.  However, by careful framing of 
questions and the use of a number of different lines of attack, I would argue that we 
have been able to gain insight into fundamental questions of the objectives of aid, 
questions which it would be difficult to address through any other way.  I have also 
tried, especially in the section above, to separate our findings summarising the 
perceptions of the elite, which are themselves interesting and important, from the 
implications of those findings for our research question, so that the validity of both 
stages in the argument can be separately assessed. 
 
Finally, a common critique of single-case study research is the issue of external 
validity or generalisability.  While more case studies would of course be desirable, 
this study is, I argue, still able to make a number of contributions to the literature. 
These are outlined in the next section.  
 
8.4 Contribution to the literature 
 
The first fundamental contribution of this research is to update the Cold War literature 
on aid to the 9/11 era.  In that sense, this thesis is in the tradition of Sietz (2012), 
Banfield (1963), Burnett (1992) and Morgenathau (1960).  
 
The central finding that nation-building objectives were undermined in Pakistan by 
realist ones is consistent with Burnett (1992) and Bearce and Tirone (2010).  
However, the argument of Burnett (1992) that aid loses all leverage when countries 
are strategically important is rejected by this case study.  The finding that aid is 
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ineffective at overcoming political differences confirms the argument of Morgenthau 
(1960). 
 
The second important contribution of this thesis is to the Pakistan studies literature.  
With the exception of Lieven (2011), there have been few recent studies of Pakistani 
elite opinion.  I argue that Lieven (2011) underestimates the importance of the 
internal security threat perceived by the Pakistani elite.  I also show, particularly in 
Chapter 7, that US scholars and the policy elite more generally would do well to listen 
more to what the Pakistani elite is saying.  In general, both sets of elite would seem to 
communicate well within their group, but there is very little cross-elite 
communication. 
 
The third important contribution of the thesis is towards a better understanding of 
recipient attitudes of aid, the urgent need for which has been stressed by scholars of 
aid such as Riddell (2014).   The results of the thesis confirm the utility of this 
approach.  As the next section suggests, US aid policy would be enhanced if it 
listened more closely to what the Pakistani elite was saying. 
 
8.5 Policy implications  
 
Chapter 7 found strong support among the US elite for a greater emphasis on nation-
building, but an implied skepticism on the part of the Pakistani elite.  What lessons 
can be drawn from this thesis in terms of future aid and broader US foreign policy to 
Pakistan?  What should be changed?  As Steve Coll of the New America Foundation 
asks in the quote with which this chapter begins, given the relative failure of KLB and 
post-Afghanistan-withdrawal, “Since we have had the illusion scraped from our eyes, 
what do we want to reset around?” 
 
Clearly, a full answer to this question is well beyond the scope of this thesis, since it 
would require an analysis of the effectiveness of US aid, which has not been 
attempted here.  That said, my thesis findings do point in the direction of a 
downgrading of nation-building objectives for three key reasons.  
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First, US aid may get more leverage in Pakistan than the United States realises.  The 
research reported in Chapter 5 shows that, while the US elite is skeptical, nearly the 
entire Pakistani elite believes that US aid gets leverage in Pakistan.  If there is 
leverage, it is predominantly in the military and foreign policy spheres, and so this 
should be the focus of US policy.  After all, even post-withdrawal, US still needs 
Pakistan for a number of important strategic goals: primarily to get peace in 
Afghanistan, but more generally to combat terrorism and nuclear-proliferation, and 
not to undermine stability in South Asia.  With reduced leverage due to increased 
Chinese aid, the United States should concentrate its efforts where it is most – albeit 
still only partially – effective, namely, in relation to Pakistani military and foreign 
policy. 
 
Second, my research suggests that the United States cannot use aid to win hearts and 
minds in Pakistan without broader foreign policy change.  Simply pouring more 
money into Pakistan, or undertaking more concerted public diplomacy campaigns will 
not change the views of the elite, which are based on much broader historical and 
foreign policy considerations.  While strictly speaking this finding only holds for the 
elite, it is likely that the same is true of the general public, as Wilder (2011) finds. 
 
Third, as Chapter 7 showed, the Pakistani elite desire greater sovereignty and equality 
and will resist attempts by the US to significantly influence development, governance 
and other nation-building activities in Pakistan.  Instead, Pakistan wants to get its 
“own house in order”, and move away from its dependency on aid that has 
undoubtedly slowed aspects of its development.  
 
My own conclusion, or rather suggestion, from these findings is in line with that of 
Andrew Wilder at the United States Institute for Peace.  As quoted in Chapter 7, 
Wilder rebuts the common criticism of the US-Pakistani relationship that it is 
“transactional”: 
The transactional relationship is overly criticised, but that is what a lot of 
relationships are about and should be about. We have our national interests 
and they have their national interests and let’s be very honest about that.  Let’s 
not try to sugar coat it with KLB programs and aid programs to think that we 
can somehow win hearts and minds with our foreign policy efforts.  We need 
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to be clear that it is about their interests and our interests, and let’s be honest 
about that and negotiate, transact (Interview: 6 March 2012). 
 
Perhaps, as Shamila Chaudhary at the New America Foundation implicitly suggests, 
the US needs to identify those relationships are primarily about realist objectives, and 
then be satisfied with giving them “a blank cheque basically in exchange for 
partnership or cooperation on security issues.”  Chaudhury gives Israel, Jordon and 
Egypt as examples of such countries, and suggests that Pakistan should be added to 
the list, though noting that a written agreement outlining what is expected of Pakistan 
is necessary. 
 
It may be the case, as Kagan (2011) argues, and as quoted in Chapter 1, that American 
support for nation-building “springs naturally and inevitably” from the American 
character, but sometimes that impulse may need to be suppressed.   
 
8.6 Recommendations for future research 
 
There is a need for more case-studies focusing on perceptions of aid to allow for 
further assessment of the utility of using aid for both development and non-
development purposes.  Exploring the following ideas as future research strategies 
can facilitate attainment of this goal.   
 
First, more case-studies of aid are needed, especially of other relationships where twin 
nation-building and realist goals exist.  Candidates would include US aid to Egypt, 
US aid to Iraq (post Arab Spring, since Iraq’s cooperation in third countries, such as 
Syria, is now required), and Australian aid to Indonesia. 
 
Second, more work is needed to provide insights into Pakistani perspectives of aid.  
As a majority Muslim country in a location of significant geo-strategic importance, 
Pakistan will continue to be a country of significant importance to the United States 
and the West.  It would be useful to explore further case studies of public opinion of 
aid at the provincial level, to better understand the impact and irritants of US aid.  
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Third, the declining influence of the United States and the rising influence of China 
will significantly impact the geo-political outlook in the region over the next 10-20 
years.  Trilateral comparisons between US, Pakistani and Chinese elite opinion would 
help policy makers to develop a better understanding of potential gains and 
flashpoints in the region.    
 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
 
The Cold War is long over, but the lessons of the Cold War should not be forgotten 
when we study aid in the post 9/11 era.  With ever widening zones of instability and 
conflict around the world, the trade-offs between the realist and nation-building 
objectives of aid are only likely to become more rather than less important.  It is 
hoped that, in this context, this thesis makes a useful contribution not only to the 
study of aid to Pakistan, but to the study of aid in the post 9/11 era more broadly. 
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